

# **Evaluating the Income Redistribution Effects of Tax Reforms in Discrete Hours Models\***

**John Creedy**  
The Treasury  
Wellington, New Zealand

**Guyonne Kalb and Rosanna Scutella**  
Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research  
The University of Melbourne

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**Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research**  
The University of Melbourne  
Victoria 3010 Australia  
*Telephone* (03) 8344 5330  
*Fax* (03) 8344 5630  
*Email* melb-inst@unimelb.edu.au  
*WWW Address* <http://www.melbourneinstitute.com>

## **Abstract**

Recent studies have examined tax policy issues using labour supply models characterised by a discretised budget set. Microsimulation modelling using a discrete hours approach is probabilistic. This makes analysis of the distribution of income difficult as even for a small sample with a modest range of labour supply points the range of possible labour supply combinations over the sample is extremely large. This paper proposes a method of approximating measures of income distribution and compares the performance of this method to alternative approaches in a microsimulation context. In this approach a pseudo income distribution is constructed, which uses the probability of a particular labour supply value occurring (standardised by the population size) to refer to a particular position in the pseudo income distribution. This approach is compared to using an expected income level for each individual and to a simulated approach, in which labour supply values are drawn from each individual's hours distribution and summary statistics of the distribution of income are calculated by taking the average over each set of draws. The paper shows that the outcomes of various distributional measures using the pseudo method converge quickly to their true values as the sample size increases. The expected income approach results in a less accurate approximation. To illustrate the method, we simulate the distributional implications of a tax reform using the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator.

# 1 Introduction

This paper proposes a method of approximating the inequality and poverty measures when using discrete hours labour supply modelling in tax policy microsimulation studies. It examines the performance of this approximation against alternative approaches and against a benchmark which is known to be close to the true value but is impractical to use with real-life data.

The traditional approach to the modelling of labour supply assumes that the decision variable, hours of work, is continuous. However, a number of recent studies have examined tax policy issues using labour supply models characterised by a discretised budget set.<sup>1</sup> There are several reasons for this. Firstly, it is doubtful that a model which allows continuous substitution of hours for leisure constitutes a realistic representation of supply choices. For many socio-demographic groups labour market participation takes the form of fixed wage and hours contracts, with individuals choosing from among a discrete set of hours combinations (most often at part-time levels of around 20 hours, and at full-time levels of between 38 and 40 hours per week). Secondly, there are statistical and practical reasons to favour a discrete hours approach in preference to continuous models. These largely stem from the difficulties associated with the treatment of nonlinear budget constraints in continuous estimation. The strategy adopted in the discrete approach is to replace the budget set with a finite number of points and optimise over these discrete points only.

Microsimulation modelling using a discrete hours approach is essentially probabilistic. That is, it does not identify a particular level of hours worked for each individual after the policy change, but generates a probability distribution over the discrete hours levels used. As a result, individuals have a set of probabilities of being at different income levels and the usual formulae for poverty and inequality measures cannot be applied.

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<sup>1</sup>The discrete approach allows both for random preference heterogeneity and state-specific errors in perception, and can incorporate either directly estimated or indirectly imputed fixed costs in estimation. See, for example, Van Soest (1995) and Keane and Moffitt (1998). For a survey of discrete and continuous approaches, see Creedy and Duncan (2002).

Section 2 introduces the outcomes available after simulating policy reforms using a discrete hours labour supply model, and discusses three alternative approaches to poverty and inequality measurement. Special attention is given to the case of the variance. The formulae for the other measures are far less tractable and they are discussed briefly in the Appendix. Section 3 presents a Monte Carlo study for these other more complex measures. In Section 4, as an illustration, the method is applied to a hypothetical reform of the Australian tax and transfer system using the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS). Section 5 concludes.

## 2 Some Analytical Results

When simulating labour supply effects of policy reforms using microsimulation models the result is a set of probabilities of being at different income levels for each individual. This section derives analytical results to compare the performance of three alternative approaches to estimating summary measures of the income distribution after simulating changes in labour supply resulting from a policy reform. The three measures are described in subsection 2.1. In subsection 2.2, some properties of the methods are discussed and compared. These analytical results are for the variance, other inequality measures are too intractable to examine in this way. Formulae for the other measures are presented for the three alternative approaches in the Appendix.

### 2.1 Alternative Approaches

For convenience the following discussion is in terms of individuals, but it can easily be extended to couple households. Suppose there are  $n$  individuals and  $k$  possible outcomes of labour supply (hours levels) for each individual. This would result in  $k^n$  possible combinations of labour supply, and thus income distributions. Each outcome results in a different value for poverty and inequality measures.

Under the reasonable assumption that individuals' distributions of hours are independent, the probability of each income distribution or outcome ( $P_q$ ) is given by the product of the relevant probabilities. Hence, if  $p_{i,j}$  is the

probability that individual  $j$  is at hours level  $i$ , the joint probability  $P_q$  is equal to  $p_{i,1}p_{j,2}\dots p_{r,n}$ , where  $q$  runs from 1 to  $k^n$ ; and  $i, j, r$  can attain values between 1 and  $k$  (indicating the labour supply points chosen in combination  $q$  for each individual). In principle, each inequality or poverty measure can be calculated as the weighted sum of the measures over all possible outcomes with weights equal to the probabilities  $P_q$ , where the sum over all  $P_q$  is equal to one. However, for any realistic sample size, even for few discrete labour supply points, the large number of possible combinations makes it computationally impractical to calculate all  $k^n$  distributions and associated probabilities  $P_q$ .<sup>2</sup>

Instead of examining all combinations of income levels, it would be possible to adopt a sampling approach. A large number of possible income distributions could be obtained by taking random draws from each individual's hours distribution.<sup>3</sup> Each choice of discrete hours is drawn with the probability of it occurring for the relevant individual, so no weighting is required in averaging inequality measures over the samples. With a sufficiently large number of randomly selected samples, the proportion of each hours combination would replicate the precise probabilities discussed above. This approach still requires a large computational effort, depending on the number of draws needed to obtain a good approximation. However, it provides a valuable way of examining the performance of alternative less computer-intensive approaches against this benchmark in a Monte Carlo experiment.

In considering alternatives which offer more practical solutions, the most obvious is perhaps a simple approach where the expected income is calculated for each individual and is used as if it were a single 'representative' level of income for that individual.<sup>4</sup> In addition, we explore an approach where

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<sup>2</sup>It would be impossible to store all the information needed, although this would not be necessary as the appropriate weighted average could be obtained cumulatively using an algorithm for systematically working through all the  $k^n$  combinations. However, the computing time needed would be extremely long. Some measure for the computing time is provided in Section 3.2 in footnote 13.

<sup>3</sup>This can be achieved by using a random number generator which produces random uniform variates between 0 and 1, which are then compared with the cumulative distribution at the hours points for each individual in order to select the relevant income for each sample drawn.

<sup>4</sup>See for example, Gerfin and Leu (2003).

all possible outcomes for every individual are used as if they were separate observations. The outcomes are weighted by the individual probabilities of labour supply to produce a pseudo distribution.

To illustrate the alternative approaches by a simple example, imagine a two person population with two hours choices available. Person 1 has a wage of 2 and a probability 0.8 of working 10 hours and 0.2 of working 20 hours and person 2 with wage of 3 and a probability 0.3 of working 10 hours and 0.7 of working 20 hours. The exact approach has four possible outcomes  $\{(20,30),(40,30),(20,60),(40,60)\}$  with probabilities 0.24, 0.06, 0.56 and 0.14 of occurring. The Lorenz curve would have an income proportion of 0.4, 0.43, 0.25 and 0.4 at the 0.5 fraction of the population for the respective outcomes. The average Lorenz curve (using the above probabilities) would have an income proportion of 0.3178 at 0.5.

