

Work Hours Mismatch in the U.S. and Australia*

Robert Drago, Professor of Labor Studies and Women's Studies, The Pennsylvania State University, and Professorial Fellow, Melbourne University

Mark Wooden, Professorial Fellow and Deputy Director, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, The University of Melbourne

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ABSTRACT:

We use cross-sectional data on preferred and usual work hours in the U.S. and Australia from the 2002 National Study of the Changing Workforce and the 2002 wave of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia survey. We test for the presence of a “time divide” in each nation, whereby many long hours employees prefer shorter hours and many short hours employees desire longer hours. We divide the samples into employees who are overworked, underworked, and matched on preferred and usual hours, and test for associations between these categories and various hypothesized related conditions.

Given a variety of institutional considerations, we hypothesize that: 1) the time divide will be more pronounced in the U.S.; 2) women and mothers employed part-time in Australia will be less likely to report underwork; 3) men and fathers will more often report overwork in the U.S. relative to Australia; 4) professionals and managers will more often report overwork in both nations but particularly in the U.S.; 5) unions will be associated with fewer reports of both underwork and overwork across the samples, and may particularly reduce the time divide in Australia; and 6) neotraditional family arrangements will be associated with less reported underwork among women working part-time, and less reported overwork among men. Only the first hypothesis is fully supported. The results also suggest that a heavy reliance on neotraditional family arrangements in Australia has done little to alleviate the time divide there.

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Work Hours Mismatch in the U.S. and Australia

Many academics and practitioners are urging employers to provide greater flexibility in total hours of employment. As Moen and Roehling (2005) argue, we need the clockwork of careers to become “flexible enough to be compatible with the clockwork of the rest of life for all employees, regardless of their gender, their age, or their family responsibilities” (p. 188). Similarly, Hewlett’s (2005) study of highly educated women concludes that businesses need to create reduced hours positions for women, and particularly new mothers, if they are to retain valued employees. For academics, Drago and Williams (2000) promoted the notion of a half-time tenure-track to permit academics to simultaneously meet commitments to career and home, downshifting when family demands are high and upshifting as those demands decline, while Leslie and Janson (2005) highlighted opportunities surrounding phased retirement.

Calls for enhanced flexibility over the life course are predicated on the existence of a workplace-workforce mismatch: employees need and desire flexibility in their hours of work, and employers are supplying an insufficient amount of flexibility. Evidence supporting this claim appears in studies comparing preferred and usual work hours. These studies reveal evidence of a ‘time divide’ wherein overworked employees – persons who work long hours and desire fewer – coexist with underworked employees – persons who work short hours and desire more. Evidence consistent with a time divide appears in studies of the U.S. (Drago 2000; Jacobs and Gerson 2004) and of Australia (Drago, Tseng and Wooden 2005). This evidence suggests that employers in both nations are providing an insufficient quantity of medium-hours jobs.

While there have been several analyses of cross-national differences in the number of hours worked and in the pattern of those working hours (e.g., OECD 1998, 2004; Rubery, Smith and Fagan 1998; Jacobs and Gerson 2004), to date, no cross-national comparison of work hours mismatch has been undertaken. We provide such a comparison here using data on preferred and usual hours from the U.S. and Australia. To be sure, the two nations exhibit striking similarities. Both are part of the developed world, have democratic governments, are highly integrated into the global economy, and have European-based societies that are English-speaking in the main. More to the point, both nations have witnessed an increasing diversity of family forms, a rise in delayed and denied childbearing, and continuing gender inequality (Drago, Scutella and Pirretti forthcoming). In addition, among a list of nine developed nations, Jacobs and Gerson (2000) identify these two as having the highest proportions of employees reporting working long hours each week (at least 50).¹ These facts suggest that any comparison of the two nations will yield similar results, and that the results might not hold in analyses of other countries.

Nonetheless, there are important institutional differences, and it may be instructive to see whether these differences affect the extent of mismatch in each nation. Sources of significant current divergence between the two societies include governmental policies supportive of low-wage employees in Australia, along with more attractive part-time opportunities for mothers. However, there is also a relatively more equal division of labor in the home in the U.S., along with higher rates of labor force participation and of full-time employment for women in that nation. These differences may alter the extent and reasons for any time divide in the two nations.

¹ The OECD (2004) report data on the proportion of employees working long usual weekly hours for a much longer list of countries, but using a weekly hours cut-off of 45 hours rather than 50 hours. In this list Iceland, Japan, New Zealand and the United Kingdom all show up as having more male employees working long hours than both Australia and the US.

Theories of the Time Divide

The notion of a time divide implies a shortage of medium hours jobs – roughly those within some range of 30 to 40 hours per week, a range encompassing both the historical norm of the 40 hour week in the U.S. and of the 38 hour week in Australia. Many employees would choose these hours, but are forced into either longer or shorter hours jobs, and hence view themselves as either overworked or underworked. But why would employers provide fewer medium hours jobs than employees desire? Several dynamics may be at work.

First, fixed costs of employment may be relevant. For example, providing an office or equipment, family health insurance coverage, pensions, or vacations based on years of service, all drive up the fixed costs of hiring and retaining employees. Employers may, therefore, have an incentive to spread these fixed costs over a larger number of work hours per employee, and thereby generate the overwork side of the time divide. Indeed, when all costs of employment are fixed, employers have an incentive to demand – even if they cannot obtain – work hours up to the margin where productivity declines to zero. If these fixed costs are mainly associated with full-time employment, then employers also have an incentive to provide some short-hours jobs for which fixed costs are low.

Second, and relatedly, high dismissal costs give employers an incentive to provide long hours jobs. For example, in an industry with volatile sales, employers may seek long hours from employees during upturns so that they are not stuck with too many employees during downturns. That said, where it is difficult for employers to dismiss employees, current employees should also enjoy a substantial amount of bargaining power, so be in a stronger position to achieve preferred working hours arrangements.

Third, norms around ‘ideal workers’ may be in play (Bailyn 1993; Williams 1999). Ideal workers demonstrate commitment by working long hours for periods of years or decades, without interruption, and their performance is judged in part by high levels of ‘face time’ in the workplace. These norms are mainly applied to managers and professionals. If an ideal worker attempts to work reduced hours due to, for example, child care commitments, he or she may be subject to substantial reductions in hourly wages, lost promotion opportunities and generally be viewed as a substandard employee by co-workers and superiors. In this case, employees who wish to succeed will experience overwork, while those who effectively give up on their careers will be penalized with underwork. To the extent the norms are effective, we would expect far more overworked than underworked employees in managerial and professional careers.

