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**How Principals Affect Schools** 

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Mike Helal<sup>†</sup> and Michael Coelli<sup>‡</sup>

† Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research,
The University of Melbourne

‡ Department of Economics, The University of Melbourne

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Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research
The University of Melbourne
Victoria 3010 Australia
Telephone (03) 8344 2100
Fax (03) 8344 2111
Email melb-inst@unimelb.edu.au

WWW Address http://www.melbourneinstitute.com

#### Abstract

Recent studies in Economics have found that the idiosyncratic effect of school leaders may be an important factor in improving student outcomes. The specific channels through which principals affect schools are, with minor exceptions, still largely unexplored in this literature. Employing a unique administrative panel data set from the Victorian public school system, we construct estimates of the idiosyncratic effects of principals on student achievement. We do so using fixed effects techniques and turnover of principals across schools to isolate the effect of principals from the effect of schools themselves. More importantly, through annual detailed staff and parent surveys, we investigate several potential mechanisms through which individual principals may affect student outcomes.

**JEL classification:** I21

**Keywords:** Student achievement, school principals, value-added

## 1 Introduction

The Economics literature on school effectiveness has grown exponentially following initial findings that the home environment mattered most in determining student achievement (Coleman et al, 1966). This research has focussed on a number of areas over the years, initially on the effects of class size, education spending and teacher education, but more recently on school accountability, school choice, charter schools and the idiosyncratic effect of individual school teachers. The vast majority of studies of individual teacher effects find that teachers are an important input into student learning, yet observable teacher characteristics explain little of this effect. This research has been accompanied by, and equally spurred by, increased policy emphasis on evaluating teachers.

In the Education literature, while teachers are recognised to have large impacts on student learning, school principals have long been considered to be equally important (Leithwood et al., 2004; Leithwood and Jantzi, 2005; Day et al., 2009; Seashore et al., 2010). Amongst other attributes, this literature highlights the importance of instructional leadership, a key aspect of principals' jobs which involves building, managing and developing the teaching team. School leadership is also increasingly at the centre of recent education policies regarding "turnaround schools", where low-performing schools are restructured with new leadership.

In this study, we have two main objectives. To begin, we construct estimates of the idiosyncratic effect of school principals on student achievement using longitudinal administrative student test score data from public primary (elementary) schools in the Australian state of Victoria. We construct our estimates using individual student outcomes from standardised tests of reading and mathematics at grades 3 and 5. When constructing our estimates, we employ two specific estimation methods that isolate the effect of principals from the effect of schools themselves by focusing on changes in principals across schools only (principal turnover). The first estimation method we employ follows the within school variance decomposition approach of Coelli and Green (2012). This approach provides a direct test of whether or not there is significant variation in individual principal effects. The second method involves estimating principal fixed effects directly while allowing for school fixed effects. We then calculate the variance of these

fixed effects to provide a measure of principal effectiveness. This second method follows the majority of prior studies of principal effectiveness in the Economics literature, and provides an important input into our second main objective.

Our second main objective is to attempt to identify specific pathways by which individual school principals may affect the schools they lead and ultimately student achievement, our main measure of school outcomes (productivity). The effective practices of school leaders, and leaders more generally, remains largely unknown. This investigation is an early attempt to lift the veil and try to pin down those practices of leaders that are effective in raising staff and ultimately student performance. Understanding specifically how school principals affect schools is also central to identifying successful leadership practices and thus informing leadership training and selection.

The school and student data we employ is well-suited to this second objective. The Victorian Department of Education has conducted annual surveys of both staff and parents for many years. These surveys measure a range of factors potentially influenced by school principals. We then attempt to identify which particular changes in school factors are also related to improved student achievement. We focus on the precise timing of changes in school factors and student achievement to ensure as far as possible that the school factors are most likely to be driving student achievement. The staff survey data includes information on staff morale, staff interaction, the supportiveness of leadership, and goal congruence. These staff perceptions are important for understanding how leadership affects those staff that are ultimately responsible for raising student achievement. The parent survey data includes information on general satisfaction and environment, quality of teaching, "customer" responsiveness, student reporting and academic rigour. What is most interesting about these parental perceptions is that we find little evidence that such perceptions are related to improved student achievement on standardised tests.

Our research provides several contributions to the literature on whether and how school leaders affect student achievement. Principals in Victorian public schools have historically had considerable flexibility (autonomy) in how they run schools. Obtaining credible objective evidence on the individual effect of school principals on student achievement has only been a focus in Economics in the past five to ten years. The evidence to date, however, is based primarily on a handful of North American studies. This litera-

ture finds principals have a significant impact on student achievement as measured by standardised test scores. The estimated effects are roughly equivalent in size to the effect of individual school teachers. Principals have also been found to affect other outcomes including retention and graduation. Our estimates will provide both robustness to the effects found in the North American studies, as well as evidence on whether principals have larger effects in a jurisdiction with more principal autonomy.

Studies within Economics that attempt to uncover the pathways by which principals affect schools are rare and generally rather restricted in nature. As far as we are aware, only the studies by Bohlmark et al. (2015) and Dhuey and Smith (2014b) attempt to estimate any such pathways using methods that are robust to unobserved differences across schools. These studies, however, generally focused on "pathways" measured using the observable characteristics of each school's teaching workforce. Our data (specifically the staff and parent surveys) allow us to investigate a much wider set of school factors.

Previewing the results, we find principals in Victoria have significant effects on student achievement that are comparable in size to those estimated in the North American studies. A one standard deviation improvement in principal quality is related to 0.09 to 0.16 of a standard deviation improvement in student achievement. School principals also have significant impacts on a range of school factors associated with teaching, learning and school management. Linking these changes in school factors to measures of student achievement reveal specific pathways by which principals are likely to affect student learning. These factors include improving the sense of goal congruence among teachers, professional interaction amongst staff, and increasing staff professional development opportunities.

This paper is organised as follows. The literature related to this study is discussed in Section 2. The student achievement and survey data we employ are detailed in Section 3, along with a description of the Victorian public school environment and details of the school principal movements we employ in identification. The strategies we employ to estimate principal effectiveness are described in Section 4. Our main estimates are provided in Section 5. A discussion of the results and potential policy implications is presented in Section 6. Concluding comments are provided in Section 7.

## 2 Related Literature

The importance of school principals has been widely recognised in the Education literature. In an extensive review, Leithwood et al. (2004) report that principals successfully impact schools by setting directions, developing people, redesigning the organisation and managing the teaching and learning program. Leithwood and Jantzi (2005) reviewed 18 studies of transformational schools, finding consistent evidence of principals' positive effects on student engagement. Day et al. (2009) concluded that school leadership was second only to classroom teaching in influencing student learning in effective UK schools. Seashore et al. (2010) concluded that collective leadership had significant effects on student achievement directly as well as indirectly via influencing teachers in US schools. Research on effective targeted school interventions also frequently observed that principals played an important role in nurturing the environment required to achieve targets (Barry, 1997; International Reading Association, 2007; Western Australian Department of Education, 2013).

Unlike teachers, who have largely consistent job descriptions across school jurisdictions, principals often work in quite differentiated environments. In cross-country comparisons, Hanushek et al. (2011) and the OECD (2013) report that a wide range of decision-making powers are vested in principals across and within countries. Both studies conclude that principal autonomy is mostly associated with positive student outcomes under certain conditions. These conditions include a combination of devolved responsibilities, the schools' capacity to assume these responsibilities, and the extent of accountability in the schooling system.

Within the Economics literature, studies of the idio-syncratic effect of individual teachers on student performance have been plentiful over the past 10 to 15 years. Examples include the early influential studies of Rockoff (2004) and Rivkin et al. (2005), to more recent additions such as Chetty et al. (2014). Yet despite the Education literature putting considerable emphasis on school leadership, studies of principal effectiveness within Economics are still relatively limited (see below). One key point of difference between Education and Economics studies of both teacher and principal effectiveness is the focus within Economics on sharp identification of individual effects by separating the

teacher / principal effect from the effect of the school. Such identification generally relies on changes of teachers across classrooms, and changes of principals across schools.

Coelli and Green (2012) estimate the effect of school principals on high school graduation probabilities and grade 12 English scores using data from British Columbia (BC) in Canada. The authors find that principals have little effect on graduation rates, but a one standard deviation more effective principal is associated with English exam scores that are 1.64 percentage points higher using principal "fixed effects" methods. The authors also construct estimates using "dynamic models" that allow the effectiveness of principal's to grow (for good or bad) over time. These estimates implied that principals took several years to have their full effect on student outcomes.

Using data on student achievement gains from grade 4 to grade 7 from BC Canada, Dhuey and Smith (2014a) find that a one standard deviation improvement in principal quality is associated with a 0.29-0.41 standard deviation improvement in math and reading scores. Dhuey and Smith (2014b) find that a one standard deviation improvement in principal quality is associated with annual gains over grades three to eight in North Carolina of approximately 0.17 of a standard deviation in math and 0.12 in reading. Branch et al. (2012) find that a one standard deviation more effective principal is associated with approximately a 0.1 standard deviation annual gain in test scores in Texas public schools. Grissom et al. (2015) highlight the modelling complexities and stringent data requirements for estimating principal effects. Models that are consistent with other research in the field (using within-school variation only) produced estimates of 0.04 standard deviations in math and 0.02 in reading in terms of annual test score gains, using data from the Miami-Dade school district in Florida. While the estimates from these studies vary considerably, on average these studies find that principals can be equally as effective as individual teachers in raising student performance.

