

The Growth of Jobless Households and the Polarisation of Employment in Australia

By Peter Dawkins*, Paul Gregg# and Rosanna Scutella*
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* Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research,
The University of Melbourne

University of Bristol, H.M. Treasury and Centre for Economic Performance, London
School of Economics

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Abstract

While employment levels in Australia have improved from the low levels experienced after the recession in the early 80's, the available work has become increasingly polarised into either all-work or no-work households. Over 16 per cent of working age households had no adult member in paid work in 1997/8, while nearly 1 in 6 children lived in such households. Indeed, the incidence of jobless households with children is one of the highest in the OECD.

Increasing employment concentration within households has a direct impact on inequality and poverty with seventy per cent of jobless households with incomes in the lowest quintile. Even more worrying is that over seventy four per cent of jobless households with children are in the poorest quintile.

Growing trends in household joblessness can, in part, be explained by the changing structure of households. In particular there has been a shift towards single-adult households. Of at least equal importance however, has been the polarisation of employment within household types.

The dominant household type in seeing employment polarised into either all-work or no-work households are couple households with children. Shifts in employment away from less educated men and toward prime-age better educated women, explains about 40% of the adverse shift against couples with kids. Lone parents have gained employment over this period at a faster rate than the average worker but are failing to keep up with prime-age women who contribute to the growing number of couples where both adults work.

Hence, there is a large shift in patterns of employment in households with children, away from a dominant single male earner model toward more dual-earner and no-earner (couple and single) households with children.

This dramatic polarisation of work and incomes for households with children is likely to have consequences for welfare costs and child opportunities in the next generation.

1. Introduction

Although aggregate OECD employment rates have recovered from the 1980s recession lows, there has also been an upward trend in the number of jobless households in the majority of these nations (OECD, 1998). Thus, the aggregate unemployment rate, or employment rate based on individual data, may not fully capture the evolving economic and social impact of joblessness on families. Both Australian and overseas studies have shown that the burden of unemployment, or more generally joblessness, is concentrated in certain households (for eg. Dawkins, Gregg and Scutella, 2001 and forthcoming; Dawkins, 1996; Miller, 1997; Gregg and Wadsworth, 1996a, 1996b and 2000; OECD, 1998; Gregory, 1999). Furthermore, this concentration has become more pronounced while employment levels have risen, so that a growing proportion of those not in work at any point in time are located in households with no earned income. Hence, a growing proportion of households are dependent on savings, transfers from other households or, more often, from the state for income. Coinciding with this increase in the concentration of joblessness within households has been an increase in the number of households with two or more workers in them (Dawkins, 1996; and Gregory, 1999).¹

Thus, employment is becoming increasingly polarised into all-work households and no-work households. This has direct implications for inequality and poverty with the vast majority of those in jobless households, including nearly one in six children, living on low incomes. The aim of this paper is to examine the changing distribution of employment and determine what has caused this uneven dispersion of employment towards households in society who already receive earnings, leaving others jobless and essentially dependent on Government support. We wish to establish the relative contribution of aggregate changes in employment, household composition and the changing distribution of work for given household types in driving this phenomenon. Then to assess how wider shifts in patterns of employment by gender, age, education, region and immigrant arrival status relate to jobless households.

The recent McClure Report on Welfare Reform (Reference Group on Welfare Reform, 2000a and 2000b) emphasised that the growth in jobless households and families over the last two decades was a major motivation for their recommendations, and that substantially reducing the number of jobless households and families should be one of three targets for reform. A second target was to reduce substantially the number of people who rely heavily on income support. A substantial reduction in jobless families would also impact on that target.

The McClure Report emphasised that reducing jobless families would not only be a major improvement for society at the time, it could be expected to have positive inter-generational effects. McClelland et al (1998) state that there is evidence to suggest that the likelihood of a young person completing secondary school and finding secure employment is affected by their parent's socio-economic background. Longitudinal social security data show that, between the ages of 16 and 18, young people from income support recipient families are much more likely than other young people to become parents at an early age, leave school early, receive income support and be highly income

¹ As overseas studies concentrate on the household as opposed to the family or the income unit we similarly focus on the household for comparative purposes.

support reliant themselves (Pech and McCoull, 1999). For all of these outcomes but the first, the risk is highest for young people whose parents have received income support continuously for at least two years.

In this paper we bring together the outcomes of two earlier pieces of work, the first which examined the relationship between household and individual joblessness and patterns across certain demographic groups in some detail, and the second which focused on measuring the extent of employment polarisation after accounting for general trends towards smaller households and changes in individual employment levels (see Dawkins Gregg and Scutella, 2001; and Dawkins et al, forthcoming; respectively). In measuring the polarisation of employment we initially measure the deviations from a benchmark world where the available work is randomly distributed across all working-age adults, as was proposed by Gregg and Wadsworth (2001). Following them we extend this approach to allow for variations in employment rates across various subgroups of the population to determine what observed factors are driving this polarisation.

This paper finds that joblessness has become concentrated in particular households, especially households with children. This has been so strong that jobless households have become more prominent while employment levels increased. Part of the explanation, for the growth in jobless households, lies in the changing structure of households. In particular there has been a household compositional shift towards single-adult households, both with and without children. Of at least equal importance however, has been the polarisation of employment within household types. Indeed, a large majority of the polarisation of employment within household types is found within two-adult (couple) households, particularly those with children. Nearly two thirds of the increase in polarisation for households of a given size comes from couples with kids.