Fourth, human capital may play a role in the time divide. As Becker (1985) argues, gains from specialization in couple families may make it optimal for one member to focus on paid work and the other to devote their efforts to unpaid work for the family. As a result, employees may often seek either long- or short-hours jobs, with employers having an incentive to invest in the human capital of long- but not short-hour job holders. However, these considerations should not generate a time divide: employees are selecting either long- or short-hours jobs in a rational fashion. What Moen and Roehling (2005) label the ‘neotraditional family’, wherein men perform most but not all paid work and women perform most but not all unpaid work is, in the Becker view, simply a result of the economy working itself out.

Fifth, governmental supports for families and the unemployed, as well as labor market regulations, may alter the time divide equation. For example, if income supports for the poor are means-tested, there may be incentives for individuals to work short-hours jobs. Somewhat differently, if minimum wages are higher in one nation, part-time and low-wage jobs are more likely to provide a reasonable income, thereby reducing perceived underwork.

These considerations raise an almost metaphysical question regarding survey research on the time divide: what factors are respondents viewing as constraints when answering questions regarding working time preferences? At a minimum, it seems reasonable to ask respondents to avoid viewing income as unchanging when work hours increase or decrease; presumably, most employees would enjoy reducing their working time if their income would not decline. Beyond this, we cannot know whether respondents in couple families view their partner's working time and income as a given or instead think through some sort of ideal family working time arrangements when answering hours preferences questions. Similarly, an individual working short hours due to means-tested government supports who claims to prefer longer hours might either assume that the supports would remain in place or instead take the loss of such supports into account; we simply cannot know whether or not these constraints are taken as given or fluid for a particular response. At a minimum, these issues call for caution in interpreting time divide results.

Institutional Considerations

In many ways, Australia and the U.S. are similar. As mentioned earlier, both are democratic states with mainly English-speaking residents, and both are heavily integrated into the world economy. Further, both have a similar mix of manufacturing and non-manufacturing employment; 11.4 percent of Australian workers are in manufacturing compared to 12.3 percent of U.S. workers.² Key differences surround gender roles and labor market institutions.

Gender Roles

In terms of gender, Australia is arguably more 'traditional'. While the participation of women in the labor force has increased dramatically in both nations in recent decades, female labor force participation rates in Australia still lag behind those in the US – 66.3 percent of working-age women in Australia in 2004 were either working or actively looking for work compared with 69.2 percent in the U.S.³ Looked at differently, employment to population ratios for women in the age group 25 to 54 years are 68.9 percent in Australia compared with 71.8 percent for women in the U.S, while for women in the age range of 55 to 64 years these ratios are 54.3 percent in the U.S. compared to only 41.7 percent in Australia.⁴

Not only are Australian women less often employed, but part-time employment is more common among those who do hold jobs. According to OECD data for 2004, just 8.1 percent of male employees in the US and 18.8 percent of female employees worked on a part-time basis (defined as less than 30 hours per week). By comparison, in Australia 16.1 percent of working men and 40.8 percent of working women were defined as part-time.⁵ By implication, traditional and neotraditional families are more common in Australia.

² According to the LABORSTA database at the International Labour Organization, as of 2003, 1,082,000 Australians were in manufacturing employment, compared to 9,481,000 employees nationwide. In the U.S., 16,902,000 out of 137,736,000 total employees were in manufacturing. See <http://laborsta.ilo.org/>, accessed April 1, 2006.

³ Source: OECD, *Employment Outlook 2005*, Statistical Annex: Table B.

⁴ Source: OECD, *Employment Outlook 2005*, Statistical Annex: Table C.

⁵ The source for these data is OECD, *Employment Outlook 2005*, Statistical Annex: Table E. Note that while the OECD does its best to convert data for each member country into a comparable format, there are differences in definitions that could not be dealt with. Most obviously the U.S. data are for wage and salary earners only whereas the Australian data relate to all employed persons. Further, the definition of part-time employment in the US data relates to usual hours in the main job while in the Australian data it is based on actual hours worked in all jobs.

Relatedly, crude divorce rate statistics suggest that marriages are more stable in Australia. As of 2004, the Australian rate was 2.6 divorces per 1000 in the adult population, while the U.S. rate was 3.7.⁶ Greater marital stability makes traditional and neotraditional families more viable over the life course for the women who rely on a male breadwinner and for the men who rely on women for unpaid family work.

It is not clear how more traditional gender roles will alter the time divide in Australia relative to the U.S. If Australian women (and perhaps men) are less concerned with gender equity in the labor market and the home, as the numbers above might suggest, then they should experience less of a time divide than their counterparts in the U.S. However, if Australian women (and some men) are involuntarily trapped in traditional gender roles, then the time divide should be more pronounced there.

The structure of governmental supports for children facilitates the higher incidence of traditional and neotraditional families in Australia. In the U.S., parents with very low incomes may qualify for Temporary Aid for Needy Families, a welfare-to-work program with time limits, their children may qualify for health insurance under the SCHIPS program, and many families qualify for small tax exemptions for dependent children and for child care expenses. In Australia, all parents who are either unemployed or have low incomes qualify for a parenting payment (around A\$250 per week for single parents). There is also a means-tested family tax benefit (Part A) for all parents, a means-tested child care benefit, and a means-tested family tax benefit (Part B) covering all single parents as well as non-employed parents in couple families.⁷ Although precise comparisons are difficult, our reading of these structures is that the incentive for mothers to either be non-employed or to work part-time is greater in Australia. To the extent this interpretation is correct, and if respondents take these structures as given, Australian mothers and particularly single mothers should less frequently report underwork at low hours of working time. Income supports are more generous for this group in Australia relative to the U.S., so desires for expanded hours among low-hours employees should be mitigated.

Labor Market Institutions

Australian and U.S. labor market institutions also diverge in ways that are relevant to the time divide. Historically, Australian wage determination was largely centralized under the 'awards' system, wherein unions and employers negotiated rates to which most other wages were keyed (Davis and Lansbury 1998). As recently as 1986, unions represented over 45 percent of Australian employees. That figure has subsequently declined sharply, standing at only 22.4 percent in 2005.⁸ Further, although award coverage remains high and in the late 1990s was still estimated to have been in excess of 80 percent of the civilian workforce (see Joint Governments' Submission 2000, Table 5.12), by 2004 it was estimated that only 20 percent of the workforce were reliant on award minima for their wages.

A major difference that remains involves minimum wages, which are currently \$5.15 per hour in the U.S. for up to a 40 hour week, and A\$12.75 per hour for a 38 hour week in Australia. More telling, according to a study by the U.K. Low Pay Commission (2005), as of mid-2004, the

⁶ Sources: Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), *Divorces, Australia, 2004* (ABS cat. no. 3307.0.55.001), Table 10; and National Center for Health Statistics, "Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths: Provisional Data for 2004," *National Vital Statistics Reports*, vol. 53, no. 21, June 28, 2005, Table A (updated February 15, 2006).

⁷ See Drago, Scutella and Pirretti (forthcoming) for further discussion.