Economics research on the factors associated with principal effectiveness are also relatively rare. Branch et al. (2012) find the impact of principal quality to be larger in high-poverty schools. Both Brewer (1993) and Dhuey and Smith (2014a) find no relationship between principal experience and effectiveness. In contrast, Eberts and Stone

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>This finding is based on their estimates that also include school fixed effects, as the literature generally does.

(1988) and Clark et al. (2009) find principal experience is positively related to effectiveness. Corcoran et al (2012) find that principals trained in the New York City Aspiring Principals Program have positive effects on student outcomes. Clark et al. (2009), however, find mixed evidence on the effect of principal development programs on student achievement.

Economics research on the pathways by which principals affect schools appear currently confined to the studies by Bohlmark et al. (2015) and Dhuey and Smith (2014b). Bohlmark et al. (2015) employ data from Swedish middle schools, and attempt to investigate the relationship between various school factors and principal effectiveness. The factors they investigate, however, are confined to observable characteristics of the school's teachers: the proportion female, proportion certified, retention of teachers, long-term sick leave usage and wage dispersion. The authors find some significant relationships between their three main measures of principal effectiveness with teacher wage dispersion, the proportion of female teachers and the proportion of certified teachers, but with little consistency across measures. Dhuey and Smith (2014b), employing data from North Carolina schools, also investigate the relationship between principal effectiveness and teacher workforce characteristics, including teacher experience, education, certification, licensing and turnover. No consistent relationships were found.

We build significantly on these studies by investigating a number of school factors measured using staff and parent perceptions of schools collected in annual surveys. Thus we are able to investigate pathways that are not reliant on changes in the teaching workforce, which may or may not be under the direct control of the school principal. Principals in many public school systems are unable to fire teachers, and may also be restricted in their hiring choices.

# 3 Environment and Data Description

## 3.1 Victorian public school system

In this study, we employ administrative and survey data for government (public) schools from the state of Victoria - Australia's second most populous state. Two-thirds of Vic-

torian primary school students attend government schools, 22% are enrolled in Catholic schools and the remainder attend Independent schools (also private schools, often religious-based).<sup>2</sup> Non-government schools, particularly Independent schools, have traditionally enjoyed greater autonomy than most government schools (Productivity Commission 2012).

Individual school councils govern public schools in Victoria. At least one-third of council members must be elected parents, while Education Department representatives including the principal and other teachers can comprise no more than one-third of members. One of the main tasks of the council is to appoint the school principal. Public school principals in Victoria are generally employed on five-year contracts. Contracts can be renewed by council for a second five-year period, after which positions must be advertised. There are no restrictions, however, on the council renewing principal appointments after ten years, if the school council decides the current principal dominates other applicants.

In Victoria, the school principal is responsible for developing and implementing a budget to manage school resources, which are primarily obtained from the Victorian Department of Education and Training (DET), but also includes some locally raised funds. Principals are responsible for hiring and allocating staff, and are also expected to identify excess and under-performing staff, and are responsible for managing such staff in accordance with Education Department policy (Productivity Commission, 2012). Although a number of education systems have increased the decision-making responsibility and accountability of school principals, the autonomy of Victorian government school principals is high in national and international comparisons. Information collected as part of the 2012 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) revealed that Victorian government schools have above-average autonomy among OECD countries regarding responsibility for curricular and instructional decisions, as well as in managing financial and material resources and personnel (OECD, 2013).

# 3.2 Information on school principals

To reliably estimate the effect of school principals on schools and student outcomes, it is essential to isolate the impact of the principal from the impact of the underlying

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>At the secondary school level, 57% of Victorian students attend government schools, as a greater share enrol in Independent schools in particular at this level (DEECD 2014).

characteristics of the schools they run. Recent studies within Economics have employed estimation techniques that remove any observed or unobserved time invariant characteristics of schools. Identification of principal effects then relies on changes in the principals leading schools over time. The estimated effect of principals on school outcomes is then the difference in outcomes between principals leading the same school.

We began by constructing annual information on all principals leading Victorian public schools over the period from 1997 to 2011. This construction employed a quarterly database of Victorian public school administrative records collected by the DET since 1997. In some cases, more than one principal was recorded as leading a particular school at different quarterly intervals within a school year (which is equivalent to a calendar year in Australia). In order to allocate just one principal to a school in a particular year, we chose the principal who had led the school for at least half the year, with the outgoing principal chosen in case of ties.

Full employment histories within the Victorian public school system were constructed for these principals using the DET's Human Resource (HR) database. These profiles include information that dates back to as early as 1950. All HR-related status changes were captured, including changes in job classification, contract initiation or renewal, transfers and working hours.

Summary statistics for Victorian school principals are provided in Table 1. Of these principals, 47% were female, with a growing female proportion over time (left-hand panel of Figure 1). On average, these principals had nearly 24 years of experience in the Victorian public education sector prior to their first principal appointment. The average age at first appointment was 44, with 63% aged between 40 and 49. Movements between schools prior to becoming principals was common. The median principal had worked at 6 different Victorian public schools prior to becoming a principal. Less than 5% had remained at the same school since starting their careers, while 18% had worked at more than 9 schools. After being appointed as a principal, 52% had served at one school only up to 2011, while 25% had served at two schools and 11% at three schools. This observed distribution, however, is potentially a function of the specific time period covered (some observed principal careers may be right censored). The median number of schools served as principal among principals observed until retirement was two.

When we construct our estimates of principal effectiveness below, we isolate the effect of principals on student achievement from the effect of schools using changes in principals leading schools. In the right-hand panel of Figure 1, the percentage of schools each year with a new principal appears to be on a slight upward trend over the period, apart from a sharp decline in 2011. In a typical year, 15% of schools have a new principal starting. Only 22% of all schools had the same principal over the entire 1997-2011 period, while 37% experienced one change in principal, 28% had two changes and 11% three changes. The frequency of principal turnover is similar to jurisdictions where explicit principal rotation policies exist such as BC, Canada (Coelli and Green, 2012).

The prior positions of the majority of incoming principals could be identified in the DET HR data, with summary statistics provided in Table 2. On average, 55% of incoming principals were external appointments, with approximately half of those having served as principals in other schools, while the remainder were in teaching or administrative positions in other schools. Two-thirds of this external group promoted to principal upon appointment served as assistant principals in their previous school, while the remainder were in teaching positions. On average, 30% of new principal appointments are internal promotions, but this percentage fell over the period. Approximately 4% of new principal commencements observed were actually former principals at the same school. This group includes those who left for another school after serving as principal but then return, and those who return to the school after extended leave.<sup>3</sup>

To estimate the causal effect of principals using within school variation in leadership, principal changes must be unrelated to within-school changes in school characteristics beyond the control of the principal. It does not require principal turnover to be unrelated to fixed characteristics of schools, as we remove fixed school effects in the estimators we employ. However, it is useful to understand whether principal changes are related to school and principal characteristics. In Table 3, we provide estimates of models where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether a change of principal occurs in a school in a particular year. Each column presents a separate set of estimated coefficients, where

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>We could not trace the Victorian government school working history of 11% of new principals. These may be individuals hired from outside the system, including principals and teachers from private schools, other states or other countries.

the set of explanatory variables differs from column to column. These estimates are average marginal effects constructed from Probit model estimation.<sup>4</sup>

The estimates in the first two columns of Table 3 suggest principal turnover is marginally lower in more advantaged schools (higher parental Socio-Economic Status or SES) and lower in larger schools. Turnover is higher in secondary and combined schools than in primary schools, with little difference in turnover between non-metropolitan (regional) schools compared to schools in metropolitan areas. Regarding principal characteristics, there is scant evidence of turnover differences by gender, but consistent evidence of higher turnover among older principals. Finally, turnover is more likely among principals with longer tenure (linear turnover term including in column 1), however the relationship is not linear throughout (indicators for each year of tenure in column 2). Turnover is lower in the second and third years of tenure relative to the first year (the base category).<sup>5</sup>

In columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, we include average school achievement in grade 5 reading and mathematics exams as additional covariates, and focus on primary and combined schools.<sup>6</sup> Average school achievement in reading is essentially unrelated to principal turnover, but there is lower turnover in schools with higher mathematics achievement. By including measures of achievement, and excluding secondary schools, some of the other estimated effects change. There is now a larger negative effect of school size on turnover, a smaller negative effect of parental SES (which is strongly correlated with achievement), and a larger positive effect of principal tenure.