Using the expected income approach, person 1 is expected to earn 24 ( $2 \times 10 \times 0.8 + 2 \times 20 \times 0.2$ ) and person 2 is expected to earn 51 ( $3 \times 10 \times 0.3 + 3 \times 20 \times 0.7$ ). At a fraction 0.5 of the population, we would have an income proportion of 0.32. Using the pseudo approach described here and constructing a pseudo income distribution, we have outcomes 20, 30, 40 and 60 with probabilities 0.4, 0.15, 0.1 and 0.35. Thus at fraction 0.4 we have an income proportion of 0.13, at fraction 0.55 we have an income proportion 0.33, and at fraction 0.65 we have an income proportion of 0.6.

## 2.2 The Variance of the Income Distribution

Suppose there are  $n$  individuals and  $k$  discrete hours levels,  $h_1, \dots, h_k$ . Let  $y_{j,i}$  and  $p_{j,i}$  denote respectively the  $i^{th}$  person's income at hours level  $j$ , and the probability of hours level  $j$ . On the assumption that the probability distributions for different individuals are independent, the joint probabilities of the  $k^n$  possible alternative combinations are as shown in Table 1. An arbitrary combination  $m$  from the set of all possible combinations consists of the set of hours points  $h_{1m}, h_{2m}, \dots, h_{nm}$  for persons 1 to  $n$  respectively, where  $h_{im}$  has a value between 1 and  $k$ , indicating one of the  $k$  possible hours points for each person.

Table 1: Alternative Possible Income Distributions

| Combination q                          | Incomes of persons: |                |     |                | distributional             | Probability $P_q$                            |
|--|---------------------|----------------|-----|----------------|----------------------------|--|
|  | 1                   | 2              | ... | n              | measure $g_q$              |  |
| 1                                      | $y_{1,1}$           | $y_{1,2}$      | ... | $y_{1,n}$      | $g_1$                      | $p_{1,1}p_{1,2}\dots p_{1,n}$                |
| $m$                                    | $y_{h_{1m},1}$      | $y_{h_{2m},2}$ | ... | $y_{h_{nm},n}$ | $g_m$                      | $p_{h_{1m},1}p_{h_{2m},2}\dots p_{h_{nm},n}$ |
| $k^n$                                  | $y_{k,1}$           | $y_{k,2}$      | ... | $y_{k,n}$      | $g_{k^n}$                  | $p_{k,1}p_{k,2}\dots p_{k,n}$                |
| exact expected distributional measure: |                     |                |     |                | $\sum_{q=1}^{k^n} P_q g_q$ |  |

Consider the arithmetic means of each possible combination, denoted  $\bar{Y}_i$ . The arithmetic mean of all these means,  $\bar{Y}$ , is given by:

$$\bar{Y} = p_{1,1}p_{1,2}\dots p_{1,n}\bar{Y}_1 + \dots + p_{h_{1m},1}p_{h_{2m},2}\dots p_{h_{nm},n}\bar{Y}_m + \dots + p_{k,1}p_{k,2}\dots p_{k,n}\bar{Y}_{k^n} \quad (1)$$

Substituting for  $\bar{Y}_m = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n y_{h_{im},i}$ , gives:

$$\bar{Y} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k p_{h,i} y_{h,i} \quad (2)$$

The arithmetic mean,  $\bar{S}^2$ , of the variances for each possible combination,  $S_i^2$ , is:

$$\bar{S}^2 = p_{1,1}p_{1,2}\dots p_{1,n}S_1^2 + \dots + p_{h_{1m},1}p_{h_{2m},2}\dots p_{h_{nm},n}S_m^2 + \dots + p_{k,1}p_{k,2}\dots p_{k,n}S_{k^n}^2 \quad (3)$$

Where  $S_m^2 = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n y_{h_{im},i}^2 - \bar{Y}_m^2$ .

Hence:

$$\begin{aligned}
\overline{S}^2 &= \sum_{m=1}^{k^n} p_{h_{1m},1} p_{h_{2m},2} \cdots p_{h_{nm},n} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n y_{h_{im},i}^2 \\
&\quad - \sum_{m=1}^{k^n} p_{h_{1m},1} p_{h_{2m},2} \cdots p_{h_{nm},n} \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n y_{h_{im},i} \right)^2 \\
&= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{i=1}^n p_{h,i} y_{h,i}^2 - \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{i=1}^n p_{h,i} y_{h,i}^2 \\
&\quad - \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{m=1}^{k^n} p_{h_{1m},1} p_{h_{2m},2} \cdots p_{h_{nm},n} \left( 2 \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} y_{h_{im},i} y_{h_{jm},j} \right) \\
&= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{i=1}^n p_{h,i} y_{h,i}^2 - \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{i=1}^n p_{h,i} y_{h,i}^2 \\
&\quad - \frac{1}{n^2} \left( 2 \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{l=1}^k p_{h,i} y_{h,i} p_{l,j} y_{l,j} \right) \tag{4}
\end{aligned}$$

### 2.2.1 The Expected Income Method

Consider the use of the arithmetic mean income for each individual as a representative income.<sup>5</sup> Using expected incomes,  $\overline{y}_1 = \sum_{h=1}^k p_{h,1} y_{h,1}$  to  $\overline{y}_n = \sum_{h=1}^k p_{h,n} y_{h,n}$ , the overall mean of the  $n$  individual means,  $\overline{Y}_m$ , is identical

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<sup>5</sup>Other possible candidates are the median and the mode of the hours distribution for each individual. These are rejected here on the grounds that they ignore potentially important information, as they are based on just one value in the distribution, and the arithmetic means of resulting income distributions do not correspond to  $\overline{Y}$ .

to (2). The variance of the individual mean incomes,  $S_m^2$  is:

$$\begin{aligned}
\overline{S}_m^2 &= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \overline{y}_i^2 - \overline{Y}_m^2 \\
&= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \left( \sum_{h=1}^k p_{h,i} y_{h,i} \right)^2 - \left( \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k p_{h,i} y_{h,i} \right)^2 \\
&= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \left( \sum_{h=1}^k p_{h,i}^2 y_{h,i}^2 + 2 \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{l=1}^{h-1} p_{h,i} y_{h,i} p_{l,i} y_{l,i} \right) \\
&\quad - \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k p_{h,i}^2 y_{h,i}^2 - \frac{2}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{l=1}^{h-1} p_{h,i} y_{h,i} p_{l,i} y_{l,i} \\
&\quad - \frac{2}{n^2} \left( \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{l=1}^k p_{h,i} y_{h,i} p_{l,j} y_{l,j} \right) \tag{5}
\end{aligned}$$

The terms in (5) contain powers of the various probabilities. Hence  $S_m^2 \neq \overline{S}^2$ . The arithmetic means, as linear functions, are identical, but the variances, involving nonlinear functions of the various terms, are unequal. A similar feature is expected for any inequality measure that is expressed as a nonlinear function of incomes. The difference between the method using all combinations and the method using the expected income is:

$$\begin{aligned}
\overline{S}_m^2 - \overline{S}^2 &= \left( \frac{1}{n} - \frac{1}{n^2} \right) \left[ \sum_{i=1}^n \left( \sum_{h=1}^k p_{h,i} y_{h,i} \right)^2 - \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k p_{h,i} y_{h,i}^2 \right] \\
&= \left( \frac{n-1}{n^2} \right) \sum_{i=1}^n \left( (\overline{y}_i)^2 - \overline{y}_i^2 \right) \leq 0 \tag{6}
\end{aligned}$$

This confirms the trivial case where the two approaches give identical results for the variance if either the hours distributions are concentrated on a single hours level for each individual or the incomes are the same irrespective of the hours worked. The method using the expected income always underestimates the true expected variance.<sup>6</sup> This is as expected given that the use of the expected income understates the variety in incomes in the population.