⁸ Data on trade union membership are regularly compiled by the Australian Bureau of Statistics and reported on in ABS, *Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership* (ABS cat. no. 6310.0).

national minimum as a percentage of median wages for adult wage earners was 58.8 percent in Australia, but only 32.2 percent in the U.S. As with family supports, a higher hourly wage at the bottom end of the economy should reduce the relative incidence of reported underwork among low-wage/short-hours employees in Australia. For Australian employers, higher hourly costs for such employees provide them with an incentive to work salaried employees even longer hours, increasing the incidence of overwork.

Supporting these dynamics, Australia passed strong equal pay legislation in the early 1970s (Gregory and Duncan 1981). Partly as a result, the part-time hourly wage penalty found in studies of the U.S. labor market is non-existent in Australian studies (see Booth and Wood 2004; Rogers 2004). As with the higher hourly minimum wage for low-wage employees, these differences in part-time wages should be associated with a reduced incidence of underwork among short hours employees and an elevated level of overwork among long hours employees in Australia.

Similarly, health insurance is mainly funded through employer contributions in the U.S., whereas a national tax-payer funded system exists in Australia, effectively raising the fixed costs of full-time employment in the U.S. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act permits employers to discriminate against part-time employees in the provision of health insurance (Kelly 2006), hence the fixed costs of full-time employees are typically higher than for part-time employees in the U.S. American employers therefore have a stronger incentive to work full-time employees longer hours, and to prevent part-time employees from achieving full-time status, thereby increasing the time divide. Accentuating this dynamic, pension benefits are typically tied to employment in the U.S. and often provided only to full-time employees, while pro-rated and portable pension payments are typically provided to part-time employees in Australia.⁹

In addition to the fixed costs explanation for higher levels of overwork in the U.S., there is also a supply-side possibility. Hamermesh and Slemrod (2005) suggest that progressive tax rates may serve to reduce the incidence of long hours. Given that taxes are more progressive in Australia, employees may have a lesser incentive there to engage in overwork.

One other notable difference is worth discussing: the Australian distinction between ‘casual’ and ‘permanent’ employees. Historically, casual employment was specified in awards to provide employment-at-will for employers of certain types of labor. Permanent employees, on the other hand, enjoyed relative job security. Partly as a result, in an international comparison of job protections for regular employees (which presumably excludes casuals), Australia achieved a much higher rating of 1.5 relative to 0.2 for the U.S.¹⁰ Regardless of the casual distinction, this comparison suggests that dismissal is typically far more costly in Australia, and that employment-at-will is more typical in the U.S.

Casual employment is particularly relevant to any time divide discussion because there is substantial overlap between part-time and casual employment, with an estimated 65 percent of casual employees working part-time hours.¹¹ To the extent employers have an incentive to hire

⁹ Note that Australia has had a national state funded age pension since 1909 and more recently has introduced privately funded schemes for retirement, known as superannuation. Superannuation schemes require employer contributions and thus are included in our more general discussion on the cost of pensions to employers.

¹⁰ Source: OECD, *Employment Outlook 2004*, p. 117. Note that protections against collective dismissals in unionized settings were found to be about the same in the U.S. and Australia. Given the low level of union coverage in the U.S., that similarity strikes us as less important than the difference for all regular employees.

¹¹ Source: ABS, *Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership, August 2005* (ABS cat. no. 6310.0). Part-time employment is defined by the ABS as including any person who usually works less than 35 hours a week (in all jobs) and either did so during the survey reference week or was not at work in the reference week.

casual employees in order to be able to either motivate employees with threats of dismissal or to change employment in response to product market volatility, they might have an incentive to generate more short-hours jobs – and hence underwork – than is true in the U.S. At the top end of the hours distribution, however, greater difficulties in releasing Australian permanent employees may provide them with greater bargaining power to achieve desired hours arrangements, thereby reducing the incidence of overwork.

A final consideration regards the ideal worker norm. To the extent the norm is operative for professional and managerial employees we would expect the incidence of overwork to be higher; given the punishment for non-ideal worker performance is short hours in dead-end jobs, we would also expect a higher incidence of underwork among that group. However, to the extent the norm is effective, we would expect a far higher incidence of overwork as compared to underwork among professionals and managers. Further, the ideal worker literature is U.S. based (e.g., Bailyn 1993; Williams 1999), suggesting that the norm might be stronger in that nation.

Hypotheses

Many of the factors discussed above will exert contradictory tendencies regarding the time divide, and the effects of some factors (such as dismissal costs) are not entirely clear-cut. Nonetheless, our overall reading of the evidence suggests the following six hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: The time divide will be more severe among U.S. employees relative to their Australian counterparts.

It is important to recognize that this result could hold even if the distribution of hours is similar within each economy. Specifically, the Australian setting permits many individuals – but particularly mothers – to achieve a reasonable standard of living while working short hours, while the greater incidence of breadwinner fathers might be associated with a desire for long hours among many of these individuals. Therefore, it might be the case that hours are distributed similarly but with a greater reported incidence of underwork and overwork in the U.S.

We consider various explanations for hypothesis 1. Specifically, each of the hypotheses that follows could help to explain a more substantial time divide in the U.S. Taking gender into account, it seems likely that:

Hypothesis 2: Women, and particularly mothers (whether single or in dual-earner couples), working short hours will be more likely to report underwork in the U.S. relative to Australia.

We expect lower levels of underwork among Australian women because of both the higher level of financial supports from government for nonemployed and part-time employed mothers in Australia, and the greater stability of marriages in Australia, which will reduce the perceived need among many married women to achieve the (full-time) hours associated with financial independence. Looked at from the U.S. point of view, many married women in that nation may work part-time in order to make time for unpaid family work but nonetheless be concerned about their earnings in the event of a divorce and therefore state a preference for longer hours.

For related reasons, we conjecture that:

Hypothesis 3: Men and fathers will more often report overwork in the U.S. relative to Australia.

The grounds for this hypothesis are less firm than for hypothesis 2. The greater incidence of traditional and neotraditional families places a greater level of responsibility on men and fathers to be breadwinners, driving overwork among men in Australia. However, the ability of employers to demand long hours is compromised in part by higher dismissal costs, by greater family stability, and by more substantial governmental supports for the spouses of male, long-hours employees. All in all, hypothesis 3 seems reasonable.

Hypothesis 4: Professionals and managers will more often report overwork in both nations, with a stronger effect in the U.S.

The possibility that overwork among professionals and managers is driven in part by the ideal worker norm, in conjunction with the possibility that the norm is stronger in the U.S., suggests this hypothesis. However, it is important to note that, to date, there is little solid evidence regarding the extent of the norm in either country.

We also conjecture that:

Hypothesis 5: Union membership will be associated with less overwork and underwork in both countries; higher rates of membership in Australia may explain a less severe time divide there.