Relaxing the random distribution of employment assumption and allowing for varying employment rates across the key subgroups of the population by which employment is known to vary, shows that the shifts in employment across these groups goes part of the way in explaining the concentration of joblessness within certain households, especially for couples. However, even after conditioning for characteristics there remains an unexplained component. This is most pronounced for couple households with children and for households renting privately. In conjunction with this, we also find an increase in the all-work household rate also almost entirely emanating from couples and again focused on couples with children. Hence, the employment circumstances of families with children has born the brunt of employment polarisation.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of the patterns and trends in the incidence of jobless families between 1982 and 1997/98 while the overlap between household joblessness and low income is explored in Section 3. Section 4 tries to determine the driving force in the growth of no-work and all-work households by using individual employment rates to measure the polarisation of employment in Australia. Households facing particular disincentives to offer labour supply at the bottom end of the distribution, households with children and households in private rental property, are the focus of our attention in Section 5. Concluding comments and policy implications are offered in Section 6.

2. Incidence and trends in jobless households

Previous studies have shown an increase in the incidence of both unemployed households (Miller, 1997) and jobless households (Dawkins, 1996, and Gregory, 1999) over the last two decades in Australia. The following section explores the incidence and trends in jobless households using the 1982, 1986 and 1990 Income Distribution Surveys and the 1994/5, 1995/96, 1996/97 and 1997/98 Income and Housing Costs Surveys released by the Australian Bureau of Statistics as Confidentialised Unit Record Files (CURF's).

This analysis refers to adults as individuals of working age not in full-time study, where working age is defined as 15-64 years for males and 15-59 years for females. We refer to the reference person (or head of household in the 1982 and 1986 IDS data) as the nominated head of household. Note that the ABS definition of a reference person/head of household is the male partner in a couple household, the parent in a lone-parent household and the person in a single-person household. Dependent children are defined as all children less than 15 years plus full-time students living in the household under the age of 18 years. This differs from the current ABS definition and reflects our focus on households with children.

A jobless household is defined as a household where no working-age adult is in paid employment. Thus, household members in a jobless household can be either unemployed or not in the labour force. Full-time students are excluded as their economic inactivity is a productive investment in their future and thus does not reflect the same degree of social distress or exclusion. Likewise, and for similar reasons, households with heads of retirement age are also excluded.

Table 1 shows the aggregate employment rate (the individual non-employment or jobless rate is then calculated as one hundred minus the employment rate) and the overall incidence of jobless households from 1982 to 1997/98. Aggregate employment recovered between 1982 and 1990 after the early 80s recession. Since then it has remained broadly unchanged. By contrast, there has been a near continuous growth in the overall incidence of jobless households, from 12.7 per cent in 1982 to 16.3 per cent in 1997/98. This rise in jobless households mirrors the increasing number of households where a member is claiming one of the three major income support payments (unemployment, disability and lone parenthood). Here there may be an earner present and so the shares are higher than for jobless households. The Reference Group on Welfare Reform noted that between 1986 and 1996 the proportion of workforce-age income units with at least 90% of their income from government cash payments rose from 11.9 to 14.1% (Reference Group on Welfare Reform, 2000c, p.28). Again this was a period over which employment rose. So the rise in jobless households is mirrored in terms of rising welfare dependency. Table 1 also shows the proportions of working-age adults and the proportion of dependent children in jobless households. Both of these have also risen over the period, with the proportion of dependent children in jobless households rising at a notably faster rate. The proportion of children in jobless households rose by 5 percentage points to 15 percent (or nearly 1 ½ times its 1982 level). Labour force data published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (1999) suggests that the upward trend in the number of children living in jobless

families has continued over recent years with about 860,000 (17.4 per cent) dependent children living in jobless households in June 1999².

Table 1: Comparison of employment rates and jobless household rates, 1982 to 1997/98

	Employment rate %	Recipient rate of major Income Support Payments	Jobless households		Working age adults in jobless households		Dependent children in jobless households	
		%	n	%	n	%	n	%
1982	70.4	15.4	558,343	12.7	801,352	9.5	424,295	10.2
1986	71.9	14.9	641,127	14.9	925,112	10.8	496,474	11.5
1990	74.2	15.8	649,466	14.2	948,166	10.5	511,367	11.4
1994/95	73.1	20.4	751,886	15.5	1,112,880	11.8	616,341	14.2
1995/96	74.3	20.9	754,398	15.1	1,068,740	11.2	565,060	12.9
1996/97	72.8	22.9	821,939	16.8	1,161,142	12.3	686,529	15.6
1997/98	73.7	21.3	819,442	16.3	1,165,596	12.1	660,242	15.0

Figures 1 and 2 draw on the data published by the OECD and place Australia in the international context (OECD, 1998). The OECD estimates of jobless households for Australia in 1996 match ours closely, at 16%. Australia in the data has a lower share of households that were jobless than is common in most developed nations, but perhaps the most striking feature is just how little variation there is across countries despite the wide variations in employment patterns. This commonality disappears however, when households with children are considered. Here Australia, along with other English speaking countries other than the US, has an unusually high incidence of children growing up in households with no adult working. Only the UK and Ireland have larger proportions of children in jobless households and this is also true for both single parent and couple households. According to the OECD some 70% of jobless households had incomes in the bottom quintile of all Australian households but details across families with children were not developed. We explore the relationship between income and household joblessness further in the next section. The OECD study also explored changes between 1985 and 1996. Many OECD countries, including Australia, experienced rising shares of jobless households while employment also rose. This implies that the available work is going to other households, and indeed in Australia the share of couples where both work has risen from 49% in 1982 to 59% in 1997.

Table 2 outlines the shifting circumstances of the jobless household population. Jobless households in the table are captured in the first category they fall under. Therefore, the first column reports the proportion of jobless working-age households where there is an

² In the labour force data dependent children are defined as children under 15 plus dependent students aged 15-24.

unemployed person resident, with the second column reporting the proportion of lone-parent jobless households who are not represented in the unemployed category, the third the proportion with a permanently unable to work member who are not represented in columns one or two, and so on. Households with an unemployed person are offering labour supply but are constrained by opportunities in the labour market. Here we see that the full impact of the early eighties recession had not yet fed through to unemployment rates in 1982 and as such the proportion of jobless households with an unemployed resident only fell slightly by 1986, with an overall increase between 1982 and 1990. This then fell after the early nineties recession, tapering off to remain fairly steady over the mid to late nineties. This is coupled with quite a significant and consistent increase in the proportion of the unemployed resident in jobless households, thus although the proportion of jobless households with an unemployed member does not change significantly over the general period, the unemployed have become increasingly concentrated in particular households (see Dawkins et al, 2001).