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<sup>6</sup>The square of the expected value is always smaller than or equal to the expectation of the squared values.

### 2.2.2 The Pseudo Income Distribution Method

Consider the pseudo income distribution with  $nk$  income levels, each associated with a corresponding probability. The incomes are  $y_{h,i}$ , where  $h$  ranges from 1 to  $k$  and  $i$  ranges from 1 to  $n$ , and associated probabilities are  $p_{h,i}/n$ . The division by  $n$  ensures that the sum of the probabilities adds to 1. The  $y_{h,i}$  values are placed in a single vector,  $z = \{y_{h,i}\}$  with  $nk$  elements, with the associated probabilities given by  $p' = \{p_{h,i}/n\}$ . Hence:

$$\sum_{j=1}^{nk} p'_j = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k p_{h,i}/n = 1 \quad (7)$$

The arithmetic mean of this pseudo distribution,  $\bar{Y}_p$ , is equal to  $\bar{Y}$  in (2) above. The variance of this pseudo distribution,  $S_p^2$ , is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{S}_p^2 &= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k p_{h,i} y_{h,i}^2 - \left[ \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k p_{h,i} y_{h,i} \right]^2 \\ &= \frac{1}{n} \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{i=1}^n p_{h,i} y_{h,i}^2 - \frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{i=1}^n p_{h,i}^2 y_{h,i}^2 \\ &\quad - \frac{2}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{l=1}^{h-1} p_{h,i} y_{h,i} p_{l,i} y_{l,i} \\ &\quad - \frac{2}{n^2} \left( \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{l=1}^k p_{h,i} y_{h,i} p_{l,j} y_{l,j} \right) \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

Again, this expression depends on the powers of the various probabilities, which appear in the term in square brackets, so it cannot be expected to equal the arithmetic mean of the individual sample variances given in (4). The difference between the method using all combinations and that using

the pseudo method is:

$$\begin{aligned}
\overline{S}_p^2 - \overline{S}^2 &= -\frac{1}{n^2} \left( \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{i=1}^n (p_{h,i}^2 y_{h,i}^2 - p_{h,i} y_{h,i}^2) + 2 \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{l=1}^{h-1} p_{h,i} y_{h,i} p_{l,i} y_{l,i} \right) \\
&= -\frac{1}{n^2} \left( \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{i=1}^n \left( p_{h,i}^2 y_{h,i}^2 + 2 \sum_{l=1}^{h-1} p_{h,i} y_{h,i} p_{l,i} y_{l,i} \right) - \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{i=1}^n p_{h,i} y_{h,i}^2 \right) \\
&= -\frac{1}{n^2} \left( \sum_{i=1}^n \left( \sum_{h=1}^k p_{h,i} y_{h,i} \right)^2 - \sum_{h=1}^k \sum_{i=1}^n p_{h,i} y_{h,i}^2 \right) \\
&= -\frac{1}{n^2} \sum_{i=1}^n \left( (\overline{y}_i)^2 - \overline{y_i^2} \right) \geq 0 \tag{9}
\end{aligned}$$

The pseudo method always overestimates the true expected variance, which is as expected because the method exaggerates the true variety of incomes by treating all individual hours points as separate observations with weights relative to the probability of occurring. Comparing this difference to the difference for the method using expected income demonstrates that, for samples of more than two persons, estimates of the variance using the pseudo method are closer to the variance calculated in the method using all combinations, compared with estimates using the expected income method. Furthermore, the true outcome lies in between the pseudo method and the expected income method. The difference is expected to become smaller for the pseudo method as the sample size increases, indicating that the exaggeration of the income variability becomes less important when the number of individuals in the sample increases.

### 3 Monte Carlo Experiments

The previous section compares differences in average income and the variance using three approaches. As mentioned earlier, comparing other summary measures is intractable. Thus this section uses Monte Carlo simulation methods to examine the relative performance of the alternative approaches discussed in the previous section.

### 3.1 The Experimental Approach

To ensure that the simulations were based on realistic distributions, a base sample of 10,293 individuals was produced using the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS).<sup>7</sup> This sample was generated from the confidentialised unit record files from the 1996/97 and 1997/98 Surveys of Income and Housing Costs made available by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. A sample of single persons was selected to avoid the additional run time (and additional complexity) that would be introduced by examining the hours distribution of couples jointly, thus keeping the number of hours points to a minimum for the experiment.<sup>8</sup> The sample provides, for each individual, the incomes and probabilities associated with  $k = 11$  discrete hours levels ranging from 0 to 50 hours in five-hourly bands. Examples of three hours distributions are shown in Figure 1.

It is of interest to consider the properties of poverty and inequality measures as the sample size  $n$  varies, so values of  $n$  of 50, 100, 250 and 500 were examined. The use of the smaller sizes is relevant where samples are divided into particular socio-economic or demographic groups. In each case, 1000 subsamples of size  $n$  were drawn from the basic data set of about 10,000 individuals. Gini,  $G$ , and Atkinson inequality measures,  $A$  (with relative inequality aversion set to 0.4) were computed along with the variance,  $V$ . In addition, three poverty measures were computed from the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) family. The measures chosen are the headcount measure,  $P_0$ ; one that depends on the extent to which individuals fall below the poverty line,  $P_1$ ; and finally a measure that also depends on the coefficient of variation of incomes of those in poverty,  $P_2$ .<sup>9</sup> The poverty line was set in relative terms at half the median income; hence the poverty line varies across samples.

First it is necessary to consider the behaviour of the method of sampling from the set of possible alternative distributions. Although the number of

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<sup>7</sup>For details of this model, see Creedy *et al.* (2002).

<sup>8</sup>Extension of the method to apply to couples is however straightforward and only involves an increase in the number of possible combinations.

<sup>9</sup>See Creedy (1996) or Deaton (1997) for an overview of these measures.





Figure 1: Examples of Hours Distributions




Figure 2: Convergence for Mean Income

possible distributions is huge (even for samples sizes of 50, with 11 hours levels there are  $11^{50}$  possible combinations), it was found that the values for the inequality measures and the values for mean income converged by 50,000 draws.<sup>10</sup> The convergence of mean income and the Gini inequality measure are shown in Figures 2 and 3 respectively, for the case of  $n = 50$ . Of course, this does not provide a practical approach that could be used easily in microsimulation models, particularly for larger samples.<sup>11</sup> However, the associated stable values can be regarded as the ‘true’ values against which the performance of the alternative approaches may be gauged in this experiment.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup>Convergence takes place more quickly for the larger samples. However in many instances, the difference between the ‘true’ measure or mean and the measure or mean found through the sampling approach is already small using many fewer draws even for the smaller sample sizes.

<sup>11</sup>For  $n = 500$ , taking 1000 repetitions, each of which involves 50,000 random draws from the 500 individuals’ hours distributions in the sample, the computation time is substantial at around four days.

<sup>12</sup>There is one exception. It was demonstrated in section 2 that the use of average incomes, and the pseudo distribution, provide exact measures of the (appropriately weighted) mean,  $\bar{X}$ . Where 10 draws are taken with the sampling approach, the mean from the pseudo distribution has been taken as the ‘true’ value, rather than that produced by 50,000 draws.