The reason for this supposition is that both U.S. and Australian unions have historically sought and often achieved work hours reductions for full-time workers in tandem with maintenance of pay. To the extent these efforts have been successful, union members should achieve reasonable hours. We do not predict whether union effects *per se* will be stronger in the U.S. or Australia. On the one hand, Australian trade unions have historically been stronger relative to their U.S. counterparts, at least at the national level. On the other hand, unions in the U.S. have historically had a stronger shopfloor presence, and hence may be better positioned to gain and enforce work hours reductions. Nonetheless, even if the absolute effects of unions were slightly smaller in Australia, the higher proportion of union members there could explain a less severe time divide in Australia.

Hovering behind much of the discussion above is the question of the role of the neotraditional family in each nation. Becker's theoretical arguments suggest that neotraditional families may result in levels of gender inequality in paid work hours that are both voluntary and optimal. Further, if neotraditional families are more pervasive in Australia, it might be that Australians have simply been better at figuring out the advantages of neotraditional arrangements and putting them in place. If this is true, then we may have an alternative explanation for evidence supporting hypotheses 1 through 3, and need to exercise caution in interpreting the results.

It also follows, however, that if these arrangements are voluntary, then men in neotraditional families should less often report overwork relative to other men, and women in these families should less often report underwork relative to other women working part-time. That is, long hours for men and short hours for women in these families allow each to develop specialized skills and are hence rational responses to various opportunities in the labor market and the home. This logic suggests:

Hypothesis 6: Men in neotraditional families will less often report overwork relative to other men, and women in these families will report underwork less often than other women.

Although we know that neotraditional families are far more common in Australia, it is not obvious that the effects of these arrangements on underwork or overwork should diverge across the two countries. We therefore make no predictions regarding the relative strength of any effects.

Data

The two data sets employed in this analysis are the National Study of the Changing Workforce (NSCW) for the United States, and the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey for Australia. Data from the 2002 administration of the surveys are used here.

The 2002 NSCW was conducted by Louis Harris and Associates using a stratified random probability sample of telephone numbers generated by random-digit-dial methods.¹² The method was designed to obtain a random sample (after weighting) of the population within the 48 contiguous states of individuals employed for monetary gain, at least 18 years of age, and limited to the civilian labor force. Households were contacted with a maximum of one individual per household surveyed. Interviews were completed with 3,504 households out of 3,578 determined to be in-scope, implying a cooperation rate of 98 percent. However, it was estimated that around half of the 6,035 households where eligibility could not be ascertained may have in fact been eligible, meaning that the true response rate was much lower. The sample used here was limited to individuals who answered the usual and preferred hours questions, and were employed as wage and salary workers (the relevance of time divide analyses to the self-employed is not obvious). For comparability, multiple job holders were excluded as well,¹³ as were 52 individuals with inconsistent responses (described below), resulting in a working sample of 2349 respondents. All estimates are weighted to mimic the population distribution of wage and salary employees.

The Australian data come from the second wave of the HILDA survey. Described in more detail in Watson and Wooden (2002), the HILDA Survey is a longitudinal household panel survey. It began in 2001 with a large national probability sample of households and, unlike the NSCW, involved personal interviews with all household members aged 15 years and over. In wave one, interviews were obtained at 7682 households, which represented 66 per cent of all households identified as in-scope. This, in turn, generated a sample of 15,127 persons eligible for interview, 13,969 of whom were successfully interviewed. In 2002 all responding

¹² The 2002 NSCW survey administration is described in “National Study of the Changing Workforce, Guide to Public Use Files,” May 2004, a file provided with the “2002, 1997 and 1992 National Study of the Changing Workforce, Public-Use Files Version 1.0,” New York: Families and Work Institute, 2004.

¹³ If multiple job holders are included, then total working time for the NSCW sample is calculated as the sum of responses to three questions: a) paid hours on the main job, excluding unpaid extra time or official overtime; b) unpaid extra time and official overtime on the main job; and c) all time on any other job or jobs. In the HILDA Survey, a single total hours question covers all jobs. Comparability is enhanced by limiting the samples to holders of a single job, thereby reducing the number of relevant NSCW questions from three to a maximum of two. About 14.3 percent of the NSCW sample, or 408 respondents, were excluded as multiple job holders. Around 8.9 percent of the HILDA sample, or 553 respondents, were similarly excluded as multiple job holders. Note, however, that preferred work hours might refer to a desire to hold multiple jobs regardless of this exclusion.

households from wave one were re-contacted.¹⁴ Interviews were again sought with all household members aged 15 years or over, including persons who did not respond in wave one, as well as any new household members. In total, interviews for wave two were completed with 13,041 persons from 7,245 households. Of this group, almost 12,000 were respondents from wave one, which represented almost 87 per cent of the wave one individual sample. From the initial sample of 11,639 eligible households, the 7,245 responding households in wave two represents an approximate cooperation rate of 62 percent.

For present purposes, the HILDA sample is limited to civilian employees who were at least 18 years of age and held a single job, resulting in a working sample of 5480 respondents. All estimates are weighted by the individual person weight for wave two to mimic the population distribution.

Both surveys ask about usual weekly hours in all jobs and preferred work hours. All values at or above 99 hours per week were set to missing for the analysis, and the precise wording of questions is provided in an Appendix.

In the HILDA Survey, following a series of questions on employment status, respondents who were employed during the previous four weeks were asked about their average hours per week over that four week period, including any paid and unpaid overtime, on all jobs, and taking account of work in both the workplace and the home. The mean response was 37.7 hours with a standard deviation of 13.7 hours, implying that around 90 percent of relevant respondents reported between 24.0 and 51.4 hours per week.

Following a question on reasons for part-time employment (for those reporting less than 35 hours per week), HILDA respondents were asked whether, taking into account how that would affect your income, they would prefer to work fewer, about the same, or more hours than now. Those responding fewer or more were then asked how many hours they would choose to work, again accounting for how that would affect income. Setting responses of “about the same” at the value of usual hours and combining this with responses on the hours of work respondents would choose, results in a preferred hours variable with a mean of 36.1 hours and a standard deviation of 12.3, placing approximately 90 percent of respondents between 23.8 and 48.4 preferred hours of work. Subtracting usual from preferred hours results in a time divide variable with a mean of -1.5 and a standard deviation of 9.1 hours for the Australian sample.

In the NSCW, following the employment status questions, respondents were asked first about paid work hours on their main job, followed by a question regarding unpaid work hours for the main job, performed at any location. As a check, respondents were asked whether the sum of the two sounded correct, and if the total seemed incorrect to the respondent the original hours questions were asked again. The results of the two questions were summed to provide a usual weekly hours figure. The mean response was 43.0 hours, with a standard deviation of 12.0, placing most respondents between reports of 31 and 55 hours per week.

These questions were followed by one addressing ideal work hours per week at all jobs. The mean response to this question was 35.0 hours, with a standard deviation of 14.3, placing the 90 percentile range between 20.7 and 49.3 preferred hours per week. Subtracting usual from preferred hours yields a U.S. time divide variable with a mean of -8.0 and a standard deviation of 16.3 hours.