With unemployment being increasingly concentrated in certain households, the majority of jobless households are not offering labour supply. Columns 2 to 5 of Table 2 show the changing characteristics of households not offering any labour supply. Lone parents not in the labour force increase slightly over the period, while the proportion of jobless households with a person resident who is permanently unable to work has consistently risen over the period³. Early retirement does not seem to be a significant factor in explaining the increase in the jobless household rate as the proportion of jobless households with a member over 50 years and not in any of the other jobless categories actually declines over the period. Labour Force data also shows us that the trend towards early retirement for males actually stabilised in the early 1980s, which is when our data begins, therefore we would not expect that this early retirement trend would explain much of the increase in the jobless household rate over this period.

Thus, the key point from this table is the stability in the primary source of joblessness within these households. While the permanently unable to work has clearly increased, they remain a very small portion of the jobless population.

³ The question in the surveys enabling identification of those permanently unable to work changed between the Income Distribution Surveys and the Income and Housing Costs Surveys therefore we expect that part of the rise between the proportions in this category between 1990 and 1994/95 was due to this. However, we still expect the increasing prominence of households in this category to be apparent.

Figure 1: Jobless household rate by country (OECD – 1996)




Figure 2: Jobless household rate by country for households with children (OECD – 1996)




Table 2: Hierarchy of jobless households by primary source of joblessness, 1982 to 1997/98¹

	Unemployed person resident	Lone-parent households not in the labour force	Permanently unable to work person resident	Person resident 50 years plus	Other jobless households	Total jobless households
1982	31.3	15.3	0.7	40.3	12.4	518,324
1986	29.2	17.2	0.3	41.5	11.8	641,127
1990	36.9	16.1	1.0	36.3	9.7	649,466
1994/95	35.8	16.5	2.5	35.1	10.2	751,886
1995/96	32.9	18.6	2.2	31.8	14.5	754,398
1996/97	32.5	20.2	2.6	32.7	12.1	821,939
1997/98	32.5	17.7	3.7	32.6	13.5	819,442

1) Note that the table reads with jobless households represented in the first category they fall under. That is the first column reports the proportion of jobless working-age households where there is an unemployed person resident, the second column the proportion of lone-parent jobless households who are not represented in the unemployed category, the third the proportion with a permanently unable to work member who are not represented in columns one or two, and so on.

3. Income Distribution of Jobless Households

Perhaps the most important ramification of the divergence between the individual - and household - based pictures of joblessness is low income. Figures 3 and 4 show incomes of jobless households overall and then with children, respectively, by their relative deciles in the income distribution. The measure of income used is total household equivalised disposable income, with only the working-age population included in the base⁴. The equivalence scale used is that proposed by Whiteford (1985) and uses the scaling 1 for the first adult, 0.52 for second and subsequent adults and 0.32 for each child. Jobless households are predominately located in the first two deciles, with 70% of all jobless households and 75% of those with children among these poorest households. There is an evident shift in the distribution of jobless households from the poorest decile to the second decile over the period. This is perhaps even more pronounced in Figure 4 for households with children where households seem to be shifting to the second and, to a lesser degree, third deciles. This suggests that an increase in the generosity of social security payment to households with children, particularly with increases to family payments over the period, has alleviated some of the financial strain from jobless households. What is worrying is that there remain over seventy four per cent of jobless households with children in the poorest quintile.

⁴ All losses are treated as zero in the calculation of total income due to the lack of information on negative incomes in the 1982 IDS.

Figure 3: Income Distribution of Jobless Households, 1982 and 1997/98






Figure 4: Income Distribution of Jobless Households with Kids, 1982 and 1997/98



Although jobless lone-parent households tend to have lower incomes than jobless couple households with children, this difference has been largely eradicated by 1997//98 with increases in payment levels available to lone parents over the years (see Figure 5). Both household types have experienced shifts in the income distribution from the poorest decile to the second decile between 1982 and 1997/98. We would thus expect that the growth in the incidence of jobless households would have caused an increase in income inequality, particularly for households with children.

Figure 5: Income Distribution for Jobless Lone-parent households and Couple Households with Kids, 1982 and 1997/98



4. Employment polarisation

The previous sections show that household joblessness has become more prominent in Australian society over the last two decades with a substantial increase in the number of children growing up in households with no adult in paid employment and on low incomes. If increasing household joblessness has its origins in changes in household structure toward units where labour supply has always been low then policy makers may need to look at trends in family break-up and household formation as explanations of the rise in jobless households rather than on labour market opportunities and constraints on members of these households. Table 3 looks at the changes in household composition over the period. There have been clear shifts in the pattern of household composition with a 10 percentage point increase in the share of households containing only one adult, with corresponding declines in the share of both 2 and 3 adult households. Single-adult households without children make the majority of the rise in one-adult households rather than lone parents. As a result of this increase one-adult households make up approximately 60% of jobless households. Of course, larger households make up a much larger share of the population living in jobless households. One-adult households contain only around 40 per cent of working age adults living in jobless households and contain around half of children in such households.