Figure 3: Convergence For Gini Inequality Measure

## 3.2 Experimental Results

Tables 2 to 5 present the Monte Carlo results for three approaches comparing deviations of the various approaches from the ‘true’ values for 1000 replications of the experiments.<sup>13</sup> The first two methods are the expected income method and the pseudo method. To explore the quality of the sampling approach when few draws are used, results are also produced for the sampling approach with 10 draws. The use of 10 draws would be feasible in practice and this number has been shown to be sufficient in other situations, such as for example, Simulated Maximum Likelihood estimations.<sup>14</sup>

From all measures in the tables, it is clear that the pseudo method performs much better than the expected income method. As shown analytically for the variance, the two inequality measures are also always underestimated by the expected income method and overestimated by the pseudo method for samples with 50 or 100 individuals. This is as expected given that the ex-

<sup>13</sup>The experiment where a sample of 500 individuals is used took roughly four days to run. This involved drawing around 50,000,000 times (which is less than  $10^8$ ) from the 500 hours distributions and computing averages across the 50,000 draws in each of the 1000 replications. The exact measure for the same sample would involve  $11^{500}$  different combinations which compared to the above drawing of 50,000 would require an enormous amount of time and be infeasible to carry out.

<sup>14</sup>In Van Soest (1995), 5 draws seemed sufficient in one of the models estimated using the Simulated Maximum Likelihood approach.

Table 2: Distribution of Differences from ‘True Value’: n=50

|  | $G$      | $A$      | $P_0$    | $P_1$    | $P_2$    | $\bar{X}$ | $V$      |
|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|
| Average "true" values                              |          |          |          |          |          |           |          |
|  | 0.33391  | 0.084995 | 0.115037 | 0.062394 | 0.047425 | 318.27    | 42674.11 |
| Use of each individual's expected income           |          |          |          |          |          |           |          |
| Mean   | -0.0336  | -0.01199 | -0.00526 | 9.18E-06 | 0.000372 |           | -7303.94 |
| mse <sup>a</sup>                                   | 0.001174 | 0.000148 | 0.000404 | 2.78E-05 | 1.26E-05 |           | 55194286 |
| Min  | -0.06056 | -0.01993 | -0.0821  | -0.01785 | -0.01328 |           | -11498.1 |
| Max  | -0.01467 | -0.00621 | 0.08906  | 0.025669 | 0.017747 |           | -3531.46 |
| Use of pseudo distribution of income               |          |          |          |          |          |           |          |
| Mean   | 0.004543 | 0.000275 | 0.001585 | 0.000748 | 0.000459 |           | 149.8281 |
| mse <sup>a</sup>                                   | 0.000021 | 7.87E-08 | 0.000083 | 2.52E-06 | 8.82E-07 |           | 23739.04 |
| Min  | 0.001503 | 0.000079 | -0.0253  | -0.00373 | -0.00267 |           | 4.246241 |
| Max  | 0.006876 | 0.000499 | 0.041592 | 0.006866 | 0.004414 |           | 314.5633 |
| Use of 10 random draws from possible distributions |          |          |          |          |          |           |          |
| Mean   | -3.5E-05 | -6.3E-06 | 0.000419 | 9.77E-05 | 7.14E-05 | 0.093905  | -41.5227 |
| mse <sup>a</sup>                                   | 0.000017 | 3.24E-06 | 0.000057 | 5.67E-06 | 3.1E-06  | 14.72302  | 2736878  |
| Min  | -0.01408 | -0.0078  | -0.02878 | -0.01001 | -0.00698 | -11.542   | -11104.1 |
| Max  | 0.011255 | 0.006216 | 0.049411 | 0.013506 | 0.012192 | 13.13847  | 9338.877 |
| Note a: mse stands for the mean squared error.     |          |          |          |          |          |           |          |

Table 3: Distribution of Differences from ‘True Value’: n=100

|  | $G$      | $A$      | $P_0$    | $P_1$    | $P_2$    | $\bar{X}$ | $V$      |
|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|
| Average "true" values                              |          |          |          |          |          |           |          |
|  | 0.337054 | 0.085744 | 0.112875 | 0.062622 | 0.047801 | 318.11    | 43145.16 |
| Use of each individual's expected income           |          |          |          |          |          |           |          |
| Mean   | -0.03405 | -0.01218 | -0.00248 | 4.47E-05 | 0.000303 |           | -7369.36 |
| mse <sup>a</sup>                                   | 0.00118  | 0.00015  | 0.000194 | 1.23E-05 | 5.97E-06 |           | 55064023 |
| Min  | -0.0494  | -0.0167  | -0.05305 | -0.01051 | -0.00849 |           | -10896.5 |
| Max  | -0.0194  | -0.00813 | 0.062672 | 0.014378 | 0.008512 |           | -4648.41 |
| Use of pseudo distribution of income               |          |          |          |          |          |           |          |
| Mean   | 0.002273 | 0.000137 | 0.001157 | 0.000364 | 0.000237 |           | 74.73766 |
| mse <sup>a</sup>                                   | 5.23E-06 | 1.94E-08 | 0.000039 | 7.18E-07 | 2.51E-07 |           | 5944.869 |
| Min  | 0.001236 | 0.000063 | -0.02872 | -0.00286 | -0.0011  |           | 6.374102 |
| Max  | 0.003116 | 0.000244 | 0.025762 | 0.003468 | 0.002167 |           | 155.9846 |
| Use of 10 random draws from possible distributions |          |          |          |          |          |           |          |
| Mean   | 1.91E-05 | 1.3E-05  | 0.000204 | 6.33E-05 | 3.97E-05 | 0.185203  | 31.26735 |
| mse <sup>a</sup>                                   | 7.41E-06 | 1.55E-06 | 0.000022 | 2.54E-06 | 1.54E-06 | 7.814952  | 1479075  |
| Min  | -0.00835 | -0.0045  | -0.02395 | -0.00516 | -0.00408 | -10.4604  | -7314.95 |
| Max  | 0.009678 | 0.005463 | 0.022216 | 0.005611 | 0.004703 | 10.86006  | 5933.581 |
| Note a: mse stands for the mean squared error.     |          |          |          |          |          |           |          |

Table 4: Distribution of Differences from ‘True Value’: n=250

|  | $G$      | $A$      | $P_0$    | $P_1$    | $P_2$    | $\bar{X}$ | $V$      |
|--|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|-----------|----------|
| Average "true" values                              |          |          |          |          |          |           |          |
|  | 0.338943 | 0.086112 | 0.114024 | 0.063022 | 0.048044 | 317.97    | 43322.27 |
| Use of each individual's expected income           |          |          |          |          |          |           |          |
| Mean   | -0.03437 | -0.01227 | -0.00156 | 0.000181 | 0.000301 |           | -7417.44 |
| mse <sup>a</sup>                                   | 0.001191 | 0.000151 | 0.000108 | 5.11E-06 | 2.53E-06 |           | 55352057 |
| Min  | -0.04348 | -0.01506 | -0.03549 | -0.00592 | -0.00429 |           | -10211.7 |
| Max  | -0.02511 | -0.01005 | 0.03473  | 0.008382 | 0.005616 |           | -5802.55 |
| Use of pseudo distribution of income               |          |          |          |          |          |           |          |
| Mean   | 0.000911 | 5.38E-05 | 0.00057  | 0.00012  | 8.41E-05 |           | 29.81149 |
| mse <sup>a</sup>                                   | 8.35E-07 | 3.05E-09 | 2.05E-05 | 1.75E-07 | 5.52E-08 |           | 1006.12  |
| Min  | 0.000678 | 0.000016 | -0.01327 | -0.00145 | -0.0008  |           | -10.9953 |
| Max  | 0.001146 | 0.000104 | 0.014827 | 0.001469 | 0.000927 |           | 85.59714 |
| Use of 10 random draws from possible distributions |          |          |          |          |          |           |          |
| Mean   | -8.5E-05 | -3.4E-05 | 2.62E-05 | 8.59E-06 | -7.9E-07 | 0.029564  | -10.633  |
| mse <sup>a</sup>                                   | 3.25E-06 | 6.53E-07 | 9.87E-06 | 9.77E-07 | 5.83E-07 | 2.999281  | 595096.4 |
| Min  | -0.00574 | -0.00267 | -0.01384 | -0.00367 | -0.00302 | -5.36467  | -3252.28 |
| Max  | 0.004986 | 0.002338 | 0.016108 | 0.003251 | 0.002815 | 4.945107  | 2578.688 |
| Note a: mse stands for the mean squared error.     |          |          |          |          |          |           |          |