By only using within school variation in principals during estimation, we are potentially constructing lower bound estimates of the overall variation in principal effectiveness in the schooling system. Some schools may be able to attract principals of higher quality than others due to their underlying characteristics; for example, schools based in wealthy suburbs of large cities. In other schooling jurisdictions, non-random sorting of principals across schools has been observed. For instance, principals leading schools with a high proportion of low-income, low-achieving and non-White students have less experience,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Estimates from linear probability models were similar.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Estimates of turnover by years of tenure revealed slight spikes after 5 and 10 years, as expected given the 5 year contracts often used when employing Victorian Government school principals over the period.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Our estimates below also focus only on primary and combined schools, as we employ grade 3 and grade 5 test scores as our measures of student achievement.

less education and have attended less selective colleges prior to entering the workforce (Loeb et al., 2010).

While information on the education backgrounds of principals is not captured in our data, we can look at potential sorting across schools by principal experience. Relationships between principal experience and various school characteristics are presented in Table 4. While there is some evidence that principals at schools with the lowest level of achievement and with students from less-advantaged backgrounds (low parental SES) have less experience, the relationships are neither strong nor monotonic. There are stronger relationships between principal experience and the remaining four school characteristics in Table 4. Smaller schools, primary schools, schools located in remote areas and schools with lower proportions of students from non-English speaking backgrounds (NESB) tend to have less experienced principals. Note, however, that school size is strongly related to these other 3 characteristics. School size is lower among primary and remote schools, while it is higher among schools with a high proportion of NESB students.<sup>7</sup> Principals generally gravitated to larger schools over their careers as principal salaries are higher in larger schools.<sup>8</sup>

#### 3.3 Student achievement data

Our main measures of student achievement are individual scores on state-wide assessments of literacy and numeracy in Years 3 and 5 (primary school) from 1997 to 2007 in Victoria.<sup>9</sup> Testing took place in the first half of August each year. These assessments were scored against the state's Curriculum and Standards Framework (CSF), which described what students should know and be able to do in eight key areas of learning

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>NESB students are more likely in metropolitan schools, which are larger.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Approximately two-thirds of all principal switches we see in our estimation sample are principals moving to larger schools.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>The student assessment program in Victoria was known as the Learning and Assessment Project (LAP) up until 1999, then as the Achievement Improvement Monitor (AIM) program up until 2007. Australia-wide testing under the National Assessment Program - Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) replaced all such state-based tests in 2008.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>The Curriculum and Standards Framework (CSF) was replaced by the Victorian Essential Learning Standards (VELS) in 2006.

at each schooling stage. The average student was expected to improve their level of achievement by about one CSF level over a two-year period. Despite setting a centralised assessment framework, the DET continued to emphasise that decisions about curriculum organisation and delivery remained in the hands of schools (Victorian Curriculum and Assessment Authority, 2002).

Our main estimates of principal effectiveness are based on value added models of student achievement in two domains: reading and mathematics.<sup>11</sup> We focus on scores for those students who were assessed in both grades 3 and 5, and who can be matched over time. In total, 264,826 students were able to be matched over this period. This matching was undertaken using student name and school only, as no birthdate information was available. Approximately 72% of all students were matched.<sup>12</sup> The student level data includes information on school attended, gender, non-English speaking background (NESB), and Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander (ATSI) origin.

Summary statistics for the students we employ in our analysis are presented in Table 5, along with statistics for all students who undertook the same tests. On average, 15% of students had a language background other than English (Victoria is home to a large number of recent migrants to Australia) while approximately 1% were of ATSI origin. Consistent with the scoring of AIM against CSF levels, grade 5 average scores are approximately 1 point higher than those observed at the grade 3 level. The matched sample of students were less likely to be NESB or ATSI and had slightly higher test scores than all students.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Scores on tests of numbers and reading were also available. Scores for the numbers testing domain were highly correlated with mathematics scores at the individual student level. Scores for the writing testing domain were based on both a centrally set and marked component and a teacher set and marked component. Having a teacher assessed component in this domain made it less amenable to the type of analysis we undertake.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>If names were not unique within school and grade, no match was formed. Matches were only formed if the two tests were taken two years apart, thus students who repeated grades would not be matched and thus not included in the estimates.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>All these differences were statistically significant.

## 3.4 Staff and parent survey data

The main contribution of this analysis is the ability to explore some of the potential pathways by which principals can impact schools. We undertake this exploration by analysing changes in a range of school-level factors which principals can directly or indirectly influence. These school factors are measured using annual surveys completed by school staff (in June each year) and by parents of enrolled students. Generally all school staff were asked to complete the questionnaires, while a 20% random sample of parents were sent the questionnaire for completion. For more recent years, we have information on response rates, which for both the staff and parent surveys exceeded 70%.

Summary statistics for the school factors we employ in our investigation are provided in Table 6. Staff responses to individual survey questions were combined to produce measures on each school factor using a 100-point scale. We have information on the first four factors over the whole period from 1997 to 2007, and from 1998 to 2007 on Professional Growth. The summary statistics in Table 6 are provided for the last year in our investigation: 2007. The specific questions that were combined to construct each of these factors are listed in Appendix Table A1.<sup>14</sup>

The Parent Opinion Surveys (conducted in late July each year) sought parental perceptions of the school, staff and the extent of their own interactions with their children's school. Responses to individual questions were collected on a 6 or 7 point scale (depending on year), and were subsequently combined to produce an overall score for each factor on a 6 or 7 point scale.<sup>15</sup> The specific parental questions that form each of these factors are listed in Appendix Table A2. We have information on the first two factors over the whole period from 1997 to 2007, but only have information on the remaining four parental factors from 1997 to 2003.

While the absolute levels of these composite responses by factor may be difficult to interpret directly, what is clear in Table 6 is that there is significant variation across schools in these measures. We employ variation over time within schools in these composite scores to isolate the influence of individual principals on these school factors. We

 $<sup>^{14}\</sup>mathrm{We}$  do not have access to individual staff responses to specific questions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>As with the staff survey, we have been provided with the average school scores for each factor only, not individual responses to each question.

also investigate whether our measures of principal effectiveness identified using student test score gains are related to simultaneous changes in these school factors.

# 4 Empirical Strategy

Our first main objective is to construct measures of the idiosyncratic effect of individual school principals on student outcomes in Victorian Government primary schools. The key statistic is the variance of principal effectiveness or quality, in terms of their ability to improve student performance. Non-zero variation in measured principal effectiveness implies both variation in the quality of principals, and that principals can affect student outcomes. We construct our measures of the variance in principal effectiveness after removing the non-time varying influence of schools on student outcomes.

We construct our measures using two estimation techniques. Firstly, we employ the variance decomposition technique of Coelli and Green (2012), which is based on the technique employed by Rivkin et al (2005) to estimate teacher effectiveness. <sup>16</sup> Secondly, we construct estimates of each individual principal's effectiveness using standard regressions that include individual principal and school indicators. We then construct estimates of the variance of the estimated coefficients on the principal indicators after appropriate shrinkage to allow for measurement error (see Dhuey and Smith, 2014a, 2014b; Bohlmark et al, 2015). Both techniques assume that principals have a time-invariant effect on the schools that they lead. We allow these effects to differ across each school a principal leads, as principals may have different effects on different schools. <sup>17</sup> Note that only variation over time within schools in principal leadership is exploited by both techniques. Thus these estimators potentially provide lower bound estimates of the true dispersion in principal effectiveness (quality), as the average quality of principals may differ considerably across schools.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>Branch et al. (2012) also employ a variant of this technique when measuring principal effectiveness.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Some prior studies constrain principals to have the same fixed effect in each school that they lead.

## 4.1 Variance decomposition method

Construction of the variance decomposition estimator is as follows. Average student achievement  $\bar{A}_{st}$  in school s at time t is defined as a linear and additive function of a fixed school effect  $(\gamma_s)$ , the effect of the specific principal leading school s at time t  $(\theta_{st})$ , average student quality in school s and time t  $(\bar{\delta}_{st})$ , and a random error term  $(u_{st})$ , which is assumed independent of the other three components<sup>18</sup>:

$$\bar{A}_{st} = \gamma_s + \theta_{st} + \bar{\delta}_{st} + u_{st} \tag{1}$$

Constructing deviations from the within school over time mean removes the fixed school effect  $(\gamma_s)$ . Squaring both sides then yields:

$$(\bar{A}_{st} - \bar{A}_s)^2 = (\theta_{st} - \bar{\theta}_s)^2 + (\bar{\delta}_{st} - \bar{\delta}_s)^2 + 2(\theta_{st}\bar{\delta}_{st} + \bar{\theta}_s\bar{\delta}_s - \theta_{st}\bar{\delta}_s - \bar{\theta}_s\bar{\delta}_{st}) + (u_{st} - \bar{u}_s)^2 + \nu_s \quad (2)$$

where  $\nu_s$  denotes all the cross product terms of the random error deviations  $(u_{st} - \bar{u}_s)$  with  $(\theta_{st} - \bar{\theta}_s)$  and  $(\bar{\delta}_{st} - \bar{\delta}_s)$ . In expectation,  $\nu_s$  will equal zero, due to the assumed independence of  $u_{st}$ .