Note that the preferred hours questions provide similar means, even with the caveat in the Australian survey asking respondents to account for relevant changes in income. However, the NSCW inconsistency exclusion mentioned earlier is relevant, as we excluded 52 respondents

¹⁴ The actual interview period runs from late August to the following March each year.

who: a) claimed to prefer fewer hours; b) responded to a follow-up question regarding whether a reduction would alter their income with the answer ‘no’; and c) were employed on an hourly basis.¹⁵ The fact that relevant income changes were mentioned in the initial HILDA question on preferred hours might, nonetheless, help to explain why the range is smaller for the Australian preferred hours variable; Australian respondents may have been more conservative in stating preferences for changes in hours. In addition, the range may be smaller because over half of HILDA respondents claimed that usual and preferred hours were “about the same”, thereby restricting preferred hours to the value of usual hours.

For usual hours, the reported difference between the two samples – 37.7 for Australia compared to 43 for the U.S. – seems overly large. Figures from the International Labour Office for 2001 place average Australian work hours at 35.2, with a U.S. figure of 34.2 (ILO 2003, Table 4A), suggesting the Australian figures are more reliable. This conjecture is supported by the fact that the U.S. figures in the NSCW are added from two questions, while the HILDA estimates are from a single question; asking about multiple forms of working time may serve to inflate the estimate of overall working time. Therefore, we take the usual hours figures for the U.S. as likely somewhat overstated in interpreting our results.

Methods

For hypothesis testing, we first need comparable estimates of the time divide. Such estimates, as found in Drago (2000) or Drago, Tseng and Wooden (2005), are based on ordinary least squares regressions of the time divide (TimeDivide) variable – the difference between preferred (PreferredHours) and usual work hours (UsualHours) – against a constant term and usual work hours, as in equation (1) below. If the estimated intercept (α) is positive and the slope coefficient (β) is negative, and they together generate a zero point ($-\alpha/\beta$) in an intermediate range of hours such that underwork characterizes short hours and overwork long hours, then we would have evidence of a time divide. The strength of the time divide can then be roughly gauged by the absolute value of the slope coefficient along with the value of the adjusted R^2 of the equation.

$$\text{TimeDivide} = \alpha + \beta\text{UsualHours} + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

To test hypothesis 1, we need to know whether the intercept is larger and the slope coefficient absolutely larger in the U.S. Subscripting variables with ‘US’ for NSCW respondents, one test involves combining the two data sets and estimating:

$$\text{TimeDivide} = \alpha + \alpha_{us} + \beta\text{UsualHours} + \beta_{us}\text{UsualHours}_{us} + \varepsilon \quad (2)$$

If the coefficient α_{us} is significant and positive and the coefficient β_{us} is significant and negative, then hypothesis 1 will be supported. A more elegant test of hypothesis 1 involves estimating equation (1) for the combined sample and then separately for the NSCW and HILDA subsamples, and applying a Chow test to determine whether separate estimation provides a significant increase in the explanatory power of the regression. Both types of tests are applied here.

¹⁵ We did not exclude salaried employees who believed that an hours reduction would not alter their income, as might well be the case. For hourly employees, hours reductions should translate directly into income reductions.

To disentangle underwork and overwork, we divide responses on the time divide variable into the three categories of underwork, matching, and overwork. Because so many HILDA respondents claimed that usual and preferred hours were about the same (thereby making the value of the time divide variable zero), we make the data more comparable by categorizing any preferred and usual responses at or within five hours of each other as a match. Using a cut-off of zero hours differences found 56.3 percent of HILDA respondents and 22.7 percent of NSCW respondents reporting a match, while the five hours cut-off raised the HILDA figure to 64.2 percent but the NSCW figure to 35.9 percent (the latter figures are over five percent closer to each other). A check for whether the results are robust involves re-estimation using the zero hours cut-off.

Multinomial logit regression is applied to ascertain the effects of various independent variables on the probability of falling into either the underwork or overwork categories, with the matching category being omitted. These regressions can either be performed across the combined sample with interaction terms for one country or, if a Chow test supports the separation of the samples (as it does), separate regressions can be run for the country subsamples. The interpretation of coefficients is more straightforward in the latter approach and hence results from the separate regressions are reported here.

To test hypothesis 2, we first need to identify women working part-time. This group is divided into non-mother women employed part-time (NonMomWomenPT), and part-time employed women who are either single mothers (SingleMomPT) or married mothers (MarriedMomPT). These three variables need to be included in the logits, and their coefficients in the underwork category should be both positive and larger in the NSCW regression as compared to the HILDA regression, according to hypothesis 2.

For hypothesis 3, variables for both Men and Fathers are required. For the overwork category, the coefficients on these two variables should be positive and larger for the NSCW sample if hypothesis 3 is supported.

Tests for hypotheses 4 and 5 are very similar. Variables for professional and managerial occupations (ProfManager) and for union membership (Union) need to be included. We expect the ProfManager coefficient to be positive for the overwork category and larger for NSCW respondents if hypothesis 4 is correct. Support for hypothesis 5 would be found if the Union coefficient were negative and significant across both samples and for both the overwork and underwork categories. Note that, given these variables, the constant term will effectively pick up the omitted group of full-time employed women who are neither union members nor hold managerial or professional jobs.¹⁶

To test hypothesis 6, we need to add variables for men in neotraditional families (NeotradMen) and for women in these families (NeotradWomen) to the regressions just described. The cut-offs for membership in a neotraditional family are necessarily somewhat arbitrary, and we consider two of these: couple families wherein the man reports usual hours at least five hours above those for the woman, and the subsample of those families wherein the man reports at least 10 more hours. According to either cut-off, hypothesis 6 implies the coefficient for neotraditional men should be negative for the overwork category while, in the underwork category, the coefficient for women in neotraditional families should also be negative. However,

¹⁶ This group is not so small as to add noise to our estimates. Full-time employed women comprise 23.8 percent of the NSCW and 27.6 percent of the HILDA sample. The subsample of such women who are also neither union members nor managers or professionals still accounts for 11.5 percent of the entire NSCW and 18.8 percent of the entire HILDA sample.

given that neotraditional families are correlated with marriage, children, and part-time employment for women, we exclude from these regressions all part-time or family variables excepting the gender variable (Men) to ascertain the net effects of neotraditional arrangements. In this case, the reference group for the constant term is all employed women who are neither in neotraditional arrangements, union members, nor in managerial or professional occupations.¹⁷

Means, standard deviations, and sample sizes for the variables are reported in Table 1. As expected, we see negative means for the time divide variable (i.e., preferred is below usual hours), and an absolutely larger mean for the NSCW sample. We also see far higher rates of part-time employment among women in the HILDA, whether considering NonMomWomenPT, SingleMomPT or MarriedMomPT. As also expected, given women's lower rates of labor force participation in Australia, the proportion of men is higher in the HILDA sample, there are almost twice the proportion of union members in the HILDA, and there are far more members of neotraditional families in the HILDA (according to either the five or 10 hours cut-off).