Table 5: Distribution of Differences from ‘True Value’: n=500

|  | $G$       | $A$       | $P_0$     | $P_1$     | $P_2$     | $\bar{X}$ | $V$      |
|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| Average "true" values                              |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
|  | 0.340422  | 0.086779  | 0.115116  | 0.063697  | 0.048700  | 317.89    | 43486.24 |
| Use of each individual's expected income           |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| Mean   | -0.03424  | -0.01227  | -0.00090  | 0.000426  | 0.000361  |           | -7422.69 |
| mse <sup>a</sup>                                   | 0.001177  | 0.000151  | 0.000077  | 2.96E-06  | 1.35E-06  |           | 55254183 |
| Min  | -0.04077  | -0.01474  | -0.02098  | -0.00449  | -0.00378  |           | -8674.50 |
| Max  | -0.02718  | -0.01000  | 0.02746   | 0.006148  | 0.004455  |           | -6235.62 |
| Use of pseudo distribution of income               |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| Mean   | 0.000454  | 0.000026  | 0.00021   | 0.000010  | 0.000020  |           | 14.33324 |
| mse <sup>a</sup>                                   | 2.07E-07  | 7.68E-10  | 1.68E-05  | 5.30E-08  | 1.55E-08  |           | 260.649  |
| Min  | 0.000374  | -0.000001 | -0.01341  | -0.000817 | -0.000471 |           | -20.8162 |
| Max  | 0.000543  | 0.000051  | 0.012726  | 0.000951  | 0.000596  |           | 42.10908 |
| Use of 10 random draws from possible distributions |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |
| Mean   | 0.000072  | 3.12E-05  | -5.84E-05 | -3.02E-05 | -7.50E-06 | -0.001639 | 24.1993  |
| mse <sup>a</sup>                                   | 1.55E-06  | 3.05E-07  | 6.84E-06  | 5.18E-07  | 3.12E-07  | 1.522162  | 256246.7 |
| Min  | -0.003427 | -0.001878 | -0.01053  | -0.00198  | -0.00184  | -4.19253  | -1608.05 |
| Max  | 0.004071  | 0.001896  | 0.010913  | 0.002368  | 0.001782  | 3.823399  | 1670.176 |
| Note a: mse stands for the mean squared error.     |           |           |           |           |           |           |          |

pected income understates the true income variability and the pseudo income distribution overstates the income variability. However, for samples with 250 or 500 individuals, some negative differences between the "true" variance and the variance from the pseudo method are found. This does not happen very often and it can be explained by the fact that our "true" values which are used as benchmarks in the experiment are approximations as well. As the pseudo method improves with sample size, for  $n=250$  or  $500$  the pseudo method may sometimes get closer to the true value than the approximation by 50,000 draws, causing the difference to be negative rather than positive. This will happen more often for larger samples, making the pseudo method a computationally very efficient approach with an approximate value close to the true value.

The sampling method, using 10 draws, ranks in between the two other methods. Only its mean is nearly always smaller (except for some measures when  $n$  equals 500), but that is because negative and positive values partly offset each other in this approach, whereas the other two approaches tend to over- or underestimate the true values. The pseudo method clearly outperforms the sampling method with 10 draws except for the case of the headcount measure  $P_0$ . Nevertheless, on many occasions the accuracy of the sampling method using only 10 draws would be considered sufficient.

With an increase in sample size, the methods tend to perform better with the exception of the variance and inequality measures for the expected income method. Using the latter method, the mean distance from the true value does not change with sample size for  $G$ ,  $A$ ,  $P_2$  and  $V$ , whereas for  $P_0$  it falls and for  $P_1$  it increases.<sup>15</sup> Although the minimum and maximum values move towards each other in the expected income method, a bias remains. In the pseudo method and the sampling method with 10 draws, the minimum and maximum value both move towards the true value. The pseudo method improves faster with sample size than the sampling method with 10 draws.

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<sup>15</sup>This result for  $V$  makes sense when considering equations (6) and (9) in section 2.

## 4 A Simulation Example

To illustrate the use of the pseudo method, a hypothetical reform of the Australian tax and transfer system is examined. The Australian transfer system is complex, with many different types of benefit, each with its set of thresholds and taper (or withdrawal) rates, giving rise to highly nonlinear budget constraints. The simulations described in this section replace all existing basic social security benefits and additional payments such as rent assistance, pharmaceutical allowance and family payments by a basic non-taxable level of income. The existing direct tax structure (which includes the Medicare levy and all tax rebates) is replaced with a constant marginal tax rate on all taxable income (that is, all non-benefit forms of income). The reform is simulated using the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS). The method of simulating labour supply responses to tax reforms in MITTS is briefly described in subsection 4.1. The results of the simulation are described in 4.2.

### 4.1 The Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator

The behavioural responses in MITTS are based on the use of quadratic preference functions whereby the parameters are allowed to vary with an individual's characteristics. These parameters have been estimated for five demographic groups, which include married or partnered men and women, single men and women, and sole parents.

For the couples in the labour supply estimation, two sets of discrete labour supply points are used. Given that the female hours distribution covers a wider range of part-time and full-time hours than the male distribution, which is mostly divided between non-participation and full-time work, women's labour supply is divided into 11 discrete points, whereas men's labour supply is represented by just six points. The couple's joint labour supply is estimated simultaneously, unlike the popular approach in which female labour supply is estimated with the spouse's labour supply taken as

exogenous.<sup>16</sup> Thus for couples we have 66 possible joint labour supply combinations.

Rather than identifying a particular level of hours worked for each individual after a policy change, a probability distribution is generated over the discrete hours levels used.<sup>17</sup> The behavioural simulations begin by taking the discrete hours level for each individual that is closest to the observed hours level. Then, given the parameter estimates of the quadratic preference function (which vary according to a range of individual and household characteristics), a random draw is taken from the distribution of the ‘error’ term. This draw is rejected if it results in an optimal hours level that differs from the discretised value observed. The accepted drawings are then used in the determination of the optimal hours level after the policy change. A user-specified total number of ‘successful draws’ (that is, drawings which generate the observed hours as the optimal value under the base system for the individual) are produced. In computing the transition matrices, which show probabilities of movement between hours levels, the labour supply of each individual before the policy change is fixed at the observed discretised value and a number of transitions are produced for each individual, which is equal to the number of successful draws specified.<sup>18</sup> This gives rise to a probability distribution over the set of discrete hours for each individual under the new tax and transfer structure.

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<sup>16</sup>For those individuals in the data set who are not working, and who therefore do not report a wage rate, an imputed wage is obtained. This imputed wage is based on estimated wage functions, which allow for possible selectivity bias, by first estimating probit equations for labour market participation. However, some individuals are excluded from the database if their imputed wage or their observed wage (obtained by dividing total earnings by the number of hours worked) is unrealistic. The wage functions are reported in Kalb and Scutella (2002) and the preference functions are in Kalb (2002): these are updated versions of results reported in Creedy *et al.* (2002).

<sup>17</sup>Some individuals, such as the self employed, the disabled, students and those over 65 have their labour supply fixed at their observed hours.