Table 3: Change in household size, 1982-1997/98 (shares of all households containing working age adults)

	1 adult	2 adults	3+adults
1982	19.2	62.2	18.7
1986	23.6	59.6	16.8
1990	23.2	61.4	15.4
1994/95	26.3	58.6	15.2
1995/96	28.7	56.5	14.7
1996/97	28.4	56.4	15.2
1997/98	29.1	56.1	14.8
Δ 1982-97/98	9.9	-6.1	-3.9

Table 4: Share of jobless households in household type, 1982-1997/98

	1 adult	2 adults	3+adults
1982	53.0	41.5	5.5
1986	60.2	35.8	4.0
1990	59.0	37.2	3.8
1994/95	56.8	38.9	4.3
1995/96	62.8	33.8	3.5
1996/97	63.0	32.8	4.2
1997/98	61.7	35.1	3.2
Δ 1982-97/98	8.7	-6.4	-2.3

The tables above show that since 1982, while employment rates have risen, there has been a substantial shift toward smaller households and a rise in the number of jobless households. So we want to be able to address how the growing amount of work is distributed across the increasing number of households and to look for evidence of polarisation of work across households. There is a natural analogy with inequality measures for the distribution of income. However, a person's employment position is a discrete measure and standard inequality measures such as Gini coefficients are designed for continuous data. To explore the distribution of work across households we want a measure that is intuitive and can be decomposed in a way that allows identification of the origins of any developments. We follow Gregg and Wadsworth (2001) and measure polarisation as the deviation from a benchmark of available work being randomly distributed across individuals. So that for an employment rate of 75%, 1 in 4 individuals would not be in work if work were randomly distributed. For single-adult households then the individual and household jobless rate is the same and 1 in 4 will have no work for this benchmark. Likewise a couple will have a 1 in 16 chance of being workless. There is said to be negative polarisation where there are fewer than predicted jobless

households. This would occur in the traditional family if one adult works in paid employment whilst another, normally the woman, produces within the home. Positive polarisation is where there are more jobless or all working households that would occur from a random distribution of work. Appendix 1 provides the full technical details of how this measure of polarisation is constructed.

Table 5 provides the measures of polarisation using these methods. The predicted jobless household rate is driven by employment levels and the evolving family structure of households whilst the polarisation term measures the evolving deviation of the actual number of jobless households from that consistent with a random distribution of work across all working-age adults (which is also driven in part by relative shares of each household type). In 1982, the observed number of jobless households was only marginally higher than that predicted by a benchmark of randomly distributed work. There was thus little observed polarisation on this measure. Since then the predicted jobless household rate has broadly remained flat and the majority of the observed rise in workless households is attributable to the polarisation of work across households.

So since 1982 the predicted jobless household rate, given employment levels and household structure, has increased only fractionally by 0.3 percentage points. But the observed rate has increased by far more leading to a 3.3-point increase in measured polarisation. Using the relative measure, this equates to there being 40% more jobless households than predicted by the random distribution benchmark in 1997, up from 10% in 1982. Since 1982, polarisation has risen reasonably continuously, but the bulk of the deviation occurred prior to 1990.

Table 5: Employment polarisation, 1982 to 1997/98

	Actual jobless household rates	Predicted jobless household rates	Employment Polarisation
1982	12.7	11.5	1.2
1986	14.9	11.6	3.3
1990	14.2	10.3	3.9
1994/95	15.5	11.6	3.9
1995/96	15.1	11.3	3.8
1996/97	16.8	12.1	4.6
1997/98	16.3	11.8	4.5
Δ 1982-97/98	3.6	0.3	3.3

The predicted jobless household rate is driven by changes in individual employment rates and general changes in household composition, for instance if there is a general move towards smaller households, this will be picked up by our predicted jobless household rate. Likewise, polarisation need not be equal for all household sizes and so changes in

household shares will also affect our measure of polarisation if there are moves toward household types with a high propensity to be jobless (here this is single-adult households with children) this is likely to increase measured polarisation. These effects can be separated using basic shift-share analysis with the results presented in Table 6 (for technical details see Appendix 2). The apparent stability in the predicted jobless household rate is actually the result of two offsetting developments, rising employment between 1982 and 1997/98 would, every thing else held equal, reduce the number of jobless households by 2 percentage points. While an underlying trend in household structure toward more single-adult households has an opposite effect of broadly the same magnitude. The timing of these developments is such that the number of workless households should have fallen in the 1980s through the strong employment recovery but have risen in the 1990s from changing household structure.

Table 6: Decomposition of Changes in Predicted Jobless Household Rates and Polarisation, 1982 to 1997/98

	Change in predicted workless household rate	Impact due to changes in household composition	Impact due to changes in employment rate	Change in polarisation	Between household type decomposition	Within household type decomposition
1982-1997/98	0.3	2.3	-2.0	3.3	0.5	2.8
1982-1990	-1.2	1.0	-2.2	2.7	0.3	2.5
1990-1997/98	1.5	1.2	0.3	0.6	0.4	0.2

Columns 4 to 6 of Table 6 make clear that movements toward more single-adult households exert a very modest upward pressure on the measure of polarisation, with 85% of the rise in polarisation coming from an increased propensity for joblessness within household types. Three quarters of the 2.8 within household polarisation noted in Table 6 comes from 2 adult households (couples). Further decomposing this by breaking each household size by presence of children suggests that 65% of the within group polarisation affects couples with children (this is explored more fully later). Also shown in the table is that, while it seems that the majority of the employment polarisation across households occurred primarily in the 1980s, changes in household structure were more pronounced in the 1990s.

Figure 6 offers a summary of this information. The decomposition of the predicted jobless household rate tells us that the increase in single-adult households assuming employment is distributed randomly would, given employment levels in 1982, have led to a 2.3 point increase in the jobless household rate. As single-adult households, particularly those with children, traditionally have employment rates lower than those predicted by a random distribution of employment, a shift towards smaller households would also lead to a 0.5 point increase in employment polarisation (this is the between household component of the decomposition). So moves toward smaller households with

traditionally weak employment chances are of a roughly equal magnitude to the within household size polarisation effect, with both adding about 2.8 percentage points to the jobless household rate. Of the polarisation within household types, the bulk (75%) of the rise in jobless households falls on two-adult households (couples), especially couples with children.