Equation 2 thus relates over time variation in average student performance within a school to variation in principal quality within the school, variation in average student cohort quality over time within the school, twice the co-variation of principal quality with average student quality, and within school variation in the random error  $u_{st}$ . Taking expectations of Equation 2 yields:

$$\sigma_{\bar{A}_s}^2 = \sigma_{\theta_s}^2 + \sigma_{\bar{\delta}_s}^2 + 2 \cdot \sigma_{\theta_s \bar{\delta}_s} + \sigma_u^2 \tag{3}$$

where the within-school variance in student outcomes  $\sigma_{\bar{A}_s}^2$  is a linear function of a term representing the within-school variance in principal effects  $\sigma_{\theta_s}^2$ , the variance of average student quality within a school  $\sigma_{\bar{\delta}_s}^2$ , twice the covariance of average student quality and principal quality  $\sigma_{\theta_s\bar{\delta}_s}$ , and the variance in the random error term  $\sigma_u^2$ .

Following Coelli and Green (2012), we invoke three more assumptions in order to identify the underlying variation in principal effectiveness. The main additional assumption is that the covariance of average student quality and principal quality within schools is zero  $(\sigma_{\theta_s\bar{\delta}_s} = 0)$ . This means that average student quality does not change at the same time as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>This error term is also assumed to be drawn from the same distribution across schools.

principals change within a school. It does not require that average student quality is the same in all schools. It just requires that changes in student quality do not occur at the same time as principals change. This assumption thus rules out good students moving to schools that have had a principal change, or principals being moved to schools where student quality is declining or rising. Ruling out student sorting appears reasonable since school enrolment in the Government sector is generally determined by local geographic catchment areas in Victoria. In addition, individual school boards choose the principal to hire in their school. The Victorian DET did not allocate principals to schools based on any strategic objectives.

The second additional assumption is that each principal p is drawn randomly with fixed quality  $\theta_p$  from a pool with common variance denoted by  $\sigma_p^2$ . We are primarily interested in constructing an estimate of  $\sigma_p^2$ , this common variance in underlying principal quality. This assumption of common variance does not rule out different schools attracting principals with different average quality. Schools in more preferable neighbourhoods may be able to attract principal applicants with higher quality on average than other schools. By removing school fixed effects, we are removing this potential source of variation in principal quality.

The third additional assumption is that students are drawn randomly from a distribution with common variance across schools. This assumption does not rule out schools attracting students of different average quality. Schools in more affluent neighbourhoods are likely to attract students from more advantaged backgrounds. Again, by removing school fixed effects, the effects of potential variation in average student quality on our estimates is removed. This assumption assures that the within school variation in average student quality  $\sigma_{\bar{\delta}_s}^2$  will simply be proportional to the inverse of the average number of students in the school sitting each test. There will be higher variation in average student quality in smaller schools.

The main intuition underlying this estimator is as follows. The variation over time in average student achievement in a school will be higher in schools where school leadership changes, other things being held constant. If a school is led by the same principal over a particular time period, the variation in principal effects  $\sigma_{\theta_s}^2$  within that school will be zero. If more than one principal leads the school, this variation will be positive.

Using the assumption that each principal's underlying quality  $\theta_p$  is drawn randomly and independently from a distribution with variance  $\sigma_p^2$  (i.e.  $E[\theta_p\theta_k] = 0 \ \forall \ p \neq k$ ), the within school variance in principal effects for any school s can be constructed as follows:

$$\sigma_{\theta_s}^2 = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T (\theta_{st} - \bar{\theta}_s)^2 = \sigma_p^2 \left[ \frac{1}{T} \sum_{p=1}^{P_s} q_p \left[ 1 + \frac{1}{T^2} \sum_{k=1}^{P_s} q_k^2 - \frac{2}{T} q_p \right] \right]$$
(4)

where the school is observed in our data for T years, where  $P_s$  individual principals serve at the school during that period, and where each principal serves for a spell of  $q_p$  years  $(\sum_{p=1}^{P_s} q_p = T)$ . This derivation is explained in more detail in the Appendix of Coelli and Green (2012).

The variance of principal effects within a school  $\sigma_{\theta_s}^2$  is thus the underlying variance of principal quality  $\sigma_p^2$  (our main object of interest) multiplied by a deterministic term measuring the amount of turnover of school principals within school s over the time period T. This principal turnover term will equal exactly zero if one principal leads the school over all years. It increases with the number of principals leading the school during the period, with the precise value also a function of how many years each principal leads the school.

We estimate the object of interest  $\sigma_p^2$  using a simple regression equation at the school level. We regress the variance in mean student outcomes across cohorts in each school  $\sigma_{\bar{A}_s}^{2}$  on the turnover term defined in Equation 4, the inverse of the average number of students in the school sitting the test  $n_s$  to control for variation in average student quality  $\sigma_{\bar{\delta}_s}^2$ ,  $\sigma_{\bar{\delta}_s}^2$  and a constant term to absorb  $\sigma_u^2$ .

$$\sigma_{\bar{A}_s}^2 = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot \text{Turnover}_s + \beta_2 \cdot 1/n_s + \varepsilon_s \tag{5}$$

The estimated coefficient on the turnover term  $\beta_1$  is our estimate of  $\sigma_p^2$ . The main advantage of this estimation method over our second method is that it provides a direct test of whether our estimate of underlying principal quality variation  $\sigma_p^2$  is statistically different from zero. Thus it provides a specific test of whether it can be claimed that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>In the estimates below, we remove the effect of a number of observable characteristics of students on achievement prior to constructing  $\sigma_{\bar{A}}^2$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>The correct control - which we employ below - is an adjusted measure of the inverse of cohort size that reflects the limited time horizon of our data. The correct control equals  $1/n_s - 1/(n_s \cdot T)$ , where  $n_s$  is the average size of the cohort sitting the test in each school.

principals affect student outcomes. It must be noted, however, that finding a positive estimate for  $\sigma_p^2$  requires both that principals can significantly affect student outcomes, and that there is significant variation in principal quality within the principal pool. Small or insignificant estimates of  $\sigma_p^2$  may not directly imply that principals have no effect on student outcomes. It may imply that there is little variation in principal quality (all are equally good at their jobs).

## 4.2 Fixed effects regression method

Our second method for estimating  $\sigma_p^2$  is more standard in the literature (Branch et al, 2012; Dhuey and Smith, 2014a, 2014b; Bohlmark et al., 2015). We begin by estimating a value-added model of student achievement as follows:

$$A_{ist} = \alpha_1 A_{ist-2} + \alpha_2 \mathbf{X_{ist}} + \alpha_3 \mathbf{Z_{st}} + \gamma_s + \theta_{st} + \tau_t + u_{ist}$$
 (6)

where  $A_{ist-2}$  is prior achievement of student i (noting the two year gap in testing in Victoria),  $\mathbf{X_{ist}}$  is a vector of student demographic characteristics,  $\mathbf{Z_{st}}$  is a vector of time-varying school characteristics,  $\gamma_s$  are school fixed effects,  $\theta_{st}$  are principal indicators,  $\tau_t$  are year fixed effects and  $u_{ist}$  is an idiosyncratic i.i.d. error term.

By including school fixed effects, we are again using turnover of principals in schools to isolate the effect of principals on student achievement from the potentially unobserved effect of schools themselves. We use the estimated coefficients on the principal indicators to construct a measure of the variance in principal quality. Of the three assumptions we invoked above for identification of the variance decomposition method, the first two are also essentially implied here.<sup>21</sup>

One potential source of bias in our estimates is if principals choose schools based on time-varying qualities of schools. For example, if certain principals tend to apply for jobs in schools where student quality is on an upward trend, this may bias our estimates of the effect principals on achievement. By controlling for the individual student and time-varying school characteristics that we have, we are minimising the potential bias from such principal sorting.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>The third assumption of common variance of student quality across schools can be weakened here without affecting consistency.

As noted by Coelli and Green (2012), bias in estimates of the variance of principal effects using either method could arise from non-random exit of principals from the principal workforce. If only the most effective and/or least effective principals choose to quit the principal workforce, this would bias up estimates of the variance of principal quality based on turnover of principals within schools. However, analysis of the main reasons why principals exit the system entirely in Victoria, as recorded in the DET HR database, suggest that exit is most often associated with retirement.

Estimates of the variance of principal effectiveness constructed using unadjusted coefficients on the principal indicators are subject to sampling error bias. Random year to year variation in test day conditions and in the quality of students are the main sources of such bias. Such bias is also likely to be larger in smaller schools. As cautioned by Kane and Staiger (2002), the variance of these estimated coefficients will overstate the true variance in principal effectiveness. To account for this bias, we follow the previous literature by employing an Empirical Bayes shrinkage technique. Using an appropriate shrinkage technique is also important when we estimate relationships between our measures of principal effectiveness and our measures of the effect of school principals on school factors. Estimation of such relationships using measures subject to sampling error bias will yield attenuated estimates. By using appropriate shrinkage techniques, such attenuation is avoided.