<sup>18</sup>When examining average hours, the labour supply after the change for each individual is based on the average value over the successful draws, for which the error term leads to the correct predicted hours before the change. This is equivalent to calculating the expected hours of labour supply after the change, conditional on starting from the observed hours before the change. In computing the tax and revenue levels, an expected value is also obtained after the policy change. That is, the tax and revenue for each of the accepted draws are computed for each individual and an average over these is taken.

In some cases, the required number of successful random draws producing observed hours as the optimal hours cannot be generated from the model within a reasonable number of total drawings. The number of random draws tried, like the number of successful draws required, is specified by the user. If after the total draws from the error term distribution, the model fails to predict the observed labour supply, the individual is left at their observed hours in policy simulations. In the simulation example used here, the maximum number of random draws is set to 5000 with 100 successful draws required.

## 4.2 Simulation Results

In the simulations examined in this section, a basic non-taxable level of income replaces all existing basic social security benefits, and additional payments such as rent assistance, pharmaceutical allowance and family payments. The structure of the September 2001 tax and transfer system is used as the pre-reform system. In the reform system, the existing tax structure (which includes the Medicare levy and all tax rebates) is replaced with a constant marginal tax rate on all taxable income (all non-benefit forms of income). Basic income rates are set at the benefit levels as they were at September 2001 with basic income levels varying for different groups in the population reflecting the current situation. Characteristics that currently entitle individuals to a pension are used to determine whether an individual is entitled to a higher rate of basic income, which is referred to as the pension rate. This group includes those of age pension age, those with a disability, carers, veterans and sole parents. This payment is then differentiated by marital status to reflect the economies of scale of larger households. The remaining subset of the population receives a basic income level set at the current allowance payment rates. These payments also differ by age, such that single persons aged 16 or 17 years receive a lower basic income than older individuals, with youths still living at home receiving a lower rate again and those aged 60 years or over receive a higher level than 18 to 59 year olds. Members of a couple are entitled to a lower payment rate each than the single rate, reflecting economies of scale. To ensure revenue neutrality of the new

system compared to the 2001 system, the marginal tax rate required in this system was 55 per cent.

The removal of means testing reduces the disincentives to work for those on low incomes as it reduces the effective marginal tax rates significantly. Lowering the marginal tax rate has two opposing effects. A lower tax rate would induce substitution out of leisure and into work, as the price of leisure is higher. However, at the same time net incomes are higher at lower levels of labour supply, so some individuals/families may decide to reduce their hours of work. The net result depends on relative preferences for leisure and income. Higher taxes imposed at the high end of the income distribution may have an adverse effect on the labour supply of higher income earners.

A summary of the estimated labour supply responses across demographic groups is presented in Table 6 with the expected effect on net expenditure reported in Table 7. The responses differ greatly across the groups. Singles without children exhibit labour supply responses similar to those of married men. However, single persons seem more likely to decrease participation and to reduce their work effort as a result of a heavier tax burden than married men. Married males are the least likely to decrease their labour supply overall. Married women and sole parents tend to have larger income effects thus having a greater tendency to move out of the labour force with an increase in household income. In addition, the current payments to sole parents are withdrawn very gradually and thus a tax rate of over fifty per cent is higher than the effective marginal tax rate currently faced by them at low income levels, reducing their incentive to work after the reform compared with the 2001 system.

The adverse labour supply responses associated with a relatively high marginal tax rate imposes a large increase in net government expenditure. A large share of each individual's income is paid in tax, so a reduction in labour supply considerably reduces the revenue collected by the government. The large reduction in the labour supply of married females increases net government expenditure on couples. The higher tax rates on middle to high income earners are not enough to offset the decrease in revenue resulting from the decrease in participation and average working hours for this group. With a

Table 6: Behavioural Responses

|                      | Couples: |       | Single | Single | Single  |
|----------------------|----------|-------|--------|--------|---------|
|                      | Men      | Women | Men    | Women  | Parents |
| Workers (% base)     | 58.6     | 45.7  | 55.1   | 44.2   | 42.4    |
| Workers (% reform)   | 58.5     | 41.2  | 53.6   | 43.3   | 37.2    |
| Non-work → work (%)  | 1.2      | 0.4   | 0.3    | 0.5    | 0.4     |
| Work → non-work (%)  | 1.3      | 4.8   | 1.8    | 1.4    | 5.6     |
| Workers working more | 1.3      | 0.3   | 0.0    | 0.1    | 2.0     |
| Workers working less | 2.4      | 1.9   | 1.4    | 2.3    | 1.1     |
| Average hours change | -0.2     | -1.9  | -0.9   | -0.8   | -0.6    |

Table 7: Net Expenditure Summary (in millions of dollars)

|                | Couples  | Single  | Single  | Single  | Total   |
|----------------|----------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
|                |          | Men     | Women   | Parents |         |
| Fixed hours    | -4,024.5 | 1,735.8 | 2,042.8 | -282.5  | -528.4  |
| Variable hours | 2,044.3  | 2,859.5 | 2,895.4 | -172.0  | 7,627.2 |

general reduction in labour supply across all groups, net government expenditure increases after the reform when labour supply responses are taken into account.

To examine the effects of this policy change on the distribution of income before and after labour supply changes, three summary measures are presented. First, two commonly used measures of inequality, the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson measure of inequality, are examined. As the reform system provides relatively generous basic income levels financed by heavily taxing the working population, it is not surprising that inequality is reduced quite significantly after the reform; see Tables 8 and 9. Adjusting for labour supply responses does not have a strong effect on the presented measures of inequality in this case, since those who move out of the labour force were on low wages.

For the analysis of poverty, values of the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke Index of poverty are presented in Table 10. The inclusion of labour supply responses in the simulation clearly affects the headcount measure, resulting from the larger shift in median income. Taking into account labour supply

Table 8: Gini Coefficient by Income Unit Type

| Group          | Fixed hours |        |          | Variable hours |        |          |
|----------------|-------------|--------|----------|----------------|--------|----------|
|                | Before      | After  | % change | Before         | After  | % change |
| Couple         | 0.3103      | 0.2758 | -11.1    | 0.3030         | 0.2701 | -10.9    |
| Cple+dep       | 0.2460      | 0.1963 | -20.2    | 0.2333         | 0.1857 | -20.4    |
| Single Females | 0.2925      | 0.2616 | -10.6    | 0.2950         | 0.2609 | -11.6    |
| Single Males   | 0.3297      | 0.2825 | -14.3    | 0.3343         | 0.2839 | -15.1    |
| Sole Parents   | 0.2154      | 0.2067 | -4.0     | 0.2101         | 0.2029 | -3.4     |
| all            | 0.3014      | 0.2654 | -12.0    | 0.2980         | 0.2616 | -12.2    |

responses results in more poverty than would otherwise be the case. This effect becomes less pronounced when the extent of the poverty is taken into account in the poverty gap and the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke measure of poverty with  $\alpha = 2$ .

## 5 Conclusions

This paper has compared alternative approaches to the measurement of inequality and poverty indices in the context of behavioural microsimulation with discrete hours labour supply models. Special consideration is needed because microsimulation modelling using a discrete hours approach does not identify a particular level of hours worked for each individual after a policy change, but generates a probability distribution over the discrete hours levels used. This makes analysis of the distribution of income difficult because, even for a small sample with a modest range of hours points, the range of possible labour supply combinations becomes too large to handle.

The approaches examined include the use of an expected income level for each individual. Alternatively, a simulated approach could be used in which labour supply values are drawn from each individual's hours distribution and summary statistics of the distribution of income are calculated by taking the average over each set of draws. Finally, the construction of a pseudo income distribution was proposed. This uses the probability of a particular labour supply value occurring (standardised by the population size) to refer to a particular position in the pseudo income distribution.