Results

Results for four estimates of the time divide are reported in Table 2. In each regression, the constant is positive and significant while the usual hours coefficients are negative and significant, consistent with the time divide logic. For the first estimation of equation (1) for the combined sample, the estimated zero point where preferred and usual hours match is at 31.6 hours per week ($-\alpha/\text{UsualHours}$ coefficient). The addition of terms for the U.S. (on the right) increases the adjusted R^2 by around six percentage points in the estimation of equation (2). Further, the U.S. variables are significant and thus suggest a stronger time divide in the U.S., as predicted.

A Chow test comparing residuals for equation (1) over the combined as opposed to separate regressions (shown at the bottom of the table) yields an F-statistic of 319.3 (2, 7706 d.f.), which is significant at the .01 level, supporting the separate treatment of the Australian and U.S. subsamples. Also consistent with hypothesis 1, the results of the separate estimates support the interpretation of a more severe time divide in the U.S. The constant terms imply that individuals working zero hours would prefer to work over 20 hours in the U.S. but just 11 hours in Australia. At the other end of the spectrum, an individual working 50 hours per week would report 13 hours of overwork in the U.S., but only 5.5 hours of overwork in Australia. Further, the adjusted R^2 is three percentage points higher for the NSCW, suggesting the equation explains a greater percentage of the variance in the time divide variable for the U.S. as opposed to Australia.

As mentioned earlier, however, it is possible that the NSCW overstates working time, and hence overwork, relative to the HILDA. Although hypothesis 1 is supported in these data, it is worth recalling that more comparable data might produce different results.

To test hypotheses 2 through 5, we first ran the multinomial logistic regression for the categories of underwork and overwork (with the matching category being omitted) over the combined sample, using relevant variables for hypothesis 2 (NonMomWomenPT, SingleMomPT, and MarriedMomPT), hypothesis 3 (Men and Fathers), hypothesis 4 (ProfManager) and hypothesis 5 (Union). We then re-ran the regression after adding a full set of interaction terms for NSCW respondents and calculated a chi-squared statistic for any additional explanatory power. The resulting statistic was 167.8, which is significant at conventional levels

¹⁷ Using the five-hours cut-off for neotraditional families, the reference groups comprise 16.9 percent of the NSCW and 20.0 percent of the HILDA sample, proportions that rise if the 10-hours cut-off is employed.

(16 d.f.).¹⁸ The test therefore supports separate estimation for the NSCW and HILDA subsamples, as shown in Table 3.

Consistent with hypothesis 1, even after expanding the matching category to include respondents reporting differences in usual and preferred hours of up to and including five hours per week, the percentage of underworked individuals is still slightly higher in the NSCW (14.6 percent compared to 12.7 percent). However, reported overwork is still over twice as prevalent in the U.S. (49.5 percent compared to 23.1 percent).

For hypothesis 2, the coefficients in the underwork category on NonMomWomenPT should be positive but smaller for the HILDA subsample. While both are positive, the coefficient is over twice as large for the Australian respondents. Turning to mothers, we have the same expectations, and here indeed encounter larger, positive coefficients in the NSCW sample for both SingleMomPT and MarriedMomPT. These results fit the part of Hypothesis 2 based on our claim that greater supports are available to employed mothers in Australia; these supports may help to mitigate the need for longer hours in order to achieve some minimal standard of living. Nonetheless, the women employed part-time who are not mothers seem *more* susceptible to underwork in Australia, and that group accounts for almost 10 percent of the HILDA sample.

For hypothesis 3, we need to compare the coefficients on men and fathers in terms of the overwork category. In both regressions, men are significantly less likely to report overwork, although it should be noted that the omitted or reference group (picked up in the constant term) is comprised of women working full-time, who are neither in managerial or professional positions, and are not union members. This result, and the close proximity of the NSCW and HILDA coefficients, does not support the hypothesis. The coefficients for Fathers, on the other hand, are both positive and significant as predicted, but neither coefficient is as large in absolute terms as the coefficients for Men, and the HILDA coefficient is larger, also contrary to predictions.

To test hypothesis 4, we compare coefficients in the overwork category for professionals and managers. For both the NSCW and HILDA data, the coefficients are positive and significant as predicted: ideal workers more often exhibit overwork than other types of employees. Nonetheless, the HILDA coefficient is over twice as large, contrary to the hypothesis.

For hypothesis 5, we need to check the coefficients on Union across both categories and both subsamples. For underwork, the Union coefficient is negative and significant in both the NSCW and HILDA subsamples, as predicted: union membership is associated with a lower incidence of underwork. The NSCW coefficient is almost three times as large, however, suggesting that we not look here to explain the apparently more severe time divide in the U.S.¹⁹ For overwork, both coefficients are insignificant.

Considering the constant terms for the reference group of full-time employed women who are not managerial or professional employees, nor union members, the coefficients suggest these employees are less likely to encounter either underwork or overwork in Australia.

To test whether these results are robust, the regressions were replicated after replacing the categories with those where a match is held to exist only if usual and preferred hours are equal. The results, shown in Appendix Table 1, are very similar to those reported in Table 3, except that the positive Union coefficient in the overwork category for the NSCW achieves significance.

¹⁸ Results available from the authors on request.

¹⁹ Specifically, although union membership figures are almost twice as high in the HILDA sample, the fact that the underwork coefficient for the NSCW is over three times as large implies that the net effect cannot help to explain the more severe time divide in the U.S.

Turning to hypothesis 6, the regressions reported in Table 3 were replicated after adding variables for neotraditional women and men, and excluding variables for women employed part-time and for fathers. Neotraditional arrangements should reduce perceptions of underwork for women and reduce reports of overwork among men. The results can be found in Table 4, where we classify couple families as neotraditional if the man reports usual hours of at least five per week more than the woman. The neotraditional coefficient for women in the underwork categories is, contrary to predictions, positive, but is not significant. For overwork and men, the coefficients are again contrary to predictions. Indeed, they are positive and significant across both the NSCW and HILDA subsamples. Contrary to predictions, these results suggest that neotraditional arrangements are associated with no net reduction in perceived underwork among women, and higher levels of overwork for men. The arrangements might be optimal, as Becker suggests, but these results suggest they are not voluntary. A repetition of this analysis after reclassifying neotraditional families as those where the man works at least 10 hours more per week than the woman (see Appendix Table 2) leaves the overwork result in place for men, and the positive coefficient for underwork and women in the NSCW data rises to significance, again contrary to predictions.

Finally, note that the reference group here, of employed women outside of neotraditional families, and who are not employed in managerial or professional jobs nor are union members, less often exhibits underwork or overwork in the HILDA data (and this is true when either the five hours or 10 hours cut-off for neotraditional families is employed).