We use the specific shrinkage technique employed by Branch et al. (2012). The adjusted (shrunk) principal effect  $\hat{\theta}_p^*$  for principal p is constructed as follows:

$$\hat{\theta}_p^* = \left(\frac{V_T}{V_p + V_T}\right)\hat{\theta}_p + \left(\frac{V_p}{V_p + V_T}\right)\bar{\theta} \tag{7}$$

where  $\theta_p$  is the coefficient on the fixed effect for principal p from estimation of Equation 6,  $V_p$  is the estimated variance for that principal effect estimate,  $\bar{\theta}$  is the overall mean of all the estimated principal effects, and  $V_T$  is the estimate of the overall variance of the "true" principal effects. This shrinkage formula essentially pulls those estimates where the variance of the estimate  $V_p$  is large (an imprecise estimate, perhaps due to only a small number of students sitting the test) towards the overall mean  $\bar{\theta}$ .

To construct  $V_T$ , we begin by assuming that we observe a noisy estimate  $\hat{\theta}_p$  comprised of the true effect  $\theta_p^*$  plus a random disturbance  $\epsilon_p$ . If the true effect and the random

disturbance are independent, the variance of the true principal effect can be calculated as  $V_T = V_E - V_{\epsilon}$ , where  $V_E$  is the variance of the "noisy" principal effects  $\hat{\theta}_p$ , and  $V_{\epsilon}$  is the variance of  $\epsilon_p$ . We estimate  $V_{\epsilon}$  using the average of the variances of the estimated principal fixed effects  $V_p$ .

The main advantage of this second method over the variance decomposition method above is that it provides measures of the relative effectiveness of each principal compared to the other principals that led the same school over the estimation period. We use these measures of relative principal effectiveness to identify potential pathways by which principals affect student outcomes. To do this, we construct measures of the impact of principals on the various school factors that are measured in the parent and staff surveys. We construct these measures in a comparable manner to how we construct our measures of principal effectiveness. We estimate regression models as follows:

$$Y_{st} = \gamma_s + \theta_{st} + \tau_t + u_{st} \tag{8}$$

where the  $Y_{st}$  are the school factors described above.

The coefficients on the principal indicators from these regressions will then be compared to the estimates of individual principal effectiveness to ascertain which particular school factor changes coincide with improvements in principal effectiveness. These comparisons will be made using the appropriately shrunk measures to remove attenuation bias. This investigation will provide important information for understanding the potential pathways by which effective principals impact schools.

## 5 Results

We first provide our estimates of overall principal effectiveness using both methods described above. We then explore the potential pathways by which principals may be affecting schools.

## 5.1 Principal effects - variance decomposition method

Estimates of the variance of principal effectiveness calculated using the variance decomposition method are presented in Table 7. All individual student scores were first normalised

to have mean zero and standard deviation one within each testing domain, grade level and testing year. They were also adjusted for the effect of individual student, school and peer characteristics. This adjustment was undertaken by regressing the normalised scores at the individual student level on individual student characteristics (gender, NESB and ATSI indicators, plus interactions of gender with NESB and ATSI), school characteristics (socio-economic status of students based on post-code characteristics of where they live, proportion of students in the school from an NESB background, indicators for whether the school is located in a regional or remote area), and average student peer characteristics (proportions of other students in the same school, grade level and year that are female, NESB and ATSI). The adjusted scores at the individual student level are simply the residuals from these regressions. We also present estimates where grade 3 scores are also included in the grade 5 adjustment regressions. This adjustment aids comparisons to the estimates we construct using the fixed effects regression method.<sup>22</sup>

The coefficient estimates from these first stage individual student regressions for reading and mathematics are presented in Appendix Table A3. Overall, these estimates are in line with expectations. Female students achieve higher reading scores than their male counterparts, while the opposite is true in mathematics. Students from a non-English speaking background (NESB) achieve lower scores in reading in both grades 3 and 5 and in mathematics in grade 3, but achieve higher scores in mathematics in grade 5. Indigenous students (ATSI) had lower achievement in both testing domains and both grades. Regarding school level characteristics, the average socio-economic status of parents and the proportion of non-English speaking students at the school were also associated with higher achievement. Somewhat surprisingly, schools located in regional areas performed better than those located in major cities, while those located in remote areas performed above city schools but below regional schools. Keep in mind, however, that these location effects were estimated after already controlling for parental SES, which is much lower in regional and remote schools. Regarding the influence of peer characteristics, the gender of class peers was unrelated to achievement, the NESB status of peers was positively

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup>Estimates of principal effectiveness using unadjusted test scores were also constructed. Generally the estimates were larger and more likely to be statistically significant using the unadjusted scores. These estimates are available upon request.

related to achievement, while ATSI status was negatively related.

The results presented in Table 7 are the estimated coefficients on the principal turnover term from regressions at the school level of Equation 5. These coefficients are our estimates of  $\sigma_p^2$ , the underlying variation in principal quality or effectiveness. In the majority of cases, these estimates are significantly different from zero and positive. This implies that school principals have significant effects on student achievement in Victorian government primary schools, and that there is significant heterogeneity in the quality of these school principals.<sup>23</sup> Note that the value added versions at the bottom of Table 7 are not always smaller than the grade 5 estimates that do not include prior grade 3 scores when constructing the adjusted scores. Whether or not to include prior test scores when estimating principal effectiveness is open to some debate (see for example Clark et al., 2012). When constructing teacher effectiveness estimates, controlling for prior test scores seems clear. However, principals may lead a school for several years. Thus they may have also affected the prior test scores of students. Effective principals may not necessarily yield high value added if they had boosted the prior test scores considerably.

To interpret the size of these estimated effects, we take the square root of the coefficients to yield estimates of the standard deviation of principal effectiveness. These standard deviations range from 0.088 to 0.164, depending on grade level and domain. This implies that having a principal that is one standard deviation higher in the distribution of the principal pool is associated with test scores that are higher by 0.088-0.164 standard deviations. Transforming these back into terms of years of student learning, these effects equate to 0.14-0.22 years.<sup>24</sup> These estimates are large in size, and are at the upper end of estimates in the literature.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>These estimates were constructed using information on schools with at least two students sitting the test in each year, grade and domain. In addition, only schools with a continuous run of 4 years or more of information were included.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>This transformation relies on the test scoring regime being used at that time in Victoria, where an increase in raw scores of one is equivalent to 2 years of learning for the average student.

## 5.2 Principal effects - fixed effects regression method

Estimates of the standard deviation of principal effectiveness calculated using the fixed effects regression method (Equation 6) are presented in Table 8. In all cases, the estimates are sizable, even after using the Empirical Bayes shrinkage method to deal with measurement error. Note that allowing for measurement error reduces the estimates by approximately one half, highlighting the importance of employing this procedure. Note also that the shrunk standard deviation estimates are quite comparable in size to those constructed using the variance decomposition method (Table 7).

Coefficient estimates on the other variables (apart from the principal and school fixed effects) included in the value added model (VAM) regressions used to construct the standard deviation results at the bottom of Table 8 are presented in Appendix Table A4. <sup>25</sup> The effects of individual characteristics on achievement are similar to those reported in Appendix Table A3 (gender, NESB, ATSI, grade 3 test scores). The estimated effects of the school characteristics (parental SES and NESB proportion) are much reduced in these estimates that also include school fixed effects. These school characteristics have much less variation within schools than across schools. The estimated effects of the student peer characteristics also differ, but to a lesser extent. There remains some variation in these characteristics across grades and years within schools.

In these models, we are also able to include indicators of how long each principal has been leading the school (tenure indicators). This allows us to see if principals take time to improve schools that they are brought in to lead. Coefficient estimates on these tenure indicators (not reported) suggest that achievement does improve by 0.02-0.03 of a standard deviation over the first two years of tenure, then barely increased after that, and the increase even dissipates beyond approximately 8 years.

# 5.3 Pathways of principal effectiveness

We begin this part of the analysis by estimating the extent to which individual principals influence the school factors measured in the staff and parental surveys. We do so by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Only schools that had a change in principal during the observed period are included in these estimates, as principal fixed effects are only identifiable in such schools.

employing the two estimation techniques described above. We use each school factor as the dependent variable in turn.<sup>26</sup> All factors were first normalised to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Our estimated effects of principals on these factors are presented in Table 9. Note that we are again controlling for school fixed effects, so these estimates pick up changes within schools in these factors as principal leadership changes.

The estimates in Table 9 imply that principals have substantial effects on staff and parent perceptions of many school factors. Tests of whether the variance of principal effects equals zero are strongly rejected in all cases. Somewhat comfortingly, the two estimation methods again yield estimates that are similar in size. We can interpret these estimates as follows. Having a principal that is one standard deviation higher in the distribution of principals in terms of affecting school morale raises school morale by 0.469-0.494 of a standard deviation in the cross-school school morale distribution. Equivalently, the estimates suggest that approximately 22% of the cross-school variance in school morale is attributable to school principals. Among the school factors measured using staff perceptions, principals appear to have the most impact on supportive leadership. This finding makes intuitive sense, and gives us some confidence that we are measuring the underlying effect of principals on these school factors. Among the school factors measured using parent perceptions, principals appear to have the least effect on quality of teaching, again making intuitive sense.