Table 9: Atkinson Inequality Measures by Income Units

| Group               | Fixed hours |        |          | Variable hours |        |          |
|---------------------|-------------|--------|----------|----------------|--------|----------|
|                     | Before      | After  | % change | Before         | After  | % change |
| $\varepsilon = 0.1$ |             |        |          |                |        |          |
| Couple              | 0.0155      | 0.0123 | -20.6    | 0.0147         | 0.0117 | -20.4    |
| Cple+dep            | 0.0106      | 0.007  | -33.0    | 0.0095         | 0.0062 | -34.7    |
| Single Females      | 0.0141      | 0.0112 | -20.6    | 0.0145         | 0.0112 | -22.1    |
| Single Males        | 0.0182      | 0.0136 | -25.8    | 0.0188         | 0.0137 | -27.1    |
| Sole Parents        | 0.0083      | 0.0077 | -7.2     | 0.008          | 0.0075 | -7.5     |
| all                 | 0.0151      | 0.0117 | -22.5    | 0.0148         | 0.0113 | -23.0    |
| $\varepsilon = 0.5$ |             |        |          |                |        |          |
| Couple              | 0.0749      | 0.0597 | -20.3    | 0.0711         | 0.0568 | -20.1    |
| Cple+dep            | 0.0498      | 0.0332 | -33.3    | 0.0448         | 0.0294 | -34.4    |
| Single Females      | 0.0680      | 0.0540 | -20.6    | 0.0697         | 0.0539 | -22.7    |
| Single Males        | 0.0879      | 0.0646 | -26.5    | 0.0906         | 0.0652 | -28.0    |
| Sole Parents        | 0.0387      | 0.0360 | -7.0     | 0.0373         | 0.0348 | -6.4     |
| all                 | 0.0724      | 0.0564 | -22.1    | 0.0710         | 0.0546 | -23.0    |
| $\varepsilon = 1$   |             |        |          |                |        |          |
| Couple              | 0.1429      | 0.1145 | -19.8    | 0.1355         | 0.1091 | -19.5    |
| Cple+dep            | 0.0934      | 0.0627 | -32.9    | 0.0843         | 0.0560 | -33.6    |
| Single Females      | 0.1300      | 0.1028 | -20.9    | 0.1332         | 0.1020 | -23.4    |
| Single Males        | 0.1686      | 0.1222 | -27.5    | 0.1740         | 0.1232 | -29.3    |
| Sole Parents        | 0.0711      | 0.0661 | -7.0     | 0.0684         | 0.0641 | -6.3     |
| all                 | 0.1380      | 0.1078 | -21.9    | 0.1355         | 0.1046 | -22.8    |
| $\varepsilon = 2$   |             |        |          |                |        |          |
| Couple              | 0.2563      | 0.208  | -18.9    | 0.2429         | 0.1981 | -18.4    |
| Cple+dep            | 0.1684      | 0.1151 | -31.7    | 0.1524         | 0.1037 | -32.0    |
| Single Females      | 0.2383      | 0.1840 | -22.7    | 0.2451         | 0.1814 | -26.0    |
| Single Males        | 0.3114      | 0.2191 | -29.7    | 0.3221         | 0.2202 | -31.6    |
| Sole Parents        | 0.1218      | 0.1127 | -7.5     | 0.1170         | 0.1098 | -6.2     |
| all                 | 0.2527      | 0.1968 | -22.1    | 0.2501         | 0.1914 | -23.5    |

Table 10: Alternative Poverty Measures

|  | Fixed hours |          |        | Variable hours |          |        |
|--|-------------|----------|--------|----------------|----------|--------|
|  | Before      | After    | %      | Before         | After    | %      |
| <i>Poverty line</i>  |             |          |        |                |          |        |
| 50% median income  | \$182.15    | \$198.28 |        | \$176.28       | \$221.20 |        |
| $\alpha = 0$ ( <i>headcount</i> ) <sup>a</sup>                                   |             |          |        |                |          |        |
| Couple   | 0.0157      | 0.0000   | -100.0 | 0.0150         | 0.0490   | 227.3  |
| Cple+dep   | 0.0151      | 0.0000   | -100.0 | 0.0173         | 0.0027   | -84.4  |
| Single Females   | 0.0685      | 0.1177   | 71.8   | 0.0768         | 0.3980   | 418.1  |
| Single Males   | 0.0710      | 0.1137   | 60.1   | 0.0784         | 0.2798   | 256.9  |
| Sole Parents   | 0.0111      | 0.0000   | -100.0 | 0.0035         | 0.0161   | 362.9  |
| all  | 0.0409      | 0.0547   | 33.7   | 0.0444         | 0.1724   | 288.3  |
| $\alpha = 1$ ( <i>poverty gap</i> )  |             |          |        |                |          |        |
| Couple   | 0.0054      | 0.0000   | -100.0 | 0.0053         | 0.0017   | -67.9  |
| Cple+dep   | 0.0031      | 0.0000   | -100.0 | 0.0029         | 0.0001   | -93.1  |
| Single Females   | 0.0224      | 0.0157   | -29.9  | 0.0258         | 0.0420   | 62.8   |
| Single Males   | 0.0260      | 0.0103   | -60.4  | 0.0299         | 0.0316   | 5.7    |
| Sole Parents   | 0.0005      | 0.0000   | -100.0 | 0.0001         | 0.0002   | 100.0  |
| all  | 0.0135      | 0.0061   | -54.8  | 0.0151         | 0.0177   | 17.2   |
| $\alpha = 2$   |             |          |        |                |          |        |
| Couple   | 0.0021      | 0.0000   | -100.0 | 0.0020         | 0.0001   | -100.0 |
| Cple+dep   | 0.0007      | 0.0000   | -100.0 | 0.0006         | 0.0000   | -100.0 |
| Single Females   | 0.0096      | 0.0034   | -64.6  | 0.0115         | 0.0080   | -29.6  |
| Single Males   | 0.0121      | 0.0015   | -87.6  | 0.0140         | 0.0054   | -61.4  |
| Sole Parents   | 0.0000      | 0.0000   | 0.0    | 0.0000         | 0.0000   | 0.0    |
| all  | 0.0058      | 0.0012   | -81.0  | 0.0067         | 0.0032   | -52.2  |
| note a: a larger $\alpha$ indicates that larger poverty gaps are penalised more. |             |          |        |                |          |        |

It was shown that the outcomes of various distributional measures using the pseudo distribution method converge to their ‘true’ values as the sample size used in microsimulation increases. However, the method performs well for a sample as small as 50 individuals. The pseudo method performs better than the expected income method or the sampling approach with just 10 draws. The latter has a similar computational burden to the pseudo approach. The feasibility of the pseudo approach is demonstrated in an illustrative example where the labour supply responses and implications for the distribution of income were examined for a hypothetical reform of the Australian tax and transfer system.