Figure 6: Summary of decompositions of predicted jobless household rates and polarisation assuming random distribution of work

	Actual jobless household rate	Predicted jobless household rate	Polarisation		
1982	12.7	11.5	1.2		
1997/98	16.3	11.8	4.5		
Change	3.6	0.3	3.3		

Changes due to household composition		Between household			Within household		
Employment effects	-2.0	0.5	2.1	0.6	2.1	0.1	
	2.3	(15.5%)	(74.8%)	(23.0%)	(84.6%)	(2.2%)	

Individual Characteristics

The observed polarisation within household types may be just a representation of a polarisation in another dimension. If household members have similar characteristics then inequalities in labour market opportunities along the lines of these characteristics will bring a coincident polarisation by household. The most obvious is by region, for all household members reside at the same address then if that is an area of low employment, all household members are likely to have a lower propensity to be in work. In the context of couples the process by which members share common characteristics is called assortative mating. This kind of ‘assortative mating’ would tend to make joblessness concentrated on particular households if joblessness is more apparent in certain sections of the population.

To explore the importance of common characteristics we relax the assumption of randomly distributed employment across all working-age adults by allowing the predicted individual non-employment rates to vary by gender, age, qualifications and region (see

Appendix 3). This allows us to see whether changes in employment patterns across regions, skill and age groups over the last twenty years lie behind the observed polarisation of work.

This helps clarify the extent to which polarisation rises if either (a) multi-adult household members have common characteristics across which employment varies substantially or (b) single-adult households have characteristics which are associated with low employment probabilities. Having accounted for a set of observable characteristics, any residual conditional polarisation would suggest that jobless households form because all members of certain households suffer reduced access to work relative to others with similar characteristics.

The characteristics we use to differentiate between varying employment rates are region (4 groups: NSW, ACT and NT; Victoria and Tasmania; Queensland; WA and South Australia), capital city, gender, age (4 groups; 15-24 years, 25-34 years, 35 to 49 years and 50 years plus), education (3 groups; university education, other post secondary and no post secondary) and we also differentiate for recent arrivals. Recent arrivals are defined to be all arrivals during and after 1970 in the 1982 and 1986 surveys, all arrivals during and after 1975 for the 1990 survey and all arrivals during and after 1981 for the 1994/95 to 1997/98 surveys. To predict the jobless household rate we then use one characteristic at a time and then combine, see Table 7.

Table 7: Comparison of actual vs. predicted jobless household rates, 1982 to 1997/98

	Actual jobless household rate	Randomly distributed employment	Predicted jobless household rate						
			Allowing for employment variations by:						
			Gender	Age	Education	Region	Capital city	Recent arrival	Combined
1982	12.7	11.5	10.1	12.0	11.2	11.5	11.5	11.5	10.2
1986	14.9	11.6	10.6	12.3	11.4	11.6	n.a.	11.6	11.0
1990	14.2	10.2	9.7	10.8	10.1	10.2	10.3	10.2	10.1
1994/95	15.5	11.6	10.9	12.0	11.4	11.6	11.6	11.6	11.1
1995/96	15.1	11.3	10.8	11.5	11.1	11.3	11.3	11.3	10.9
1996/97	16.8	12.1	11.6	12.4	12.1	12.1	12.2	12.1	11.8
1997/98	16.3	11.8	11.2	12.0	11.7	11.8	11.8	11.7	11.5
Δ 97/98-82	3.6	0.3	1.1	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.2	1.3

The table shows that allowing employment to vary by gender and education increases the predicted change in the jobless household rate. The other factors add relatively little. Allowing for gender variations actually lowers the predicted jobless household rates but does so more for 1982. Back then fewer women worked and male employment rates were higher. As most couples contain a man and a woman then allowing for gender differences predicts fewer jobless households. Since then employment has risen for women and fallen

for men and this effect has become less pronounced. Taken with the educational changes then this suggests that less educated men are losing employment whilst better educated women are gaining and these groups tend to live in different households. In combination these employment changes raise the predicted increase by around 1 percentage point, so even after conditioning two thirds of the polarisation remains. As was noted earlier, male employment and labour force participation rates for those aged over 50 years tended to stabilise in the early 1980s and thus we do not expect this group to be a significant driver of the polarisation over the entire period. However, the employment rate for males over 50 years did fall between the 1982 and 1986 surveys prior to stabilising and thus will be a contributing factor in the combined predicted however when looking at age as an individual component, this is outweighed by increases in female employment rates.

We can repeat the within and between-household decomposition, such as in Table 6, using the unexplained component of the polarisation as our measure of conditional polarisation. Thus, conditional polarisation is estimated by taking the difference between the actual jobless household rate and the combined predicted rate presented in the table. Figure 7 offers a summary of the conditional polarisation results. Again, the vast majority of this residual polarisation (77%) remains within household types. And, yet again, the bulk of this within-household type rise affects couples (60%) even though the percentage point deviation is greater for singles. So, taken together around half of the 2.3 point total rise in conditional polarisation derives from increases in joblessness conditional on characteristics among couples.

Shifts in the patterns of employment toward the better educated, the prime-aged and women can explain about one third of the observed unconditional polarisation. Thus, two thirds of the initial polarisation based on randomly distributed employment, cannot be explained by the observed characteristics of household members. So far we have explored the major characteristics by which employment varies. We can go further and explore whether this observed conditional polarisation varies by family circumstances that may be more clearly affecting labour supply. In particular we might anticipate the increase in conditional polarisation for one-adult households stems from the increasing number of lone parents who have traditionally low employment rates.