While the results presented in Table 9 highlight the impact that principals can have on important school factors associated with teaching, learning and school management, we now turn to the larger question of determining which particular factors are associated with improved student outcomes. We do so by simply regressing each principal's fixed effect on achievement on the same principal's fixed effect on each of these school factors, after both fixed effects have been appropriately shrunk. The results from these simple regressions are presented in Table 10, where we focus on principal effectiveness in terms of value-added student achievement from grade 3 to 5.

Among the school factors measured by staff perceptions (top half of Table 10), only supportive leadership is not significantly and positively related to student achievement growth for at least one testing domain. Thus having a principal that staff members can

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup>We do not adjust these factors for student or school characteristics here.

communicate with and understands their concerns is not related to improved student achievement. Of the four factors that are related to effective principals, they are more closely related to effectiveness in improving mathematics achievement than in improving reading. The strongest relationships are with goal congruence and professional growth. Effective principals appear to be leaders that improve these two particular school factors. We can interpret these estimates as follows. Having a principal that is one standard deviation higher in terms of promoting professional growth is associated with a principal that has raised value added math achievement by 0.0447 of a standard deviation (0.06 of a year of learning).<sup>27</sup>

The factors measured in the parental surveys were not positively related to principal effectiveness. Some estimates are even negative. Thus parental perceptions of schools do not appear to be related to the effectiveness of school principals in terms of raising student test scores. This is also an interesting finding. It suggests that those principals that are effective in terms of raising student performance on standardised tests are not necessarily also those that are effective in raising parental perceptions of the quality of the school, its teachers and its "customer service". This may suggest that the skills of principals regarding these two dimensions of their job are not necessarily related. It may also suggest that principal effort in raising one of these outcomes (student performance or parental perceptions) may be at the expense of raising the other.

Note that over this period, student test scores were not used for any public accountability exercise. Parents were not able to easily compare student performances across schools. This changed in 2010 with the introduction of the My School web-site in Australia, but this occurred after the period we employ during estimation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>Results using grade 5 achievement without controlling for grade 3 scores were very similar. Results using grade 3 achievement revealed essentially no significant relationships between principal effectiveness and the school factors, apart from goal congruence with reading achievement. These results are available upon request.

# 6 Discussion and Policy Implications

The estimates presented above reveal an important and large causal effect of individual principals on student achievement. These are sizeable effects when compared to international estimates of teacher effects. Rockoff (2004) finds that individual teachers have an unadjusted effect of approximately 0.21 of a standard deviation in annual reading growth and 0.29 in mathematics growth. Aaronson et al. (2007) find an effect of 0.13 of a standard deviation of teacher effects on math scores in Chicago. Other sizeable effects were found by Ballou et al. (2004), Rivkin et al. (2005), Gordon et al. (2006) and Lavy (2009). In a review of the evidence on teacher effectiveness, Hanushek and Rivkin (2010) find an average effect of 0.11 of a standard deviation in reading and 0.15 in mathematics. In Australia, Leigh (2010) finds an average teacher effect of 0.1 of a standard deviation on literacy and numeracy achievement using data from Queensland.

Compared to other studies of principal effects, our estimates are comparable or larger, with one notable exception. Our results are larger than effects estimated by Branch et al. (2012) using data from Texas and by Grissom et al. (2015) using data from the Miami-Dade school district in Florida. Our estimates are similar in size to those reported by Dhuey and Smith (2014b) using data from North Carolina, but smaller than the very large estimates reported in Dhuey and Smith (2014a) for British Columbia. Coelli and Green (2012) found that principals may take several years to have their full effect on schools. Given our relatively long time period for estimation (relative to these previous studies), we see principals in schools for more years, and thus are potentially able to get closer to estimating their "full" effect. Another potential source of difference in the size of estimates from previous studies is the relatively high level of autonomy afforded to Victorian government school principals.

We have found that principals have a significant impact on a range of factors related to teaching and professional collaboration. Our estimates imply that principals who effectively raise student achievement are those who enhance their teaching staff's sense of goal congruence as well as their level of professional interaction and professional growth. School morale also improved, but there is the possibility that this increase is a result of improving student achievement rather than the cause.

While we do not have individual responses to the questions asked of staff that make up these specific factors, these questions (listed in Appendix Table A1) may provide some insights into what effective principals are doing. Principals may be able to enhance staff's sense of goal congruence by establishing a set of clearly-stated objectives and goals, explaining their meaning to staff, and encouraging staff to commit themselves to achieving those objectives and goals. Principals can encourage healthy professional interaction by providing specified times and places for such collaboration, allocating mentors to junior staff, and setting up simple ways for staff to communicate with one another. Principals can encourage professional growth by including professional development opportunities in regular staff reviews, and providing staff with time and resources to undertake professional development activities.

Our findings are consistent with qualitative findings in the Education literature which emphasise the importance of instructional leadership. As Hattie (2009) points out, this refers to principals who focus on more than just administrative leadership. Effective principals are actively involved in developing the school's learning environment by setting clear teaching objectives as well as high expectations for teachers and students (Hallinger and Heck 1998). Instructional leaders focus on building staff capacity and instituting systemic processes to review staff skills (Dinham 2011). Our estimates are also aligned with the case study evidence collected by Leithwood and Jantzi (1990), as well as the follow-up study by Leithwood et al. (2006), who note that school leaders described as effective by their school communities had strong positive influences on staff members' motivations, commitments and beliefs about the supportiveness of their leadership. This was also observed by Seashore et al. (2010) who concluded that school leaders who influence teachers' motivation and working conditions have the greatest impact on student achievement.

The empirical evidence on pathways uncovered here and supported by previous studies in the Education literature can assist policy-makers in identifying effective principals or those in need of further support without the need to wait for repeated measures of student achievement over an extended period of time. Moreover, the quantitative evidence linking effective leaders to certain practices can be used to develop capacity amongst current and future principals. The design of professional development programs for both existing

principals and senior staff identified as potential future leaders can benefit from these findings. Leaders who create a stimulating and collaborative professional environment, with a shared school vision and goals, are those who can best raise student achievement.

## 7 Conclusion

Our investigation has revealed that school principals have significant effects on student outcomes in Victorian primary schools. This provides further evidence on the importance of leadership in affecting student outcomes. Investigating the role of school principals in raising student achievement is as important as the current focus on the role of teachers, since a high-quality principal can affect outcomes among all students in a school.

Our analysis has also highlighted some potential pathways through which principals may impact student achievement, partially lifting the veil to reveal some of the key mechanisms. As might be expected, the more effective pathways involved principals influencing their teaching staff, rather than via influencing parental perceptions of the school. Our results suggest that the most effective principals are able to establish a coherent set of goals for the school's workforce, to encourage professional interaction among staff, and to promote the professional development of staff. More work is required, however, to fully understand the specific strategies effective principals employ to improve these school factors that are most closely related to improved student achievement.

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
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Table 1: Characteristics of Victorian government school principals

Characteristic	Mean	Median	Proportion
Female			0.472
Experience at first principal appointment	23.7	25.0	
10 years or less			0.068
11-15 years			0.087
16-20 years			0.136
21-25 years			0.267
26-30 years			0.268
31-34 years			0.120
35 years plus			0.054
Age at first principal appointment	44.0	44.0	
Under 35			0.054
35-39			0.151
40-44			0.330
45-49			0.298
50-54			0.139
55+			0.029
Schools worked at prior to first principal appointment	6.5	6.0	
0-1			0.044
2-3			0.140
4-5			0.241
6-7			0.232
8-9			0.165
10-11			0.101
12-13			0.047
14 plus			0.031
Schools worked at as a principal	2.0	2.0	
1			0.524
2			0.251
3			0.114
4			0.055
5			0.024
6 plus			0.032

Notes: Descriptive statistics for full sample of 4,665 principals who served in Victorian Government schools between 1997 and 2011, from Victorian DET data.

Figure 1: Trends in principal characteristics



Notes: From DET data, all Victorian government school principals over the 1998 to 2011 period.

Table 2: Prior positions of entering principals

Prior position	average	trend
Principal, other school	27%	some increase
Staff, other school	28%	increase
Staff, same school	30%	decline
Principal, same school	4%	_
Unknown	11%	_

Notes: From DET data, all Victorian government school principals over the 1998 to 2011 period.