## Appendix: Inequality and Poverty Measures Using the Different Approaches

This appendix lists the expressions for the inequality and poverty measures used in this paper, for the alternative approaches.<sup>19</sup>

First, the *Atkinson measure* (for unit-relative inequality aversion) is, for all combinations:

$$1 - \sum_{m=1}^{k^n} p_{h_{1m},1} p_{h_{2m},2} \dots p_{h_{nm},n} \frac{\exp \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \ln(y_{h_{im},i})}{\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n y_{h_{im},i}}$$

The sampling approach is similar, where a sample is drawn from all possible combinations and the probability of drawing a particular combination  $m$  is equal to the probability  $p_{h_{1m},1} p_{h_{2m},2} \dots p_{h_{nm},n}$ . Using expected incomes:

$$1 - \frac{\exp \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \ln(\sum_{h=1}^k p_{hi} y_{hi})}{\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k p_{hi} y_{hi}}$$

Using the pseudo approach:

$$1 - \frac{\exp \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k p_{hi} \ln(y_{hi})}{\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k p_{hi} y_{hi}}$$

Second, the *Gini Coefficient* for all combinations is expressed as:

$$\frac{n+1}{n-1} - 2 \sum_{m=1}^{k^n} p_{h_{1m},1} p_{h_{2m},2} \dots p_{h_{nm},n} \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \rho_{l_{im}} y_{h_{l_{im},m} l_{im}}}{n(n-1) \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n y_{h_{im},i}}$$

with  $l_{im}$  indicating the index for the household with the  $i^{th}$  ranked income in the  $m^{th}$  combination and  $\rho_{l_{im}} = \rho_{l_{i-1,m}} + 1$ . Using expected incomes it is:

$$\frac{n+1}{n-1} - 2 \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \rho_{l_i^*} \sum_{h=1}^k p_{h l_i^*} y_{h l_i^*}}{n(n-1) \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k p_{hi} y_{hi}}$$

with  $l_i^*$  indicating the index for the household with the  $i^{th}$  ranked expected income and  $\rho_{l_i^*} = \rho_{l_{i-1}^*} + 1$ . Using the pseudo method the Gini measure is:

$$\frac{n+1}{n-1} - 2 \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k \rho_{v_{h(i-1)+h}, \hat{l}_{h(i-1)+h}} p_{v_{h(i-1)+h}, \hat{l}_{h(i-1)+h}} y_{v_{h(i-1)+h}, \hat{l}_{h(i-1)+h}}}{n(n-1) \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k p_{hi} y_{hi}}$$

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<sup>19</sup>Creedy (1996) and Deaton (1997) present a range of inequality and poverty measures, including those presented here.

with  $\widehat{l}_{h(i-1)+h}$  indicating the index for the household with the  $(h(i-1)+h)^{th}$  ranked income within the  $nh$  possible incomes,  $v_{h(i-1)+h}$  indicating the index for the discrete hours point with the  $(h(i-1)+h)^{th}$  ranked income and  $\rho_{v_{h(i-1)+h}, \widehat{l}_{h(i-1)+h}} = \rho_{v_{h(i-1)+h-1}, \widehat{l}_{h(i-1)+h-1}} + P_{v_{h(i-1)+h}, \widehat{l}_{h(i-1)+h}}$ .

Third, the *headcount measure* for all combinations is:

$$\sum_{m=1}^{k^n} p_{h_{1m},1} p_{h_{2m},2} \dots p_{h_{nm},n} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n 1(y_{h_{im},i} \leq y_{pov,m})$$

where  $y_{pov,m} = 0.5 \times y_{h_{l_{im}m}, l_{im}}$  and  $l_{im}$  indicates the index for the household with the  $i^{th}$  ranked income in the  $m^{th}$  combination, where  $i/n = 0.5$ . Using expected income it is:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n 1\left(\sum_{h=1}^k p_{hi} y_{hi} \leq y_{pov}\right)$$

where  $y_{pov} = 0.5 \times \sum_{h=1}^k p_{h l_i^*} y_{h l_i^*}$  with  $l_i^*$  indicating the index for the household with the  $i^{th}$  ranked expected income, where  $i/n = 0.5$ . Using the pseudo method it is:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k p_{hi} 1(y_{hi} \leq y_{pov})$$

where  $y_{pov} = 0.5 \times y_{v_{h(i-1)+h}, \widehat{l}_{h(i-1)+h}}$  with  $\widehat{l}_{h(i-1)+h}$  indicating the index for the household with the  $(h(i-1)+h)^{th}$  ranked income within the  $nh$  possible incomes,  $v_{h(i-1)+h}$  indicating the index for the discrete hours point with the  $(h(i-1)+h)^{th}$  ranked income, where  $h(i-1)+h$  indicates the income where  $\sum_{k=1}^{h(i-1)+h} p_{v_k, \widehat{l}_k} = 0.5$ .

Fourth, the *Poverty Gap measure* for all combinations is:

$$\sum_{m=1}^{k^n} p_{h_{1m},1} p_{h_{2m},2} \dots p_{h_{nm},n} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \left(1 - \frac{y_{h_{im},i}}{y_{pov,m}}\right) 1(y_{h_{im},i} \leq y_{pov,m})$$

where  $y_{pov,m} = 0.5 \times y_{h_{l_{im}m}, l_{im}}$  with  $l_{im}$  indicating the index for the household with the  $i^{th}$  ranked income in the  $m^{th}$  combination, where  $i/n = 0.5$ . Using expected income it is:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \left(1 - \frac{\sum_{h=1}^k p_{hi} y_{hi}}{y_{pov}}\right) 1\left(\sum_{h=1}^k p_{hi} y_{hi} \leq y_{pov}\right)$$

where  $y_{pov} = 0.5 \times \sum_{h=1}^k p_{hl_i^*} y_{hl_i^*}$  with  $l_i^*$  indicating the index for the household with the  $i^{th}$  ranked expected income, where  $i/n = 0.5$ . Using the pseudo method it is:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k p_{hi} \left( 1 - \frac{y_{hi}}{y_{pov}} \right) 1(y_{hi} \leq y_{pov})$$

where  $y_{pov} = 0.5 \times y_{v_{h(i-1)+h}, \hat{l}_{h(i-1)+h}}$  with  $\hat{l}_{h(i-1)+h}$  indicating the index for the household with the  $(h(i-1) + h)^{th}$  ranked income within the  $nh$  possible incomes,  $v_{h(i-1)+h}$  indicating the index for the discrete hours point with the  $(h(i-1) + h)^{th}$  ranked income, where  $h(i-1) + h$  indicates the income where  $\sum_{k=1}^{h(i-1)+h} p_{v_k, \hat{l}_k} = 0.5$ .

Fifth, the *Foster, Greer and Thorbecke measure* with  $\alpha = 2$ , can be expressed, for all combinations, as:

$$\sum_{m=1}^{k^n} p_{h_{1m}, 1} p_{h_{2m}, 2} \dots p_{h_{nm}, n} \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n \left( 1 - \frac{y_{h_{im}, i}}{y_{pov, m}} \right)^\alpha 1(y_{h_{im}, i} \leq y_{pov, m})$$

where  $y_{pov, m} = 0.5 \times y_{h_{im}, l_{im}}$  with  $l_{im}$  indicating the index for the household with the  $i^{th}$  ranked income in the  $m^{th}$  combination, where  $i/n = 0.5$ . Using expected incomes it is:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \left( 1 - \frac{\sum_{h=1}^k p_{hi} y_{hi}}{y_{pov}} \right)^\alpha 1\left(\sum_{h=1}^k p_{hi} y_{hi} \leq y_{pov}\right)$$

where  $y_{pov} = 0.5 \times \sum_{h=1}^k p_{hl_i^*} y_{hl_i^*}$  with  $l_i^*$  indicating the index for the household with the  $i^{th}$  ranked expected income, where  $i/n = 0.5$ . Using the pseudo method it is:

$$\sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{h=1}^k p_{hi} \left( 1 - \frac{y_{hi}}{y_{pov}} \right)^\alpha 1(y_{hi} \leq y_{pov})$$

where  $y_{pov} = 0.5 \times y_{v_{h(i-1)+h}, \hat{l}_{h(i-1)+h}}$  with  $\hat{l}_{h(i-1)+h}$  indicating the index for the household with the  $(h(i-1) + h)^{th}$  ranked income within the  $nh$  possible incomes,  $v_{h(i-1)+h}$  indicating the index for the discrete hours point with the  $(h(i-1) + h)^{th}$  ranked income, where  $h(i-1) + h$  indicates the income where  $\sum_{k=1}^{h(i-1)+h} p_{v_k, \hat{l}_k} = 0.5$ .

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