Figure 7: Decompositions of predicted jobless household rates and polarisation allowing employment to vary across subgroups of population

	Actual jobless household rate	Unconditional predicted	Conditional predicted	Conditional polarisation
1982	12.7	11.5	10.2	2.5
1997/98	16.3	11.8	11.5	4.8
Change	3.6	0.3	1.3	2.3

	Between household	Within household
	0.5 (23.0%)	1.8 (77.0%)

	1 adult	2 adult	3+ adult
	0.7 (40.9%)	1.1 (60.3%)	-0.0 (-1.2%)

5. Households with children and renters

In this section we explore employment polarisation for households with children and further. Financial incentives to enter into paid employment facing households with children and those renting privately differ widely from other household types. Lone parents are obviously exposed to additional constraints in offering labour supply as they are often the sole carer of their children. However, it is also the case that for couple households, when interactions between the tax system and the social security system are taken into consideration, couples with children can face substantial disincentives from one member entering into low paid, insecure work, and often it only pays off if both adults enter the labour force. This is even more pronounced if one takes into consideration the costs associated with employment, such as travel costs, and the loss of non-cash benefits such as concessions to utilities and transport etc. Households renting may act as a proxy for individuals with low lifetime earnings potential. Also, families renting privately may be entitled to Rent Assistance and thus face differing financial incentives to enter employment than other families. Either way they have worse incentives (lower wages and slightly higher benefits).

Households with children

In Table 8 we report polarisation by household size and the presence of children. The key feature of this table is the large increase in polarisation in households with children.

These are emphasised in Figure 8. Unconditional polarisation, based on the benchmark of randomly distributed employment, is heavily focused on couples (65% of the total change in unconditional polarisation within-households is driven by couples with children whereas for lone parents unconditional polarisation fell sharply). Conditioning on changes in employment across key characteristics shifts the emphasis toward lone parents. In 1982 lone parents deviated quite substantially from the average employment rate, but this was much lower given that they were mostly low-educated women and had other characteristics associated with low employment. Since then lone parents have gained ground in terms of employment against the average working age person, but lost ground relative to others with the same gender, age, education etc characteristics. In absolute terms, the change in conditional polarisation is the greatest for lone parents. However, as couples with children are a much larger group in the population, the 2.4 point increase in conditional polarisation for two-adult households with children accounts for 53% of the total change in conditional polarisation within household types, whereas lone parents account for just 13%. Conditional polarisation has also risen for single adults and couples without children to a smaller degree. The increasingly adverse situation of couples with children occurs right throughout the period. Although our sample period stops before the recent welfare reform process has had any chance of a noticeable impact. For lone parents and single/couples without children the conditional polarisation stabilises in 1990.


So allowing for the presence of children suggests that more of the 3.3 point increase in polarisation comes about through movements between household types, especially toward more lone parents. However, employment rates of lone parents have risen by around 9 percentage points over this period. The striking thing about allowing for the presence of children is the very poor employment performance of couples with children.

This is in line with the findings of Gregory (1999) that couple families with children have become much more prone to joblessness over the last two decades. With falling male employment rates matched by a growth in female employment, Gregory shows that over ninety per cent of the increase in female employment in couple families with children between 1979 and 1998 went to families where the male was already in employment. Our results also reinforce Miller's (1997) finding that couple families with young dependents are particularly prone to unemployment. Gregory and Hunter (1996) show that there is geographical dimension to this with two job families within major cities congregating together into areas of high socio-economic status and no job families grouping together into areas of low socio-economic status, especially in areas formerly reliant on manufacturing.

Table 8: Polarisation within household types by presence of children

		1 adult		2 adult		3 adult	
		Kids	No kids	Kids	No kids	Kids	No kids
1982	Actual	58.21	29.90	6.50	11.76	5.14	2.51
	Unconditional polarisation	28.64	0.32	-2.24	3.02	3.23	0.53
	Conditional polarisation	16.2	2.46	1.55	2.45	3.67	0.66
1990	Actual	50.82	31.22	6.56	12.03	5.53	2.13
	Unconditional polarisation	25.04	5.44	-0.08	5.38	4.16	0.85
	Conditional polarisation	18.88	4.96	2.48	3.92	4.21	0.59
1997/98	Actual	49.20	29.56	8.92	11.99	3.61	3.51
	Unconditional polarisation	22.89	3.25	2.00	5.07	2.13	2.19
	Conditional polarisation	19.49	4.40	3.94	3.51	2.12	1.84
$\Delta 1997/98-82$	Actual	-9.01	-0.34	2.42	0.23	-1.53	1.00
	Unconditional polarisation	-5.75	2.93	4.24	2.05	-1.10	1.66
	Conditional polarisation	3.29	1.94	2.39	1.06	-1.55	1.18

Figure 8: Polarisation for households with dependent children



Repeating the above analysis on all-work households shows that the increase in the jobless household rate for multi-adult households has coincided with a sharp increase in the share of couples and larger family units where all adults work. Even after conditioning on observable characteristics there is still a large unexplained element of the increase in dual-earner couples. These jobs are the mirror image of the polarisation producing more jobless households which includes the under performance of singles which counts as negative all-work polarisation. Again there have been sharp increases in couples with children where both adults work over this period whilst there has been a simultaneous increase in those where no adult works, even after conditioning on characteristics. Couples with children account for 70% of the within household size polarisation over this period whereas for couples without children it is just 11%.

Another dimension by which work incentives are affected over this period is renting. Renters, except those in public housing, can receive Rent Assistance in addition to their basic income support payment, which is withdrawn as incomes rise after other income support payments have ended. The reforms implemented in July 2000, with more generous family payments and their slower withdrawal, mean that renters lose this support far further up the income distribution than before. In Table 9 public housing units are excluded and so the numbers do not add up to the totals used before. Only around 5% of households are in public housing but in 1997/98 nearly 60% were jobless. Highlighted in Table 9 is that renting couples have always been more prone to joblessness, even after conditioning for other observable characteristics. However, since then conditional polarisation between renters and non-renters has diverged ever more sharply. With both couples and singles in rented accommodation seeing sharp increases in joblessness for given characteristics. Figure 9 emphasises the jumps in polarisation for single and couple


households in private rental accommodation. Over the period there has been little change in the share of households renting privately and other major characteristics have been conditioned on already. While it is probable renters have other unobserved characteristics against which there have been adverse shifts over this period, the results tend to imply that lower wages, poorer work records and worse financial incentives to work have had adverse consequences on households in the private rental sector.