Table 3: Probability of a change in principal - model estimates

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
SES decile	-0.00164* (0.000996)	-0.00171* (0.000991)	-0.00151 (0.00128)	-0.00153 (0.00128)
Size (000s)	-0.0245** (0.0101)	-0.0255** (0.0101)	-0.100*** (0.0197)	-0.0975*** (0.0196)
Non-metropolitan	-0.0276 $(0.0783)$	-0.0318 $(0.0804)$	-0.00301 $(0.0604)$	-0.00734 $(0.0586)$
Secondary	0.0338*** (0.00834)	0.0340*** (0.00834)		
Combined	$0.0512^{***}$ $(0.0134)$	0.0521*** (0.0136)	$0.0611^{***}$ $(0.0161)$	0.0605*** (0.0163)
Female	-0.00943 (0.00613)	-0.00910 (0.00615)	-0.00283 (0.00718)	-0.00261 (0.00720)
Age	0.00400*** (0.000626)	0.00392*** (0.000629)	0.00444*** (0.000731)	0.00448*** (0.000738)
Tenure	0.00480*** (0.000788)		0.00765*** (0.000988)	
2nd year		-0.0304*** (0.00915)		0.0160 $(0.0109)$
3rd year		-0.0178* (0.00996)		0.0213* (0.0114)
4th year		0.00236 $(0.00988)$		0.0441*** (0.0116)
5th year		0.0298*** (0.0114)		0.0640*** $(0.0127)$
6th year		0.0258** (0.0118)		0.0630*** (0.0137)
7th year		0.0161 $(0.0127)$		0.0553*** $(0.0145)$
8th year		0.0143 $(0.0135)$		0.0567*** $(0.0162)$
9th year		0.0312** (0.0152)		0.0675*** (0.0186)
Grade 5 Reading			0.0102 $(0.0137)$	0.00951 $(0.0137)$
Grade 5 Mathematics			-0.0440*** (0.0141)	-0.0440*** (0.0141)
N	18,138	18,138	11,967	11,967

Notes: Average marginal effects from Probit model estimation. Only schools offering grade five (primary and combined) are included in last two columns. Time and region indicators were also included. Tenure indicator effects beyond 9 years are not reported for brevity. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1.

Table 4: Principals' experience and school characteristics

Experience (years)	0-3	4-7	8-11	12-15	16+	Total
Average Student Achievement						
1st quartile	0.18	0.37	0.31	0.11	0.03	1.00
2nd quartile	0.16	0.35	0.33	0.13	0.04	1.00
3rd quartile	0.15	0.34	0.34	0.14	0.04	1.00
4th quartile	0.20	0.32	0.30	0.13	0.04	1.00
Parental Socio-Economic Statu	18					
1st quartile	0.15	0.32	0.30	0.16	0.07	1.00
2nd quartile	0.17	0.31	0.29	0.16	0.06	1.00
3rd quartile	0.17	0.30	0.30	0.18	0.07	1.00
4th quartile	0.11	0.26	0.33	0.21	0.08	1.00
School Size						
1st quartile	0.40	0.33	0.19	0.08	0.01	1.00
2nd quartile	0.13	0.37	0.31	0.14	0.04	1.00
3rd quartile	0.06	0.30	0.37	0.20	0.08	1.00
4th quartile	0.03	0.20	0.35	0.29	0.14	1.00
Proportion NESB Students						
1st quartile	0.27	0.31	0.25	0.12	0.04	1.00
2nd quartile	0.16	0.33	0.30	0.16	0.05	1.00
3rd quartile	0.11	0.28	0.33	0.20	0.08	1.00
4th quartile	0.06	0.27	0.34	0.22	0.11	1.00
School type						
Primary	0.17	0.31	0.30	0.16	0.05	1.00
Secondary	0.05	0.22	0.33	0.26	0.14	1.00
Combined	0.13	0.27	0.31	0.21	0.08	1.00
School location						
Metropolitan	0.07	0.28	0.34	0.22	0.10	1.00
Provincial	0.09	0.32	0.35	0.19	0.05	1.00
Remote/Very Remote	0.27	0.32	0.25	0.13	0.03	1.00

Notes: Proportions for full sample of 4,665 principals who served in Victorian Government schools between 1997 and 2011. NESB - Non-English Speaking Background.

Table 5: Summary statistics - students

	Matcheo	d students	All Students	
Variable	Mean	Std Dev	Mean	Std Dev
Female	0.492		0.488	
Non-English Speaking Background	0.147		0.185	
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander	0.009		0.012	
Achievement - grade 3				
Reading	2.349	0.767	2.308	0.782
Writing	2.419	0.663	2.374	0.685
Numeracy	2.340	0.696	2.304	0.711
Mathematics	2.280	0.638	2.245	0.652
Achievement - grade 5				
Reading	3.203	0.781	3.161	0.789
Writing	3.200	0.759	3.152	0.769
Numeracy	3.193	0.745	3.154	0.749
Mathematics	3.145	0.668	3.106	0.675
Number of students	264,826		366,293	

*Notes*: Descriptive statistics for matched students who sat AIM tests in grades 3 and 5 between 1997 and 2007, and for all students observed in the same years.

Table 6: Summary statistics - school surveys

	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Staff survey				
School morale	74.55	13.46	25.00	100
Supportive leadership	76.52	13.21	19.29	100
Goal congruence	78.50	10.84	42.08	100
Professional interaction	78.86	10.01	22.45	100
Professional growth	72.45	11.31	26.82	100
Parent survey				
General satisfaction	5.78	0.46	4.11	7
Quality of teaching	5.63	0.41	4.21	7
Academic rigour	5.06	0.34	2.94	6
General environment	5.17	0.37	2.78	6
Customer service	5.21	0.37	3.00	6
Reporting	5.17	0.32	3.05	6

Notes: Staff surveys - 1,576 (primary) schools in 2007. Parent surveys, first two items - 1,586 schools in 2007. Parent surveys, remaining four items - 1,589 schools in 2003 (last year available).

Table 7: Estimates of principal effectiveness - Variance Decomposition method

	reading	mathematics
Grade 3		
Variance	0.0183	0.0247
(s.e.)	(0.0128)	(0.0167)
Standard Deviation	0.135	0.157
Grade 5		
Variance	0.0215**	0.0229*
(s.e.)	(0.0108)	(0.0137)
Standard Deviation	0.147	0.151
Value added 3-5		
Variance	0.00775	0.0270*
(s.e.)	(0.0104)	(0.0151)
Standard Deviation	0.0880	0.164

Notes: 1,100 schools approximately. The exact numbers differed slightly due to some schools not having information on all scores where at least two students sat the test over a run of at least four years.

\*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1.

Table 8: Estimates of principal effectiveness - fixed effects regression method

	reading	mathematics
Grade 3		
Raw standard devn.	0.291	0.310
Shrunk SD	0.144	0.172
Grade 5		
Raw standard devn.	0.259	0.308
Shrunk SD	0.098	0.162
Value added 3-5		
Raw standard devn.	0.229	0.302
Shrunk SD	0.105	0.191

Notes: Grade 3 - 1780 principals (approx.), grade 5 and VAM - 1875 principals (approx.). The "Shrunk" standard deviation measures were constructed using the Empirical Bayes method detailed in Equation 7.

Table 9: Principal effects on school factors

	Variance	Variance Decomposition Method			Fixed Effects Method		
Factor	Variance	s.e.	SD	Raw SD	Shrunk SD		
Staff survey							
School morale	0.220***	(0.0421)	0.469	0.623	0.494		
Supportive leadership	0.334***	(0.0569)	0.578	0.701	0.568		
Goal congruence	0.168***	(0.0336)	0.410	0.578	0.452		
Professional interaction	0.244***	(0.0586)	0.494	0.665	0.519		
Professional growth	0.145***	(0.0442)	0.381	0.642	0.514		
Parent survey							
General satisfaction	0.167***	(0.0550)	0.409	0.609	0.455		
Quality of teaching	0.157***	(0.0299)	0.397	0.498	0.373		
Academic rigour	0.296***	(0.0526)	0.544	0.607	0.403		
General environment	0.162***	(0.0592)	0.402	0.584	0.394		
Customer responsiveness	0.262***	(0.0644)	0.512	0.630	0.462		
Reporting	0.325***	(0.0923)	0.570	0.612	0.406		

Notes: Sample sizes differ slightly across school factors, as not all were available over all years.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1.

Table 10: Estimation of pathways of principal effectiveness

	Reading	Mathematics
Staff survey factors		
School Morale	0.0104*	0.0244***
	(0.00532)	(0.00927)
Supportive leadership	0.00291	0.00391
	(0.00463)	(0.00807)
Goal congruence	0.0160***	0.0416***
	(0.00581)	(0.0101)
Professional interaction	0.00417	0.0236***
	(0.00507)	(0.00881)
Professional growth	0.0213***	0.0447***
	(0.00519)	(0.00910)
Parent survey factors		
Quality of teaching	0.00252	0.00991
	(0.00702)	(0.0121)
General satisfaction	0.00390	0.00624
	(0.00575)	(0.00991)
Academic rigour	0.000120	-0.00639
	(0.00790)	(0.0151)
Customer responsiveness	-0.0106	-0.0332**
	(0.00688)	(0.0131)
Reporting	-0.0100	-0.0243
	(0.00783)	(0.0149)
General environment	-0.00743	-0.0212
	(0.00809)	(0.0154)

*Notes*: Value-added models of achievement used to identify effective principals. These estimates are simply the coefficient on the school factor from regressing the principal effects on achievement on the corresponding principal effects on each school factor, separately.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup> p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1.

# **Appendix**

### Table A1: Staff survey individual questions

#### School morale

- 1. There is a good team spirit in this school.
- 2. There is a lot of energy in this school.
- 3. The morale in this school is high.
- 4. Staff go about their work with enthusiasm.
- 5. Staff take pride in this school.