Discussion

The evidence presented here is consistent with the existence of a time divide in both the U.S. and Australia wherein a shortage of medium-hours jobs is associated with a high incidence of underwork among short-hours employees, and a marked prevalence of overwork among long-hours employees. Further, and as predicted, the time divide is more severe in the U.S. Although divergence across the relevant survey instruments might help to explain the stronger time divide results for the U.S., it seems reasonable to believe that a milder version of the same result would likely appear even if completely comparable data were employed.

Regarding specific hypotheses that could explain the more severe time divide in the U.S., these mainly received little support. Consistent with our claim that institutional supports for mothers are stronger in Australia, we found that motherhood was associated with a reduction in perceived underwork among Australian women working part-time. By way of contrast, motherhood in the U.S. was related to a higher incidence of perceived underwork. These results help to explain the more severe time divide in the U.S. Nonetheless, the prediction that non-mother women working part-time in Australia would experience less underwork than their U.S. counterparts was not supported. These Australian women were more likely to report underwork when employed part-time.

For men and fathers, we hypothesized that they would be more likely to report overwork in the U.S. This specific hypothesis received no support.

We also hypothesized that managers and professionals would more often experience overwork in the U.S. Although managers and professionals in both countries were more likely to report overwork, the results suggest this effect is stronger in Australia. Again, the results cannot help to explain the stronger time divide findings in the U.S.

We hypothesized that unions would reduce perceived underwork and overwork in both nations. If the effects were as predicted, and the effect sizes similar or larger in Australia, then

the higher rates of union membership there could help to explain overarching differences in overwork and underwork. The results are consistent with union members exhibiting low levels of underwork, but the effect was markedly stronger in the U.S., so again cannot explain the fundamental time divide findings.

Finally, we analyzed the role of neotraditional families wherein both members of a couple are employed, but the man works more hours for pay than does the woman. Following Becker's (1985) logic, we posited that neotraditional arrangements should mitigate perceived underwork among employed women, and reduce reports of overwork among men. The findings suggest neotraditional arrangements do not reduce underwork among women and may *increase* overwork among men, and these findings held across both the U.S. and Australian samples. It may be that couples often enter into neotraditional arrangements not so much out of choice, but instead because relatively few medium-hours jobs exist, or because of a lack of affordable, quality child care.

In sum, we found a more severe time divide in the U.S., as expected, but, with one exception, the subsidiary results cannot explain that finding. The one explanation that helps is based on greater governmental supports for mothers in Australia, who tend to work part-time in large numbers but are not as likely as their U.S. counterparts to report underwork. Fairly obviously, other factors are at work in creating the time divide.

There are at least three possible explanations for these results. First, differences in the wording of the usual and preferred hours questions across the two surveys might explain the apparent divergence in the time divide. Indeed, it is possible (though unlikely) that the time divide is stronger in Australia.

Second, there might be cultural differences in the way the question on preferred hours was answered. For example, Australian respondents may be more accepting of existing arrangements, or respond to the preferred hours questions while viewing family and work arrangements as more heavily constrained, compared to U.S. respondents.

Third, it may be that objective differences we have not captured here are responsible for the findings. For example, our data cannot inform us as to whether progressive tax rates serve to reduce the incidence of long hours in Australia. Somewhat differently, we did not focus here much on demand-side issues, and it might be that employers are in a stronger position to create and fill jobs which create underwork and overwork in the U.S. The relative ease of dismissing employees in the U.S. fits this finding. Our results, however, suggest that even if the latter explanation is generally correct, it may nonetheless be the case that many women in Australia are limited to part-time jobs; although mothers may find these jobs satisfactory, many non-mother women may be forced into these jobs even though they would prefer full-time work.

With regard to analyses of other nations, the results reported here, and particularly our interpretations of the results, suggest that the finding would likely not generalize to samples from other countries. Our hypotheses, and interpretations, were highly dependent upon knowledge of institutional differences across Australia and the U.S. Analyses for other nations should similarly focus on such details.

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Appendix: Usual and Preferred Hours Questions

2002 NSCW Questions

Usual Hours: “How many hours a week in total do you usually work at your (job/main job)? Please include all hours worked at all locations.” And, for multiple job holders, “On average, about how many PAID AND UNPAID hours per week in total do you work at your other [job/jobs] in addition to the hours per week you spend on your main job?”

Preferred Hours: “If you could do what you wanted to do, IDEALLY how many hours in total would you like to work each week [at all jobs]?”

2002 HILDA Questions

Usual Hours: “Including any paid or unpaid overtime, how many hours per week do you work *on average* over a usual 4-week period in *all* your jobs? [This includes any work done at the workplace and at home]”

Preferred Hours: “If you could choose the number of hours you work each week, *and taking into account how that would affect your income*, would you prefer to work... fewer hours than you do now? about the same hours as you do now? or more hours than you do now? Don’t know ”

Respondents answering fewer or more hours are asked, “In total, how many hours a week, on average, would you choose to work? Again, take into account how that would affect your income. This includes any work done at the workplace and at home.”

Table 1: Sample Means (and Standard Deviations), NSCW and HILDA

<i>Variable</i>	<i>NSCW</i>	<i>HILDA</i>	<i>Combined sample</i>
UsualHours	43.01 (11.98)	37.65 (13.72)	39.25 (13.45)
PreferredHours	34.97 (14.35)	36.11 (12.28)	35.78 (12.92)
TimeDivide	-8.01 (16.33)	-1.50 (9.14)	-3.42 (12.10)
NonMomWomenPT	.072 (.259)	.097 (.296)	.090 (.286)
SingleMomPT	.012 (.110)	.022 (.148)	.019 (.138)
MarriedMomPT	.040 (.197)	.095 (.293)	.079 (.269)
Men	.508 (.500)	.542 (.498)	.532 (.499)
Fathers	.222 (.416)	.222 (.416)	.222 (.415)
ProfManager	.317 (.465)	.286 (.452)	.295 (.456)
Union	.170 (.376)	.303 (.460)	.264 (.441)
Neotraditional family (man at least five more hours)	.550 (.497)	.655 (.475)	.629 (.483)
Sample size	2304	5480	7784

Table 2: Time Divide Estimates

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Equation (1): coefficient (s.e.)</i>	<i>Equation (2): coefficient (s.e.)</i>
α	14.09 (.370)**	10.82 (.401)**
UsualHours	-.446 (.009)**	-.327 (.010)**
α_{us}		11.84 (.887)**
UsualHours _{us}		-.386 (.020)**
Adjusted R ²	.246	.303
F-statistic	2510.17**	1118.74**
Sample size	7710	7710
	<i>Equation (1), NSCW subsample: coefficient (s.e.)</i>	<i>Equation (1), HILDA subsample: coefficient (s.e.)</i>
α	22.65 (1.091)**	10.818 (.316)**
UsualHours	-.713 (.024)**	-.327 (.008)**
Adjusted R ²	.271	.241
F-statistic	851.40**	1724.09**
Sample size	2284	5425

Notes: ** Statistically significant at the .01 level. Weighted to approximate the relevant population distributions.