Table 9: Polarisation within household types by rent paid¹

		1 adult Renting privately	Not renting	2 adult Renting privately	Not renting	3 adult Renting privately	Not renting
1982	Actual	25.01	36.74	9.28	7.10	7.41	2.31
	Unconditional polarisation	-4.56	7.17	0.54	-1.65	5.34	0.38
	Conditional polarisation	-2.39	6.54	3.22	0.48	5.89	0.60
1990	Actual	25.75	34.18	11.59	6.62	6.82	2.46
	Unconditional polarisation	-0.03	8.40	4.94	-0.02	5.53	1.14
	Conditional polarisation	1.36	6.48	6.31	1.08	5.53	1.00
1997/98	Actual	28.24	29.23	14.45	7.48	7.29	2.61
	Unconditional polarisation	1.93	2.92	7.53	0.56	5.91	1.22
	Conditional polarisation	5.13	2.41	7.74	1.22	5.48	1.04
$\Delta 1997/98-82$	Actual	3.23	-7.51	5.17	0.38	-0.12	0.30
	Unconditional polarisation	6.49	-4.25	6.99	2.21	0.57	0.84
	Conditional polarisation	7.52	-4.13	4.52	0.74	-0.41	0.44

1) Households in public housing have been excluded, as they are such a small group in the population.

Figure 9: Polarisation for households renting privately



6. Concluding comments and policy implications

Over the last fifteen years or so Australia has seen rising employment, shifts toward smaller households and more households with no earned income. This has implications for income inequality and poverty as jobless households are much more prone to low income than the general population. Most significantly the high, by international standards, and rising proportion of children that are in jobless households with low incomes is worrying. Hence it is clear that the vast majority of these jobless households can be thought of as experiencing social distress from the absence of earned incomes.

Comparing actual rates of household joblessness against a benchmark model predicting how many households would be jobless if employment was randomly distributed across the working age population, we examine whether Australia has seen a move to a world where the available work has become polarised into households with either all adults in paid work or no adults in paid work. This paper has used the Income Distribution Surveys and the Surveys of Income and Housing Costs from 1982 to 1997/98 published by the ABS to measure the extent of the polarisation of employment and examine which groups in Australia are the most disadvantaged. Trends in both ends of the spectrum have been examined (no-work and all-work households) but with an emphasis on no-work households as they are of greater importance to policy makers.

The shift in the composition of households towards more one-adult households, whose probability of being jobless is higher than for multi-adult households, has contributed substantially to this increase in jobless households. However, we have shown that employment growth over the years should have largely offset the effects of this shift in household composition. The diminishing numbers of jobless individuals have become concentrated in particular households. More multi-adult households with two or more earners have matched this increase in jobless households. Hence, it is fair to say that there

has been a marked polarisation of employment opportunities in Australia over this period. This polarisation against the benchmark of a random distribution of work has resulted in around 3.3 percentage points more jobless households, or around 170,000 extra largely poor and welfare dependent families. A large majority of the polarisation is within household types with most of the increase mainly falling on 2 adult (couple) households, particularly those with children. Relaxing the assumption of the random distribution of employment, and allowing for employment rates to vary across certain subgroups of the population, shows that changing variation in employment across groups explains about a third of the increasing employment polarisation. We have found that employment differences across gender and education groups add the most explanatory power to our conditional polarisation measure. Our analysis suggests that less educated men are losing employment while better-educated women are gaining, with these groups tending to live in different households. However, even after conditioning for characteristics there remains a large unexplained element. Exploring this further we have found that once the variation in employment across groups has been taken into account, polarisation is most pronounced for households with children (couples and lone parent) and for households renting privately.

Alongside this has been a growth in all-work households. Employment growth over the period and a move toward more single-adult households leads to a predicted rise in all-work households, however the actual extent of the rise in the all-work household rate was quite a significant amount higher than that predicted by these shifts. Most of the rise in polarisation when looking at all-work households occurs within multi-adult households. Again couples with children have seen large increases in dual earning. Hence taken together there has been a marked increase in the proportion of children living in households with no earner and in those with two or more earners.

It is important to note that the two elements behind the rise in jobless households happened in two rather different periods. The polarisation of employment primarily occurred in the 1980s, whereas the changes in household composition predominantly occurred after 1990. Hence the employment gains made after the early 1980s recession made no dent in the number of welfare dependent families, in fact jobless households continued to rise. This was due to a failure for this employment to reach these households. Whereas, after 1990, the continued rise was due to shifts in household structure toward single-adult households where employment rates are low. This still begs the question as to why single-adult households (with or without children) have such low labour supply.

Why might employment have become unevenly distributed into all-work or no-work households? A number of major changes have occurred over this period in the world of work. One of the most pertinent is the sharp rise in earnings inequality. This saw real earnings fall for low-wage men in the 1980s (See Borland, Gregory and Sheehan, 2001, for a discussion of this). This fall in real earnings was most pronounced at around the 25th percentile of the distribution, so there was a substantial crushing of the wage distribution just above the minimum wage. By contrast there were sharp increases in earnings for the more educated, especially more educated women over this period. Men with low earnings potential and women with high earnings potential tend to live in different households.

Our calculations after conditioning on gender and education show how this lies behind about one third of the observed polarisation.