## Supportive leadership

- 1. Staff are able to approach the school's leaders to discuss concerns and grievances.
- 2. The school's leaders don't really know the problems faced by staff (reversed).
- 3. There is support from the leaders in this school.
- 4. There is good communication between staff and the leaders in this school.
- 5. The leaders in this school can be relied upon when things get tough.

## Goal congruence

- 1. The staff are committed to the school's goals and values.
- 2. The goals of this school are not easily understood (reversed).
- 3. The school has a clearly stated set of objectives and goals.
- 4. My personal goals are in agreement with the goals of this school.

#### Professional interaction

- 1. I feel accepted by other staff in this school.
- 2. I have the opportunity to be involved in cooperative work with other members of staff.
- 3. There is good communication between groups in this school.
- 4. Staff in this school can rely on their colleagues for support and assistance when needed.
- 5. Staff frequently discuss and share teaching methods and strategies with each other.
- 6. There is good communication between staff in this school.
- 7. I receive support from my colleagues.

### Professional growth

- 1. I am encouraged to pursue further professional development.
- 2. Others in this school take an active interest in my career development and professional growth.
- 3. The professional development planning in this school takes into account my individual needs and interests.
- 4. There are opportunities in this school for developing new skills.
- 5. It is not difficult to gain access to in-service courses.

Notes: The precise wording of questions may have changed slightly from year to year.

#### Table A2: Parent survey individual questions

#### General satisfaction

1. Overall, I am satisfied with the education of my/our child.

## Quality of teaching

- 1. Teachers at this school motivate my child to want to learn.
- 2. My child's teachers are committed and enthusiastic in their approach to teaching.
- 3. Teachers at this school provide a stimulating and challenging environment for my/our child.
- 4. My child receives high quality teaching.
- 5. My child's teachers care if my child is not doing as well as he/she can.

#### Academic rigour

- 1. This school is meeting the academic needs of my child.
- 2. This school has high academic standards.
- 3. This school has realistic educational expectations of my/our child.
- 4. This school is meeting the social needs of my/our child.
- 5. This school provides sufficient challenge for my/our child in other areas (eg. sport/music etc).

#### General environment

- 1. The student management policy at this school is fair and reasonable.
- 2. This school is caring.
- 3. This school has high standards of student behaviour.
- 4. This school has a safe and secure environment.

#### Customer responsiveness

- 1. The school takes the concerns I have seriously.
- 2. This school is managed well.
- 3. I believe there is effective educational leadership within the school.
- 4. I am given the opportunity to be involved in the school's educational activities.

## Student reporting

- 1. My child's school reports are informative in that they indicate achievement level.
- 2. My child's school reports are comprehensive.
- 3. The staff at this school are approachable (by parents).
- 4. This school provides helpful information about my/our child's progress.

Notes: The precise wording of questions may have changed slightly from year to year.

Table A3: First stage adjustment equations for Variance Decomposition method

	Gra	de 3	Gra	de 5	Grade 5 v	alue added
	Reading	Math	Reading	Math	Reading	Math
Female	0.232*** (0.00417)	-0.117*** (0.00422)	0.188*** (0.00415)	-0.123*** (0.00417)	0.0409*** (0.00327)	-0.0483*** (0.00327)
NESB	-0.128*** (0.00840)	-0.0352*** (0.00848)	-0.0863*** (0.00834)	0.0914*** (0.00838)	-0.00238 $(0.00653)$	0.112*** (0.00654)
ATSI	-0.470*** (0.0299)	-0.510*** (0.0302)	-0.475*** (0.0298)	-0.552*** (0.0299)	-0.173*** (0.0237)	-0.236*** (0.0236)
Female * NESB	-0.0264** (0.0108)	0.0157 $(0.0109)$	-0.0134 $(0.0107)$	-0.00884 $(0.0108)$	0.00193 $(0.00840)$	-0.0159* (0.00842)
Female * ATSI	0.00446 $(0.0415)$	0.0396 $(0.0420)$	-0.0289 $(0.0413)$	0.0856** (0.0414)	-0.0216 $(0.0328)$	0.0718** (0.0328)
Parental SES for school	0.00750*** $(8.13e-05)$	0.00674*** $(8.22e-05)$	0.00870*** (7.91e-05)	0.00841*** (7.94e-05)	0.00370*** (6.31e-05)	0.00392*** $(6.30e-05)$
School NESB proportion	-0.0819*** (0.0305)	-0.0568* (0.0308)	0.0458 $(0.0292)$	0.135*** $(0.0293)$	0.0879*** $(0.0229)$	0.155*** $(0.0229)$
Regional location	0.0841*** (0.00755)	0.0272*** (0.00763)	0.0744*** (0.00746)	0.0266*** (0.00748)	0.0276*** (0.00585)	0.0123** (0.00585)
Remote location	0.0480*** (0.00540)	0.0715*** (0.00546)	0.0529*** (0.00528)	0.0452*** (0.00530)	0.0346*** (0.00414)	0.00974** (0.00415)
Female peer proportion	-0.0125 $(0.0178)$	0.0102 $(0.0180)$	-0.0203 $(0.0178)$	0.0168 $(0.0178)$	-0.0117 $(0.0139)$	-0.000277 (0.0139)
ATSI peer proportion	-0.0131 $(0.0698)$	-0.249*** (0.0703)	-0.0348 $(0.0695)$	-0.212*** (0.0696)	-0.0670 $(0.0546)$	-0.115** (0.0544)
NESB peer proportion	0.187*** (0.0241)	0.194*** (0.0244)	0.191*** (0.0237)	0.175*** (0.0238)	0.0686*** (0.0186)	0.0557*** (0.0186)
Grade 3 score, same subject					0.638*** (0.00155)	0.636*** (0.00154)
Observations	254,419	255,109	254,883	255,551	245,479	246,798
R-squared	0.065	0.043	0.072	0.062	0.451	0.446

Notes: These regressions also include year indicators. NESB: Non-English speaking background. ATSI: Aboriginal and/or Torres Straight Islander. Parental SES is measured in percentiles of distribution across schools. Peer measures are proportions of other students in the same school sitting the same test. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1.

Table A4: Value-Added models of achievement including fixed effects

	Yea	ar 3	Year 5		Year 5 value added	
Testing Domain	Reading	Math	Reading	Math	Reading	Math
Year 3 score, same subject					0.6347*** (0.0018)	0.6316*** (0.0019)
Female	0.2396*** (0.0051)	-0.1155*** (0.0050)	0.191*** (0.0050)	-0.1207*** (0.0049)	0.0407*** (0.0040)	-0.045*** (0.0038)
NESB	-0.1303*** (0.0108)	-0.0365*** (0.0113)	-0.0918*** (0.0105)	0.086*** (0.0113)	-0.0086 $(0.0083)$	0.1086*** (0.0084)
ATSI	-0.4667*** (0.0367)	-0.5035*** (0.0361)	-0.502*** (0.0311)	-0.5454*** (0.0319)	-0.2117*** (0.0283)	-0.2306** (0.0272)
Female * NESB	-0.032** (0.0136)	0.0127 $(0.0144)$	-0.01 (0.0133)	0.0006 $(0.0143)$	0.0043 $(0.0106)$	-0.0073 (0.0108)
Female * ATSI	-0.0063 $(0.0506)$	0.0443 $(0.0498)$	-0.0045 $(0.0434)$	0.0728* $(0.0431)$	0.0287 $(0.0389)$	0.0583 $(0.0379)$
Parental SES for school	-0.4681*** (0.1457)	-0.3245** (0.1524)	-0.058 $(0.1389)$	-0.09 (0.1439)	0.0406 $(0.1111)$	-0.0101 (0.1126)
School NESB proportion	-0.0002 $(0.0004)$	$0.0000 \\ (0.0004)$	-0.001*** (0.0004)	-0.0002 $(0.0003)$	$0.0000 \\ (0.0003)$	0.0007*** (0.0003)
Female peer proportion	0.0213 $(0.0262)$	0.0286 $(0.0262)$	0.01 $(0.0254)$	-0.0097 $(0.0250)$	0.0292 $(0.0201)$	0.0109 $(0.0199)$
ATSI peer proportion	-0.2247* (0.1358)	-0.1654 $(0.1345)$	0.0702 $(0.1306)$	-0.1835 $(0.1272)$	0.1485 $(0.1019)$	-0.1374 $(0.1012)$
NESB peer proportion	0.0998** (0.0391)	0.052 $(0.0398)$	0.1155*** (0.0381)	0.1468*** (0.0393)	0.0633** (0.0302)	0.1431*** (0.0303)
Observations	163236	163780	168199	168779	161878	162922
R-squared	0.1181	0.1127	0.1238	0.1375	0.4799	0.4935

Notes: These regressions also include year, school and principal indicators. NESB: Non-English speaking background. ATSI: Aboriginal and/or Torres Straight Islander. Parental SES is measured in percentiles of distribution across schools. Peer measures are proportions of other students in the same school sitting the same test. \*\*\* p < 0.01, \*\* p < 0.05, \* p < 0.1.