Table 3: Underwork and Overwork Estimates – Multinomial Logits for the NSCW and HILDA Samples (Five Hours Difference Cut-off)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>NSCW subsample:</i>	<i>HILDA subsample:</i>
	<i>Coefficient (s.e.)</i>	<i>Coefficient (s.e.)</i>
	<i>Underwork</i>	<i>Underwork</i>
Constant	-1.454 (.174)**	-2.931 (.181)**
NonMomWomenPT	.986 (.249)**	2.300 (.204)**
SingleMomPT	3.655 (.624)**	2.661 (.259)**
MarriedMomPT	2.050 (.302)**	1.800 (.213)**
Men	1.171 (.206)**	1.724 (.192)**
Fathers	-.164 (.184)	-.462 (.126)**
ProfManager	-1.542 (.215)**	-.722 (.120)**
Union	-1.464 (.274)**	-.465 (.104)**
Observations (%) in category	334 (14.6%)	694 (12.7%)
	<i>Overwork</i>	<i>Overwork</i>
Constant	.495 (.087)**	-.861 (.070)**
NonMomWomenPT	-2.082 (.255)**	-2.082 (.223)**
SingleMomPT	-.343 (.223)	-2.845 (.674)**
MarriedMomPT	-1.257 (.285)**	-1.379 (.159)**
Men	-.380 (.114)**	-.479 (.086)**
Fathers	.164 (.131)	.378 (.089)**
ProfManager	.272 (.100)**	.717 (.070)**
Union	.190 (.122)	-.020 (.073)
Observations (%) in category	1132 (49.5%)	1258 (23.1%)
Observations in regression	2289	5446
Pseudo-R ²	.178	.141

Notes: * Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at the .01 level. Weighted to approximate the population distributions. Omitted category is preferred and usual hours at or within five hours.

Table 4: Underwork and Overwork Estimates for Neotraditional Families – Multinomial Logits for the NSCW and HILDA Samples (Five Hours Difference Cut-off)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>NSCW subsample:</i>	<i>HILDA subsample:</i>
	<i>Coefficient (s.e.)</i>	<i>Coefficient (s.e.)</i>
	<i>Underwork</i>	<i>Underwork</i>
Constant	-.722 (.126)**	-1.330 (.080)**
NeoTradWomen	.304 (.207)	.001 (.127)
Men	.499 (.156)**	.231 (.103)*
NeoTradMen	-1.302 (.330)**	-.704 (.126)**
ProfManager	-1.535 (.209)**	-.762 (.119)**
Union	-1.329 (.267)**	-.486 (.103)**
Observations (%) in category	334 (14.6%)	694 (12.7%)
	<i>Overwork</i>	<i>Overwork</i>
Constant	.260 (.087)**	-1.259 (.069)**
NeoTradWomen	-.387 (.145)**	-.443 (.113)**
Men	-.317 (.109)**	-.313 (.093)**
NeoTradMen	.772 (.152)**	.686 (.092)**
ProfManager	.350 (.098)**	.739 (.070)**
Union	.235 (.121)	.008 (.072)
Observations (%) in category	1132 (49.5%)	1258 (23.1%)
Observations in regression	2289	5446
Pseudo-R ²	.112	.070

Notes: * Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at the .01 level. Weighted to approximate the population distributions. Omitted category is preferred and usual hours at or within five hours.

Appendix Table 1: Underwork and Overwork Estimates – Multinomial Logits for the NSCW and HILDA (Zero Hours Difference Cut-off)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>NSCW subsample:</i>	<i>HILDA subsample:</i>
	<i>Coefficient (s.e.)</i>	<i>Coefficient (s.e.)</i>
	<i>Underwork</i>	<i>Underwork</i>
Constant	-.472 (.149)**	-2.207 (.137)**
NonMomWomenPT	.800 (.228)**	1.910 (.164)**
SingleMomPT	2.586 (.612)**	2.033 (.231)**
MarriedMomPT	1.528 (.300)**	1.441 (.171)**
Men	.795 (.186)**	1.385 (.149)**
Fathers	.025 (.189)	-.615 (.119)**
ProfManager	-1.467 (.189)**	-.762 (.110)**
Union	-.982 (.231)**	-.393 (.094)**
Observations (%) in category	441 (19.3%)	869 (16.0%)
	<i>Overwork</i>	<i>Overwork</i>
Constant	1.077 (.100)**	-.615 (.068)**
NonMomWomenPT	-1.989 (.244)**	-1.557 (.174)**
SingleMomPT	-.930 (.726)	-2.026 (.427)**
MarriedMomPT	-1.201 (.290)**	-1.226 (.145)**
Men	-.359 (.130)**	-.363 (.082)**
Fathers	.325 (.151)*	.312 (.085)**
ProfManager	.201 (.113)	.640 (.068)**
Union	.334 (.143)*	.055 (.069)
Observations (%) in category	1327 (58.0%)	1508 (27.7%)
Observations in regression	2289	5446
Pseudo-R ²	.181	.139

Notes: * Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at the .01 level. Weighted to approximate the population distributions. Omitted category is preferred and usual hours identical.

Appendix Table 2: Underwork and Overwork Estimates, Neotraditional Families (man at least 10 more hours) – Multinomial Logits for the NSCW and HILDA (Five Hours Difference Cut-off)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>NSCW subsample: Coefficient (s.e.)</i>	<i>HILDA subsample: Coefficient (s.e.)</i>
	<i>Underwork</i>	<i>Underwork</i>
Constant	-.769 (.123)**	-1.361 (.078)**
NeoTradWomen	.532 (.216)*	.109 (.132)
Men	.525 (.151)**	.213 (.100)*
NeoTradMen	-1.550 (.417)**	-.644 (.131)**
ProfManager	-1.555 (.209)**	-.769 (.118)**
Union	-1.338 (.267)**	-.488 (.102)**
Observations (%) in category	334 (14.6%)	694 (12.7%)
	<i>Overwork</i>	<i>Overwork</i>
Constant	.232 (.084)**	-1.270 (.067)**
NeoTradWomen	-.399 (.159)*	-.509 (.123)**
Men	-.221 (.104)*	-.284 (.088)**
NeoTradMen	.694 (.168)**	.726 (.090)**
ProfManager	.358 (.098)**	.738 (.070)**
Union	.232 (.120)	.005 (.072)
Observations (%) in category	1132 (49.5%)	1258 (23.1%)
Observations in regression	2289	5446
Pseudo-R ²	.108	.071

Notes: * Statistically significant at the .05 level; ** at the .01 level. Weighted to approximate the population distributions. Omitted category is preferred and usual hours within five hours.