This decline in the earnings power of less educated males coincided with increases in the replacement rates between incomes available when not working and those for taking a job at the minimum wage (see the McClure report, 2000). Indeed the conditional polarisation we observe falls disproportionately on families with children and renters. These groups face additional disincentives and constraints in taking low-wage employment. Renting also proxies low earnings potential and aspects of geographic location, as highlighted by Gregory and Hunter (1995). However, the difference in relative incentives between the first earner taking a low-wage job and those facing second earners remain marked particularly if one also takes into consideration various non-cash benefits which give social security recipients various concessions on pharmaceuticals, utilities and public transport. Australia (and the UK, the other country with a very high level of jobless households with children) is unusual in having no earnings related element in welfare payments combined with an individualised tax system. This means that work incentives vary among the jobless according to family structure (whereas earnings related payments make these broadly flat) and individualised tax systems give strong incentives for second earners relative to first earners.

The ongoing welfare reform process starting from around 1994 has addressed some of these issues. The separate treatment of partners with a partial individualisation of allowance payments, the JET programme for lone parents and greater emphasis and monitoring of job search by the unemployed are the longest standing elements of reform. More recently, financial incentives for families with children, especially with child-care costs, and a wider focus on motivating and helping all welfare recipients to find work are likely to reduce this problem after our period of study. In addition, we believe that improving basic education levels and reducing employer taxes on low-wage workers (France is having some success with this latter strategy recently) may provide useful support to these reforms. Over the next few years we should hopefully be able to assess whether this reform strategy has worked.

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8. Appendices

Appendix 1: Measure of polarisation based on random distribution of work

If n is the aggregate jobless rate for the population the probability of a household with i adults being jobless at time t is given by,

$$p_{it} = n_t^i \quad (1)$$

Now taking a weighted average of these rates across household types, with the weights given by the shares of household type i in the population, gives the aggregate predicted jobless household rate,

$$\hat{w}_t = \sum_i s_{it} p_{it} = \sum_i s_{it} n_t^i \quad (2)$$

So for a given employment level and family structure we get a prediction of the share of households with no or all adults in work if being in employment is a random state. Over time, this gives a neat decomposition of whether changes are down to changes in the predicted rate, which contains changing family structure and employment levels, or shifts in the extent that work is polarised across households. Polarisation is the deviation in the number of jobless or all working households from that predicted by the random distribution of work,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Polarisation}_t &= \text{Actual}_t - \text{Predicted}_t \\ &= w_t - \hat{w}_t \\ &= \sum_i s_{it} w_{it} - \sum_i s_{it} n_t^i \\ &= \sum_i s_{it} (w_{it} - n_t^i) \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Appendix 2: Shift-share decomposition of predicted jobless household rate and polarisation measure

We now proceed to decompose changes over time in both the predicted and polarisation measures in order to explore the source of any disturbance. To examine the change in the predicted workless household rate over time, we follow along the lines of Gregg and Wadsworth (2001) and use a shift-share breakdown adapting the decomposition slightly to take account of developments presented in Shorrocks (1999), which eliminates the need for a residual, or interaction, term. The change in the predicted jobless household rate between any two time periods can thus be decomposed into:

$$\Delta \hat{w}_t = \sum_i \Delta s_{it} n_t^i = \sum_i \Delta s_{it} (n_0^i + n_t^i) / 2 + \sum_i ((s_{i0} + s_{it}) / 2) \Delta n_t^i \quad (4)$$

where the two terms capture the impact of changes in family structure taking the average employment rate over the base period and end period, and changes in aggregate

employment taking the average household share over the base and end period, respectively. Hence, between any two dates the predicted component can be attributed to changes in household structure and changes in labour market performance as measured by the aggregate employment rate.

The change in polarisation can also be decomposed using shift-share analysis,

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta(w_t - \hat{w}_t) &= \sum_i \Delta s_{it} (w_{it} - n_t^i) \\ &= \sum_i \Delta s_{it} ((w_{i0} - n_0^i) + (w_{it} - n_t^i)) / 2 + \sum_i ((s_{i0} + s_{it}) / 2) \Delta(w_{it} - n_t^i)\end{aligned}\quad (5)$$

where the first term is the between-household type component and the second term measures the within-household type component of the observed polarisation. This tells us whether the change in polarisation is due to shifts in household structure towards household types who tend to have lower employment probabilities than their predicted benchmark, (term 1 on the right hand side of (5)), or due to employment opportunities worsening amongst all household types, (term 2). Term 2 can also be split into whether the within-household component is strongest amongst single-adult or multi-adult households.

Appendix 3: Measure of polarisation conditional on demographic characteristics

In our measure of conditional polarisation we allow the predicted individual non-employment rates to vary by gender, age, qualifications and region. Since the predicted rate, n_k^i , is now based on the average non-employment rate in group k, the predicted and actual rates for group k will converge the more disaggregated the population on which n_k^i is based. The degree of disaggregation used is, of course, arbitrary but does allow us to look at the major factors over which employment is known to vary. This conditional polarisation measure at any point in time, t , now becomes

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Polarisation}_t &= w_t - \hat{w}_t \\ &= \sum_{ik} s_{ikt} w_{ikt} - \sum_i s_{ikt} n_{kt}^i \\ &= \sum_{ik} s_{ikt} (w_{ikt} - n_{kt}^i)\end{aligned}\quad (6)$$

The extent that this count differs from the measure introduced in (5) is attributable to changing variation in employment across groups and any residual polarisation from (6) can be said to be conditional polarisation. Note that if employment dispersion across any factor lies behind the divergence between actual and predicted measures then disaggregating by this variable should reduce polarisation more. Since the average actual rate at any point in time, $\sum_{ik} s_{ikt} w_{ikt}$, is unchanged by disaggregation, the better the prediction, $\sum_{ik} s_{ikt} n_{kt}^i$, the lower the polarisation measure.